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SUMMARY
The aim of this thesis is the analysis of complex systems that appear in
different research fields such as evolution, optimization and game theory, i.e., we
focus on systems that describe the evolution of species, an algorithm which opti-
mizes a smooth function defined in a convex domain or even the behavior of rational
agents in potential games. The mathematical equations that describe the evolution
of such systems are continuous or discrete dynamical systems (in particular they can
be Markov chains). The challenging part in the analysis of these systems is that they
live in high dimensional spaces, i.e., they exhibit many degrees of freedom. Under-
standing their geometry is the main goal to analyze their long-term behavior, speed
of convergence/mixing time (if convergence can be shown) and to perform average-
case analysis. In particular, the stability of the equilibria (fixed points) of these
systems plays a crucial role in our attempt to characterize their structure. However,
the existence of many equilibria (even uncountably many) makes the analysis more
difficult. Using mathematical tools from dynamical systems theory, Markov chains,
game theory and non-convex optimization, we have a series of results:
As far as evolution is concerned, (i) we show that mathematical models of haploid
evolution imply the extinction of genetic diversity in the long term limit (for fixed
fitness matrices) resolving a conjecture in genetics and moreover, (ii) we show that in
case of diploid evolution the diversity usually persists, but it is NP-hard to predict
it. Finally, (iii) we extend the results of haploid evolution when the fitness matrix
changes per a Markov chain and we examine the role of mutation in the survival of
the population.
Furthermore, we focus on a wide class of Markov chains, inspired by evolution.
xiii
These Markov chains are guided by a dynamical system defined in the simplex. Our
key contribution is (iv) connecting the mixing time of these Markov chains and the
geometry of the dynamical systems that guide them.
Moreover, as far as game theory is concerned, (v) we propose a novel quantitative
framework for analyzing the efficiency of potential games with many equilibria. The
notion we use is not so pessimistic as price of anarchy and not so optimistic as price of
stability; it captures the expected long-term performance of a system. Informally, we
define the expected system performance as the weighted average of the social costs of
all equilibria where the weight of each equilibrium is proportional to the (Lebesgue)
measure of its region of attraction. Using replicator dynamics as our benchmark, we
provide bounds of this notion for several classes of potential games.
Last but not least, using similar techniques, (vi) we show that gradient descent
converges to local minima with probability one, for cost functions in several settings




The thesis aims at the analysis of complex systems motivated by interdisciplinary
areas such as Evolution, Game Theory and Optimization. Given a system, natural
questions people address are: does the system reach a steady/equilibrium state, and
if yes how fast, i.e., what is the speed of convergence; if there are multiple equilibria,
which is the “right” one; can the long term behavior of the system be predicted; what
can be said about its average performance; is the system robust under noise? Theo-
retical computer science community is particularly interested in all these questions.
We will try to answer them for a variety of complex systems. All these systems are
described mathematically by (discrete or continuous) dynamical systems. The branch
of mathematics that tries to understand their behavior is called dynamical system
theory and has its origins in Newtonian mechanics. The function (update rule) that
describes mathematically a dynamical system is an implicit relation that describes
the state of the system into the future (for a short amount of time). This relation can
be either a differential equation dx
dt
= f(x) (continuous time) or a difference equation
xt+1 = g(xt) (discrete time). A dynamical system may have simple behavior and be
easy to analyze (e.g., when f, g is linear, when the system is gradient or hamiltonian,
see Figure 2) or may have chaotic behavior (highly sensitive to initial conditions, see
Figure 1). In Section 1.1, we provide all definitions, techniques and theorems, as far
as dynamical systems are concerned, which are necessary for the rest of the thesis.
Later on, we describe the evolutionary dynamics we particularly focus on, some basic
definitions and tools for Markov chains and Game theory. The chapter ends with
some notation and the organization of this thesis.
1
Figure 1: Lorenz attractor.
1.1 Dynamical systems: overview
1.1.1 Definitions
Continuous time dynamical systems. Let f : S → Rn be continuously differ-
entiable with S ⊂ Rn, S an open set. An autonomous continuous (time) dynamical




Since f is continuously differentiable, the ordinary differential equation (1) along with
the initial condition x(0) = x0 ∈ S has a unique solution for t ∈ I(x0) (some time
interval) and we can represent it by φ(t,x0), called the flow of the system. This is a
generalization of Picard-Lindelőf theorem (see [110]). φt(x0) ··= φ(t,x0) corresponds
to a function of time which captures the trajectory of the system with x0 the given
starting point. The flow is continuously differentiable, its inverse exists (denoted by
φ−t(x0)) and is also continuously differentiable, i.e., the flow is a diffeomorphism in
the so-called maximal interval of existence I. It is also true that φt ◦ φs = φt+s for
t, s, t + s ∈ I and therefore φk = φk1 for k ∈ N (composition of φ1 k times as long
as 1, k ∈ I). p ∈ S is called an equilibrium if f(p) = 0. In that case, it holds that
φt(p) = p for all t ∈ I, i.e., p is a fixed point of the function φt(x) for all t ∈ I.
Finally, a fixed point p is called isolated if there is a neighborhood U around p and
p is the only fixed point in U .
2
Figure 2: Gradient system.
Remark 1. If f is globally Lipschitz1, then the flow is defined for all t ∈ R, i.e.,
I = R. One way to enforce the dynamical system to have a well-defined flow for all






‖f(x)‖ + 1 , (2)
because the function becomes globally 1-Lipschitz. The two dynamical systems (before
and after renormalization) are topologically equivalent ([110], p.184). Formally this
means that there exists a homeomorphism H which maps trajectories of (1) onto
trajectories of (2) and preserves their orientation by time. In words it means that
the two systems have the same behavior/geometry (same fixed points, convergence
properties).
Discrete time dynamical systems. Let f : S → Rn be a continuous function. An
autonomous discrete (time) dynamical system is of the form
xt+1 = f(xt), (3)
with update rule f . The point p is called a fixed point or equilibrium of f if f(p) = p.
A sequence (f t(x0))t∈N is called a trajectory of the dynamics with x0 as starting point.
1A function is called globally Lipschitz or just Lipschitz if there exists a L so that for all x,y
it holds ‖f(x)− f(y)‖ ≤ L ‖x− y‖. A function is locally Lipschitz if for each point x there is an
ε-neighborhood of x, and a constant K(x, ε) so that f satisfies the Lipschitz condition for all y, z in
that neighborhood with constant K.
3
Besides the notion of fixed point, there is the notion of periodic orbit or limit cycle.
The definition below is about discrete time systems and is used in Chapter 5. 2
Definition 1 (Periodic orbits). C = {x1, . . . ,xk} is called a periodic orbit of size
k if xi+1 = f(xi) for 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 1 and f(xk) = x1.
If a dynamical system converges in the sense that limk→∞ f
k(x) (discrete case)
or limt→∞ φt(x) (continuous case) exists, then the limit is an equilibrium point. In
dynamical systems, we are interested in the set of initial conditions that converge
to a particular equilibrium point. This is captured by the notion of the region of
attraction of an equilibrium point. Formally the region of attraction of a fixed point
p is Rp = {x ∈ S : limt→∞ φt(x) = p} for continuous and for discrete it is Rp = {x ∈
S : limk→∞ fk(x) = p}. But how can one show convergence? This will be partially
answered in the next section.
1.1.2 Convergence and stability
Lyapunov functions and convergence. One way to show that a dynamical system
converges, is via Lyapunov type functions. A Lyapunov (or potential) type3 function
V : S → R is a function that strictly decreases along every non-trivial trajectory of
the dynamical system. Formally, for continuous time dynamical systems it holds that
dV
dt
≤ 0 with equality only when f(x) = 0. For discrete time dynamical systems, it is
true that V (x) ≥ V (f(x)) with equality only at fixed points. Intuitively, a Lyapunov
function is an energy function of the system, in the sense that we hope the system
prefers a stable energy state.
Therefore, given a dynamical system, one has to come up with a Lyapunov func-
tion to show convergence; this is a hard task in general, especially for discrete dynam-
ical systems. Nevertheless, using the theorem below and by doing reverse engineering,
2There exists the analogous notion for continuous time systems.
3We say Lyapunov type because this is not the formal definition of a Lyapunov function, but a
generalized refinement.
4
we are able to construct Lyapunov functions for specific (discrete time) evolutionary
dynamics that appear in Chapters 4 and 5. It turns out that the dynamical systems
we are looking at in these specific chapters have the same structure with the ones
that are induced by the following theorem.
Theorem 1.1 (Baum and Eagon Inequality [14]). Let P (x) = P ({xij}) be a
polynomial with nonnegative coefficients, homogeneous of degree d in its variables
{xij}. Let x = {xij} be any point of the domain D : xij ≥ 0,
∑qi
j=1 xij = 1, i =
l, . . . , p, j = l, . . . , qi. For x = {xij} ∈ D, let Ξ(x) = Ξ{xij} denote the point of D




















Then P (Ξ(x)) > P (x) unless Ξ(x) = x.
Local behavior. Assume now that for a fixed point p, we use Taylor’s theorem
(around p) and we get
f(x) = p + J(p)(x− p) + o(‖x− p‖), where J(p) is the Jacobian at p.
It follows that the linear function p + J(p)(x − p) is a good approximation to the
(nonlinear) function f(x) in the neighborhood of the fixed point p. It is very natural
to expect the behavior of the system near the fixed point p is (well) approximated
by the behavior of the linear system with matrix the Jacobian of f at p. Analyzing
a linear dynamical system is very standard; can be done by spectral analysis of the
underlying matrix. So it seems that we can say something about the behavior of the
system, at least locally around the fixed points, via analysis of the linearized system.
Below, we give some definitions due to Lyapunov, based on the local behavior of
dynamical systems around fixed points.
Definition 2 (Stable). Let S ⊆ Rn be an open set. A fixed point p of (1) is
called stable if for every ε > 0, there exists a δ = δ(ε) > 0 such that for all x with
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‖x− p‖ < δ we have that ‖φt(x)− p‖ < ε for every t ≥ 0. For discrete time systems
(3), a fixed point p is called stable if for every ε > 0, there exists a δ = δ(ε) > 0
such that for all x with ‖x− p‖ < δ we have that
∥∥fk(x)− p∥∥ < ε for every k ≥ 0.
Otherwise it is called unstable.
In words, a fixed point p is stable so that, if the starting point of the dynamics is
sufficiently close to p, then the dynamics remains close to p for all subsequent times.
Definition 3 (Asymptotically stable). Let S ⊆ Rn be an open set. A fixed point
p of (1) is called asymptotically stable, if it is stable and there exists a δ > 0 such that
for all x with ‖x− p‖ < δ, we have that ‖φt(x)− p‖ → 0 as t → ∞. For discrete
time systems (3), a fixed point p is called asymptotically stable, if it is stable and there
exists a δ > 0 such that for all x with ‖x− p‖ < δ, we have that
∥∥fk(x)− p∥∥ → 0
as k →∞.
In words, a fixed point p is asymptotically stable so that, if the starting point of the
dynamics is sufficiently close to p, then the dynamics converge to p as t→∞. This
is a stronger notion than the notion of a stable fixed point.
Arguably one of the most important theorems in dynamical systems is the next
theorem and is used extensively in this thesis. It connects the stability of a fixed
point p with the spectral properties of the Jacobian matrix of the update rule at p.
Theorem 1.2 (Eigenvalues and stability [110]). As far as continuous dynamical
systems (1) are concerned, at fixed point p if J(p) has at least one eigenvalue with
positive real part, then p is unstable. If all the eigenvalues have real part negative then
p is asymptotically stable. Moreover, for discrete dynamical systems (3), at fixed point
p if J(p) has at least one eigenvalue with absolute value > 1, then p is unstable. If
all the eigenvalues have absolute value < 1 then it is asymptotically stable.
In Chapters 2, 4 and 6 we use the following refinement of stability.
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Definition 4 (Linearly stable). For continuous time dynamical systems (1), a
fixed point p is called linearly stable, if the eigenvalues of J(p) of f have real part
at most zero. Otherwise, it is called linearly unstable. Analogously, for discrete time
dynamical systems (3), a fixed point p is called linearly stable, if the eigenvalues of
J(p) of f are at most 1 in absolute value. Otherwise, it is called linearly unstable.
Center-stable manifold theorem. The Center-stable Manifold Theorem 1.3 men-
tioned below is one of the most important results in the local qualitative theory of
continuous and discrete dynamical systems. It is written in terms of discrete time
systems; we will explain in a moment how to use it for continuous time systems. The
theorem shows that near a fixed point p, a nonlinear system has center-stable and
unstable manifolds S and U tangent at p to the center-stable and unstable subspaces
Es⊕Ec and Eu of the linearized system xk+1 = p+J(p)(xk−p). Furthermore, S and
U are of the same dimensions as Es ⊕ Ec and Eu and the set of starting points in a
neighborhood of p so that the dynamics converges to p lies in S. As far as continuous
dynamical systems are concerned, we work with the function φ1(x) (setting t = 1,
this is called the time one map). Hence the same theorem holds for continuous time
dynamical systems, but the eigenspaces (described below) correspond to eigenvalues
with real part negative, zero and positive respectively4. We use Center-stable Man-
ifold Theorem in a way to prove that the set of initial conditions that satisfy some
property is of measure zero (see Theorems 2.8, 3.6 and 6.4).
Theorem 1.3 (Center-stable Manifold Theorem [128]). Let p be a fixed point
for the Cr local diffeomorphism f : U → Rn where U ⊂ Rn is an open neighborhood of
p in Rn and r ≥ 1. Let Es⊕Ec⊕Eu be the invariant splitting of Rn into generalized
eigenspaces of J(p) corresponding to eigenvalues of absolute value less than one, equal
to one, and greater than one. To the J(p) invariant subspace Es ⊕ Ec, there is an
4The version for continuous dynamical systems is used in Chapter 6
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associated local f invariant Cr embedded disc W scloc tangent to the linear subspace at
p and a ball B around p such that:
f(W scloc) ∩B ⊂ W scloc. If fn(x) ∈ B for all n ≥ 0, then x ∈ W scloc. (4)
In words, it means that there exists a ball B around the fixed point p so that if the
trajectory lies in B for all times, then the trajectory should lie in a manifold W scloc of
dimension the number of eigenvalues of the Jacobian of the update rule at p that have
absolute value at most one. We suggest the reader to see [110] for more information
on dynamical systems. Below we give a brief introduction to evolutionary dynamical
systems.
1.2 Evolution and dynamical systems
Evolutionary dynamical systems are central to the sciences due to their versatility
in modeling a wide variety of biological, social and cultural phenomena [100]. Such
dynamics are often used to capture the deterministic, infinite population setting, and
are typically the first step in our understanding of seemingly complex evolutionary
processes.
The mathematical introduction of (infinite population) evolutionary processes is
dating back to the work of Fisher, Haldane, and Wright in the beginning of the
twentieth century. These processes to a large extent are simple, almost toy-like, but
concrete. One example is the replicator equations, first introduced by Fisher [51] in
30’s for genotype evolution, the simplest form (continuous/discrete) of which is the
following:
ẋi(t) = xi(t)((Ax(t))i − x(t)>Ax(t)) (continuous),




where A is a payoff matrix (generally non-negative), x a vector that lies in simplex
and (Ax)i denotes
∑
j Aijxj. Observe that in the nonlinear dynamics above, simplex
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is invariant (if we start from a probability distribution, the vector remains a proba-
bility distribution). This dynamics is called replicator dynamics and has been used
numerous times in biology, evolution, game theory and genetic algorithms.
Theoretical computer science community is particularly interested in evolution.
Valiant [134] started viewing evolution through the lens of computation and after that
we have witnessed an accumulation of papers and problem proposals [79, 136, 135,
135, 39]. In [24, 23], a surprisingly strong connection was discovered between standard
models of evolution in mathematical biology and Multiplicative Weights Updates
Algorithm (MWUA), a ubiquitous model of online learning and optimization. These
papers establish that mathematical models of biological evolution are tantamount
to applying MWUA, on coordination games. This connection allows for introducing
insights from the study of game theoretic dynamics into the field of mathematical
biology. The aforementioned papers are a stepping stone for our results in Chapters
2, 3 and 4.
In Chapter 2 we show that mathematical models of haploid5 evolution imply the
extinction of genetic diversity in the long term limit, a widely believed conjecture
in genetics [12]. In game theoretic terms we show that in the case of coordination
games, under minimal genericity assumptions, (modified) discrete replicator dynamics
converge to pure Nash equilibria for all but a zero measure of initial conditions.
Moreover, in Chapter 3 our contribution is to establish complexity theoretic hard-
ness results implying that even in the textbook case of single locus (gene) diploid
models, predicting whether diversity survives (in the limit) or not given its fitness
landscape is algorithmically intractable.
Last but not least, in Chapter 4 we study the role of mutation in changing envi-
ronments in the presence of sexual reproduction. Following [139], we model changing
environments via a Markov chain, with the states representing environments, each
5See Section A.1 for (non-technical) definition of biological terms.
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with its own fitness matrix. In this setting, we show that in the absence of mutation,
the population goes extinct, but in the presence of mutation, the population survives
with positive probability.
All the above mentioned results assume that the population size is infinite (contin-
uum of individuals). However, real populations are finite and often lend themselves
to substantial stochastic effects (such as random drift) and it is often important to
understand these effects as the population size varies. Hence, stochastic or finite pop-
ulation versions of evolutionary dynamical systems are appealed to in order to study
such phenomena. While there are many ways to translate a deterministic dynamical
system into a stochastic one, one thing remains common: the mathematical analysis
becomes much harder as differential equations are easier to analyze and understand
than stochastic processes.
One such stochastic version, motivated by the Wright-Fisher model in population
genetics, whose deterministic version is Eigen’s evolution equations [43], was studied
by Dixit et al. [39]. Here, the population is fixed to a size N and there are m types of
individuals. The process has 3 stages. In the replication (R) stage, every individual
of type i in the current population is replaced by ai individuals of type i and an in-
termediate population is created. In the selection (S) stage, the population is culled
back to size N by sampling with replacement N individuals from this intermediate
population. Finally, we have the mutation (M) stage, where each individual is mu-
tated in this intermediate population independently and stochastically according to
some matrix Q of size m×m. Qij corresponds to the probability an individual of type
i to change its type to j. This RSM (from the initials of the three stages) process
is a Markov chain with state space {x ∈ Nm so that ∑mi=1 xi = N}. However, the
number of states in the RSM process is roughly Nm (when m is small compared to
N), and a mixing time that grows too fast as a function of the size of the state space
can therefore be prohibitively large.
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In Chapter 5 we develop techniques for bounding the mixing time of a wide class
of Markov chains (where the previous process is included) called evolutionary. Essen-
tially, we make a novel connection between evolutionary Markov chains and dynamical
systems on the probability simplex. This allows us to use the local and global stabil-
ity properties of the fixed points of such dynamical systems and prove several results.
Roughly we show that if there exists one stable fixed point in the dynamical system,
then the chain is rapidly mixing (O(logN) mixing time), otherwise the mixing time
is slow (eΩ(N) mixing time). In section below, we give all the necessary definitions
and facts about Markov chains that will be used in Chapter 5.
1.3 Markov chains basics
A Markov chain is a random process that undergoes transitions from one config-
uration to another on a (finite) state space Ω. The process is memoryless, i.e., the
probability of moving from one configuration to another depends only on the current
configuration (not on history). Formally, a Markov chain is a sequence of random
variables X(0),X(1),X(2), . . . satisfying the Markov property, namely that the prob-








X(t+1) = x|X(t) = xt
]
. (5)
A time-homogeneous Markov chain, which has the property that the r.h.s of (5) is
the same for all t, is associated with a transition matrix P = {P (x,y)}, where each
entry corresponds to the probability with which to move from one state to another.
Formally it holds
P (x,y) = P
[
X(t+1) = y | X(t) = x
]
,
for all x,y ∈ Ω and t.
We focus on the class of ergodic Markov chains. A Markov chain is called ergodic
if there exists a time t ∈ N so that P t(x,y) > 0 for all x,y ∈ Ω. For finite (state)
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Markov chains, ergodicity is equivalent to irreducibility and aperiodicity. A Markov
chain is irreducible if for any two states x,y ∈ Ω, there exists an integer t so that
P t(x,y) > 0, i.e., it is possible to get to any state from any state and is called
aperiodic, if for all x, it holds that gcd{t : P t(x,x) > 0} = 1. 6
A stationary distribution π is defined to be invariant with respect to the transition
matrix P , i.e., it satisfies π> = π>P . It can be shown that an ergodic Markov chain
has a unique stationary distribution π and converges to it. This is a very useful fact
in algorithms and theoretical computer science. One easy case in order to compute
π is when the Markov chain is reversible. A Markov chain is said to be reversible if
there is a distribution π which satisfies the detailed balanced equations, namely
for all x,y we have π(x)P (x,y) = π(y)P (y,x).
In this case, it can be easily checked that π is a stationary distribution.
One way to sample from a distribution π is to create an ergodic Markov chain
that converges to π and this is commonly used in theoretical computer science and
machine learning. For the sampling to be efficient, the underlying Markov chain must
converge fast to the stationary distribution π. Chapter 5 is devoted to bounding the
time a Markov chain needs to get close to the stationary distribution (with respect
to some metric between distributions), for a specific class of Markov chains inspired
by evolution.
1.3.1 Mixing time and coupling method
Mixing time. As mentioned above, an ergodic Markov chain converges to a unique
stationary distribution π. Since we talk about convergence for distributions, we need
to define an appropriate metric. The most commonly used is the total variation
distance (essentially `1 distance).
6Therefore if a Markov chain has loops, i.e., P (x,x) > 0 for all x, then it is aperiodic.
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Definition 5 (Total variation distance (TV)). For distributions µ and ν on Ω,






|µ(x)− ν(x)| = max
S⊆Ω
µ(S)− ν(S). (6)
We are now ready to define the mixing time of an ergodic Markov chain, notion that
captures how much time the chain needs to get close to the stationary distribution.
Definition 6 (Mixing time [75]). Let M be an ergodic Markov chain on a finite
state space Ω with stationary distribution π. Then, the mixing time tmix(ε) is defined
as the smallest time t such that for any starting state X(0), the distribution of the
state X(t) at time t is within total variation distance ε of π. The term mixing time is
also used for tmix(ε) for a fixed value of ε < 1/2.
We say that a Markov chain is rapidly mixing (or mixes rapidly) if the mixing
time is polynomial in log |Ω| and slowly mixing if it is exponential in log |Ω|. A phase
transition occurs when a small change in a parameter such as temperature, learning,
mutation parameter, causes a large-scale change to the system. Classic example in
nature is water; when it is heated and temperature reaches 100 degree Celsius, the
water changes from liquid to gas. In terms of Markov chains, a phase transition
occurs when a small change in a parameter, changes the mixing from rapid to slow or
vice-versa. In Section 5.7.4 we provide a phase transition result for the mixing time
of a specific Markov chain that describes evolution of grammar acquisition.
Coupling method. It is clear that the mixing time is a very important notion, both
from theoretical and practical perspective, and a lot of research focuses on bounding
the mixing time for specific classes of Markov chains (e.g., glauber dynamics). One
of the most common techniques for rigorously proving bounds on the mixing time is
coupling.
Definition 7 (Coupling). A coupling for distributions µ, ν on finite Ω, is a joint
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distribution ξ on Ω× Ω with µ and ν as the marginals:
For all x ∈ Ω,
∑
y∈Ω
ξ(x,y) = µ(x) and




There always exists an optimal coupling which exactly captures the total variation
distance. The following lemma is used extensively in this thesis.
Lemma 1.4 (Coupling lemma [4]). Let µ, ν be two probability distributions on Ω.
Then,
‖µ− ν‖TV = min
ξ
P(X,Y)∼ξ [X 6= Y] ,
where the minimum is taken over all valid couplings C of µ and ν. The expression
(X,Y) ∼ ξ means that random variable (X,Y) is chosen from the distribution ξ.
Therefore for a given coupling ξ′ it also holds that
‖µ− ν‖TV ≤ P(X,Y)∼ξ′ [X 6= Y] .
The general technique to bound the mixing time of a Markov chain is the following:
Consider two arbitrary starting states X(0) and Y(0). Assume we can construct a
coupling ξ for two stochastic processes X and Y which are started at X(0) and Y(0)
and as long as X(t0) = Y(t0) for some t0 ∈ N then X(t) = Y(t) for all t ≥ t0. Let T
be the first (random) time such that X(T ) = Y(T ). From the Coupling Lemma 1.4, if
it can be shown that P [T > t] ≤ 1/4 for some t ∈ N, and for every pair of starting












and hence tmix(1/4) ≤ t since
max
x∈Ω








where π is the stationary distribution.
Remark 2. Typically in theoretical computer science we consider tmix(1/4) as the
mixing time, i.e., for ε = 1
4
. It is well-known that if one is willing to pay an additional
factor of log 1/δ, one can bring down the error from 1/4 to δ for any δ > 0; see [75].
1.4 Game theory and equilibrium selection
Nash’s theorem [94] on the existence of fixed points in game theoretic dynam-
ics ushered in an exciting new era in the study of economics. At a high level, the
inception of the Nash equilibrium concept allowed, to a large degree, the disentan-
glement between the study of complex behavioral dynamics and the study of games.
Equilibria could be concisely described, independently from the dynamics that gave
rise to them, as solutions of algebraic equations. Crucially, their definition was sim-
ple, intuitive, analytically tractable in many practical instances of small games, and
arguably instructive about real life behavior. The notion of a solution to (general)
games, which was introduced by the work of von Neumann in the special case of
zero-sum games [138], would be solidified as a key landmark of economic thought.
This mapping from games to their solutions, i.e., the set of equilibria, grounded eco-
nomic theory in a solid foundation and allowed for a whole new class of questions in
regards to numerous properties of these sets including their geometry, computability,
and resulting agent utilities.
Unfortunately, unlike von Neumann’s essentially unique behavioral solution to
zero-sum games, it became immediately clear that Nash equilibrium fell short from
its role as a universal solution concept in a crucial way. It is non-unique. It is straight-
forward to find games7 with constant number of agents, strategies and uncountably
many distinct equilibria with different properties in terms of support sizes, symme-
tries, efficiency, and practically any other conceivable attribute of interest. This raises
7An example of such a game can be found in Section 6.7.2, Lemma 6.27.
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a natural question. How should we analyze games with multiple Nash equilibria?
The centrality of the general equilibrium selection problem can hardly be overesti-
mated. Indeed, according to Ariel Rubinstein “No other task may be more significant
within game theory. A successful theory of this type may change all of economic the-
ory.” 8. Accordingly, a wide range of radically different approaches to this challenge
have been explored by economists, social scientists, and computer scientists alike.
Despite their differing points of view, they share a common high level goal. The goal
is to reduce the number of admissible equilibria and, if possible, effectively pinpoint
a single one as target for analytical inquiry. This way, the multi-valued equilibrium
correspondence becomes a simple function and prediction uncertainty vanishes. Al-
though no single approach stands out as providing the definitive answer, each has
allowed for significant headway in specific classes of interesting games, and some have
sprung forth standalone lines of inquiry. Next, we mention two approaches that have
inspired our work (Chapter 6): risk dominance and price of anarchy analysis.
Risk dominance is an equilibrium refinement process that centers around uncer-
tainty about opponent behavior, introduced by Harsanyi and Selten [60]. A Nash equi-
librium is considered risk dominant if it has the largest basin of attraction (i.e., less
risky)9. The benchmark example is the Stag Hunt game, shown in figure 10(a) of
Chapter 6. In such symmetric 2x2 coordination games a strategy is risk dominant if
it is a best response to the uniformly random strategy of the opponent.
Price of anarchy [72] follows a much more quantitative approach (see also Def-
initions 9, 10). The point of view here is that of optimization and the focus is on
extremal equilibria. Price of anarchy, defined as the ratio between the social welfare
of the worst equilibrium and that of the optimum tries to capture the loss in efficiency
8Endorsement for book [60]
9Although risk dominance [60] was originally introduced as a hypothetical model of the method
by which perfectly rational players select their actions, it may also be interpreted [91] as the result
of evolutionary processes.
16
due to the lack of centralized authority.
A plethora of similar concepts, based on normalized ratios, has been defined
(e.g., price of stability [5] focuses on best case equilibria). Tight bounds on these
quantities have been established for large classes of games [29, 120]. However, these
bounds do not necessarily reflect the whole picture. They usually correspond to
highly artificial instances. Even in these bad instances, typically there exist sizable
gaps between their price of anarchy and price of stability, allowing for the possibility
of significantly tighter analysis of system performance. More to the point, worst case
equilibria maybe unlikely in themselves by having a negligible basin of attraction [70].
Based on geometric characterizations of dynamical systems such as point-wise
convergence, computing regions of attraction and system invariants10, in Chapter 6
we propose a novel quantitative framework for analyzing the efficiency of potential
games with many equilibria. The predictions of different equilibria are weighted by
their probability to arise under evolutionary dynamics (replicator dynamics) given
random initial conditions. This average case analysis is shown to offer the possibility
of novel insights in classic game theoretic challenges, including quantifying the risk
dominance in stag-hunt games and allowing for more nuanced performance analysis
in networked coordination and congestion games with large gaps between price of
stability and price of anarchy.
1.4.1 Two-player Games and Nash equilibrium
In this section we provide some necessary definitions and facts about two-player
games where each player has finitely many pure strategies (moves). This part is
necessary for Chapters 2, 3 and 6. Let Si, i = 1, 2 be the set of strategies for player
i, and let m ··= |S1| and n ··= |S2|. Then a two-player game can be represented by
two payoff matrices A and B of dimension m×n, where payoff to the players are Aij
10Invariant functions remain constant along every system trajectory.
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and Bij respectively if the first-player plays i and the second plays j.
Players may randomize among their strategies. The set of mixed strategies for the
first player is ∆m = {x = (x1, . . . , xm) | x ≥ 0,
∑m
i=1 xi = 1}, and for the second player
is ∆n = {y = (y1, . . . , yn) | y ≥ 0,
∑n
j=1 yj = 1}. By mixed strategy (or fixed point)
we mean strictly mixed strategy (or fixed point), i.e., x such that |SP (x)| > 1 (size
of support greater than 1), and non-mixed strategies are called pure (deterministic).
The expected payoffs of the first-player and second-player from a mixed-strategy








Definition 8 (Nash equilibrium (NE) [98]). A strategy profile is said to be a Nash
equilibrium (NE) strategy profile if no player achieves a better payoff by a unilateral
deviation [94]. Formally for two-player games, (x,y) ∈ ∆m×∆n is a NE if and only
if ∀x′ ∈ ∆m, x>Ay ≥ x′>Ay and ∀y′ ∈ ∆n, x>By ≥ x>By′. 11
There is also the notion of strict Nash equilibrium which is used in Chapter 3.
Definition 9 (Strict Nash equilibrium (SNE)). NE x is strict if ∀k /∈ SP (x), (Ax)k <
(Ax)i, where i ∈ SP (x).
Given strategy y for the second-player, the first-player gets (Ay)k from her k-th
strategy. Clearly, her best strategies are arg maxk(Ay)k, and a mixed strategy fetches
the maximum payoff only if she randomizes among her best strategies. Similarly, given
x for the first-player, the second-player gets (x>B)k from k-th strategy, and same
conclusion applies. These can be equivalently stated as the following complementarity
type conditions. Let (x,y) be a Nash equilibrium, then it holds
∀i ∈ S1, xi > 0 ⇒ (Ay)i = maxk∈S1(Ay)k
∀j ∈ S2, yj > 0 ⇒ (x>B)j = maxk∈S2(x>B)k.
(7)
11In a similar way, NE is defined for more players, given a utility function for each player.
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We end this section by giving the definition of symmetric and coordination games.
Important part of Chapter 6 is devoted to analyze the efficiency of equilibria in
coordination games.
Symmetric Game. Game (A,B) is said to be symmetric if B = A>. In a symmetric
game the strategy sets of both the players are identical, i.e., m = n, and S1 = S2.
We use n, S and ∆n to denote number of strategies, the strategy set and the mixed
strategy set respectively of the players in such a game. A Nash equilibrium profile
(x,y) ∈ ∆n × ∆n is called symmetric if x = y. Note that at a symmetric strategy
profile (x,x) both the players get payoff x>Ax. Using (7) it follows that (x,x) is a
symmetric NE of game (A,A>), with payoff x>Ax to both players, if and only if,
∀i ∈ S, xi > 0⇒ (Ax)i = max
k
(Ax)k (8)
Coordination Game. In a coordination game B = A, i.e., both the players get the
same payoff regardless of who is playing what. Note that such a game always has a
pure equilibrium, namely arg max(i,j) Aij.
1.4.2 Replicator on congestion/network coordination games
In this section we provide the definitions of congestion and network coordination
games, one of the most well-studied classes of games. Congestion and network co-
ordination games are potential games. This means that there exists a single global
function Φ called the potential (depending on the strategies players choose) so that
if a player changes his strategy unilaterally, the change in his payoff is equal to the
change in Φ. This Φ is essentially the analogue of a Lyapunov function and is used
to prove convergence to Nash equilibria in many (game) dynamics. Local optima of
Φ are Nash equilibria, and it is also true that potential games have at least a pure
Nash equilibrium (easy to prove via potential arguments).
Later in the section, we describe the equations of continuous replicator dynamics
for congestion and coordination games, as have appeared in [70]. Replicator dynamics
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is a learning dynamics and describes the rational behavior of the players in a game. As
we will see in Chapter 6, replicator dynamics in congestion and network coordination
games, has some nice properties concerning convergence and stability. Additionally,
we give the definition of price of anarchy and the notation we use for the rest of thesis
concerning game theory (especially in Chapter 6).
Congestion Games. A congestion game (Rosenthal [119]) is defined by the tuple
(N ; E ; (Si)i∈N ; (ce)e∈E) where N is the set of agents (with N = |N |), E is a set of
resources (also known as edges or bins or facilities), and each player i has a set Si
of subsets of E (Si ⊆ 2E). Each strategy si ∈ Si is a set of edges (a path), and ce
is a cost (negative utility) function associated with facility e. We will also use small
Greek characters like γ, δ to denote different strategies/paths. For a strategy profile
s = (s1, s2, . . . , sN), the cost of player i is given by ci(s) =
∑
e∈si ce(`e(s)), where `e(s)
is the number of players using e in s (the load of edge e). In linear congestion games,
the latency functions are of the form ce(x) = aex + be where ae, be ≥ 0. Measures
of social cost (sc(s)) include the makespan, which is equal to the cost of the most
expensive path and the sum of the costs of all the agents.
Network (Polymatrix) Coordination Games. A coordination (or partnership)
game is a two player game where in each strategy outcome both agents receive the
same utility. In other words, if we flip the sign of the utility of the first agent then
we get a zero-sum game. An N -player polymatrix (network) coordination game is
defined by an undirected graph G(V,E) with |V | = N vertices and each vertex
corresponds to a player. An edge (i, j) ∈ E(G) corresponds to a coordination game
between players i, j. We assume that we have the same strategy space S for every
edge. Let Aij be the payoff matrix for the game between players i, j and A
γδ
ij be the
payoff for both (coordination) if i, j choose strategies γ, δ respectively. The set of
players will be denoted by N and the set of neighbors of player i will be denoted by






ij . The social welfare of a state s corresponds to the sum of the
utilities of all the agents sw(s) =
∑
i∈V ui(s).













We denote by ∆(Si) = {p ≥ 0 :
∑
γ piγ = 1} the set of mixed (randomized)
strategies of player i and ∆ = ×i∆(Si) the set of mixed strategies of all players. For
congestion games we use ciγ = Es−i∼p−ici(γ, s−i) to denote the expected cost of player
i given that he chooses strategy γ and ĉi =
∑
δ∈Si piδciδ to denote his expected cost.
Similarly, for network coordination games we use uiγ = Es−i∼p−iui(γ, s−i) to denote
the expected utility of player i given that he chooses strategy γ and ûi =
∑
δ∈Si piδuiδ
to denote his expected utility.
1.4.3 Continuous replicator dynamics
Replicator dynamics [132, 125, 70] is described by the following system of differen-















for each i ∈ N , γ ∈ Si. Observe that if ĉi > ciγ then dpiγdt > 0, i.e., piγ is increasing
with respect to time, thus player i tends to increase the probability he chooses strategy
γ. Similarly if ĉi < ciγ then
dpiγ
dt
< 0, i.e., piγ is decreasing w.r.t time, thus player
i tends to decrease the probability he chooses strategy γ. 13 Replicator dynamics
capture similar rational behavior in the case of network coordination games.
12Recall that NE denotes the set of Nash equilibria.
13Replicator dynamics describes rational behavior in a sense.
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Remark 3 (Nash equilibria ⊆ Fixed points). An interesting observation about
the replicator is that its fixed points are exactly the set of randomized strategies such
that each agent experiences equal costs across all strategies he chooses with positive
probability. This is a generalization of the notion of Nash equilibrium, since equi-
libria furthermore require that any strategy that is played with zero probability must
have expected cost at least as high as those strategies which are played with positive
probability.
1.5 Notation and organization
Notation. Throughout this thesis we use the following notation: We use boldface
letters, e.g., x, to denote column vectors and denote a vector’s i-th coordinate by
xi. We use x−i to denote x after removing the i-th coordinate. For two vectors x,y,
(x; y) denotes the concatenation of them. To denote a row vector we use x>. The
set {1, . . . , n} is denoted by [1 : n] or [n] and int S is the interior of set S.
We denote the probability simplex on a set of dimension n as ∆n. Time indices are
denoted by (super)scripts. Thus, a time indexed scalar s at time t is denoted as s(t), st
or s(t) while a time indexed vector x at time t is denotes as x(t), xt or x(t). The letters
X and Y (with time (super)scripts and coordinate subscripts, as appropriate) will
be used to denote random vectors. Scalar random vectors and matrices are denoted
by capital letters. Boldface 1 denotes a vector all whose entries are 1. Moreover we
denote by R,N,Z the set of reals, natural numbers and integers respectively.
For any square matrix A, we denote by sp (A) , ‖A‖1 , ‖A‖2, the spectral radius,
1 → 1 norm and operator norm of A respectively. Define Amax, Amin the largest,
smallest entry in matrix A and (Ax)i ··=
∑
j Aijxj. We also use ‖x‖2, ‖x‖1, ‖x‖ (or
‖x‖∞) for the `2, `1, `∞ norm of vector x respectively.
By ∇2f(x) we denote the Hessian of a twice differentiable function f : E → R,
for some set E ⊆ Rn. For a function f, by fn we denote the composition of f with
22
itself n times, namely f ◦ f ◦ · · · ◦ f︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
. We use J(x) 14 to denote the Jacobian matrix
(of some function clear from the context) at the point x.
Organization. The thesis is organized as follows: In Chapter 2 we show that (i)
mathematical models of haploid evolution imply the extinction of genetic diversity
in the long term limit. In Chapter 3 we focus on diploid evolution and show that
(ii) diversity might persist in the limit but is NP-hard to predict that. Moreover, in
Chapter 4 we complement our results on haploid evolution by analyzing the role of
mutation in the survival of the population if the environments change. Furthermore,
in Chapter 5 we provide (iii) a connection between dynamical systems and the mixing
time of a wide class of Markov chains inspired by evolution. In Chapter 6 we propose
(iv) a novel framework to analyze the efficiency of potential games with many Nash
equilibria. Finally, in Chapter 7, using the machinery developed in Chapter 2, we
show (v) that gradient descent converges to minimizers with probability 1.
14In some cases we also use Jx,J x.
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CHAPTER II
EVOLUTIONARY DYNAMICS IN HAPLOIDS
2.1 Introduction
Decoding the mechanisms of biological evolution has been one of the most in-
spiring contests for the human mind. The modern theory of population genetics has
been derived by combining the Darwinian concept of natural selection and Mendelian
genetics. Detailed experimental studies of a species of fruit fly, Drosophila, allowed
for a unified understanding of evolution that encompasses both the Darwinian view
of continuous evolutionary improvements and the discrete nature of Mendelian genet-
ics. The key insight is that evolution relies on the progressive selection of organisms
with advantageous mutations. This understanding has lead to precise mathematical
formulations of such evolutionary mechanisms, dating back to the work of Fisher,
Haldane, and Wright [18] in the beginning of the twentieth century.
The existence of dynamical models of genotypic evolution, however, does not offer
by itself clear, concise insights about the future states of the phenotypic landscape1.
Which allele combinations, and as a result, which attributes will take over? Predic-
tion of the evolution of the phenotypic landscape is a key, alas not well understood,
question in the study of biological systems [145].
Despite the advent of detailed mathematical models, still at the forefront of our
understanding lie experimental studies and simulations. Of course, this is to some
extent inevitable since the involved dynamical systems are nonlinear and hence a
complete theoretical understanding of all related questions seems intractable [126, 40].
Nevertheless, some rather useful qualitative statements have been established.
1See Section A.1 for (non-technical) definition of biological terms.
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Nagylaki [92] showed that, when mutations do not affect reproduction success by
a lot2, the system state converges quickly to the so-called Wright manifold, where
the distribution of genotypes is a product distribution of the allele frequencies in the
population. In this case, in order to keep track of the distribution of genotypes in the
population it suffices to record the distribution of the different alleles for each gene.
The overall distribution of genotypes can be recovered by simply taking products of
the allele frequencies. Nagylaki et al. [93] have also shown that under hyperbolicity
assumptions (e.g., isolated equilibria) such systems converge.
Chastain et al. [23] have built on Nagylaki’s work by establishing an informa-
tive connection between these mathematical models of population genetics and the
multiplicative update algorithm (MWUA). MWUA is a ubiquitous online learning
dynamics [8], which is known to enjoy numerous connections to biologically rele-
vant mathematical models. Specifically, its continuous time limit is equivalent to the
replicator dynamics (in its standard continuous form) [70] and its equivalent up to
a smooth change of variables to the Lotka-Volterra equations [61]. In [23] another
strong such connection was established. Specifically, under the assumption of weak
selection standard models of population genetics are shown to be closely related to ap-
plying discrete replicator dynamics on a coordination game (see Meir and Parkes [87]
paper for a more detailed examination of this connection). Discrete replicator dynam-
ics (MWUA variant), which Chastain et al. refer to as discrete MWUA, is already a
well established dynamics in the literature of mathematical biology and evolutionary
game theory [82, 61] under the name discrete (time, version of) replicator dynamics
and to avoid confusion we will refer to it by its standard name.
The coordination game is as follows: Each gene is an agent and its available strate-
gies are its alleles. Any combination of strategies/alleles (one for each gene/agent)
2This is referred to as the weak selection regime and it corresponds to a well supported principle
known as Kimura’s neutral theory.
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gives rise to a specific genotype/individual. The common utility of each gene/agent
at that genotype/outcome is equal to the fitness of that phenotype. In the weak
selection regime this is a number in [1− s, 1 + s] for some small s > 0. If we interpret
the frequency of the allele in the population as mixed (randomized) strategies in this
game then the population genetics model reduces to each agent/gene updating their
distribution according to discrete replicator dynamics.
In discrete replicator dynamics the rate of increase of the probability of a given
strategy is directly proportional to its current expected utility. In population genetic
terms, this expected utility reflects the average fitness of a specific allele when matched
with the current mixture of alleles of the other genes. Livnat et al. [78] coined the
term mixability to refer to this beneficial attribute. In other words, an allele with high
mixability achieves high fitness when paired against the current allele distribution.
Naturally, this trait is not a standalone characteristic of an allele but depends on the
current state of the system. An allele that enjoys a high mixability in one distribution
of alleles, might exhibit a low mixability in another. So, although mixability offers a
palpable interpretation of how evolutionary models behaves in a single time step, it
does not offer insights about the long term behavior.
Game theory, however, can provide us with clues about the long term behavior
as well. Specifically, discrete replicator dynamics converges to sets of fixed points in
variants of coordination games [82] (see also Chapter 6). This allows for a concise
characterization of the possible limit points of the population genetics model, since
they coincide with the set of equilibria (fixed points). In [24] it was observed that
random two agent coordination games (in the weak selection payoff regime) exhibit (in
expectation) exponentially many such mixed strategies. The abundance of such mixed
Nash equilibria seems like a strong indicator that (i) the long term system behavior
will result in a state of high genetic variance (highly mixed population), (ii) we cannot
even efficiently enumerate the set of all biologically relevant limiting behaviors, let
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alone predict them. We show that this intuition does not reflect accurately the
dynamical system behavior.
Our contribution. We show that given a generic two agent coordination games,
starting from all but a zero measure of initial conditions, discrete MWUA converges to
pure, strict Nash equilibria (see Theorem 2.9). The genericity assumption is minimal
and merely requires that any row/column of the payoff matrix have distinct entries.
This genericity assumption, is trivially satisfied with probability one, if the entries
of the matrix are i.i.d from a distribution that is continuous and symmetric around
zero, say uniform in [−1, 1] as in the full version of [24]. This class of games contains




 for both. Our results carry over even if the game has uncountably many
Nash equilibria.
Biological Interpretation. Our work sheds new light on the role of natural se-
lection in haploid genetics. We show that natural selection acts as an antagonistic
process to the preservation of genetic diversity. The long term preservation of genetic
diversity needs to be safeguarded by evolutionary mechanisms which are orthogonal
to natural selection such as mutations and speciation (see Chapter 4 mutations and
dynamic environments). This view, although may appear linguistically puzzling at
first, is completely compatible with the mixability interpretation of [78, 23]. Mix-
ability implies that good “mixer” alleles, i.e., alleles that enjoy high fitness in the
current genotypic landscape) gain an evolutionary advantage over their competition.
On the other hand, the preservation of mixed populations relies on this evolution-
ary race between alleles having no clear long term winner with the average-over-time
mixability of two, or more, alleles being roughly equal (in game theoretic terms, in
order for two strategies to be played with positive probability by the same agent in
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the long run, it must be the case that the time-average expected utilities of these
two strategies are roughly equal. The time average here is over the history of play
so far). As with actual races, ties are rare and hence mixability leads to non-mixed
populations in the long run. According to recent PNAS commentary [12] some of
the points in [23] raised questions when compared against commonly held beliefs in
mathematical biology.
“Chastain et al. suggest that the representation of selection as (partially)
maximizing entropy may help us understand how selection maintains di-
versity. However, it is widely believed that selection on haploids (the rele-
vant case here) cannot maintain a stable polymorphic equilibrium. There
seems to be no formal proof of this in the population genetic literature. . . ”
Our argument above helps bridge this gap between belief and theory.
2.2 Related work
The earliest connection, to our knowledge, between MWUA and genetics lies in
[70], where such a connection is established between MWUA (in its usual exponential
form) and replicator dynamics [132, 125], one of the most basic tools in mathematical
ecology, genetics, and mathematical theory of selection and evolution. Specifically,
MWUA is up to first order approximation equivalent to replicator dynamics. Since
the MWUA variant examined in [23] is an approximation of its standard exponential
form, these results follow a unified theme. MWUA in its classic form is up to first or-
der approximation equivalent to models of evolution. The MWUA variant examined
in [23] was introduced by Losert and Akin in [82] in a paper that also brings biology
and game theory together. Specifically, they prove the first point-wise convergence to
equilibria for a class of evolutionary dynamics resolving an open question at the time.
We build on the techniques of this paper, while also exploiting the (in)stability anal-
ysis of mixed equilibria along the lines of [70]. The connection between MWUA and
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replicator dynamics by [70] also immediately implies connections between MWUA
and mathematical ecology. This is because replicator dynamics is known to be equiv-
alent (up to a diffeomorphism) to the classic prey/predator population models of
Lotka-Voltera [61].
As a result of the discrete nature of MWUA, its game theoretic analysis tends to
be trickier than that of its continuous time variant, the replicator. Analyzed settings
of this family of dynamics include zero-sum games [3, 123], congestion games [70],
games with non-converging behavior [37, 57, 11] and as well as families of network
coordination games (see Chapter 6). New techniques can predict analytically the
limit point of replicator systems starting from randomly chosen initial condition.
This approach is referred to as average case analysis of game dynamics (Chapter 6).
2.3 Technical Overview
Technically, our result is based mostly on two prior works. In [70] the generic
instability of mixed Nash was established for other variants of MWUA, including the
replicator equation. Our instability analysis follows along similar lines. Any linearly
stable equilibrium is shown to be a weakly stable Nash equilibrium [70]. A weakly
stable Nash is a Nash equilibrium that satisfies the extra property that if you force any
single randomizing agent to play any strategy in his current support with probability
one, all other agents remain indifferent between the strategies in their support. This is
a strong refinement of the Nash equilibrium property and in two agent coordination
games under our genericity assumption it coincides with the notion of pure Nash.
Since mixed equilibria are linearly unstable, by applying the Center-Stable Manifold
Theorem 1.3 we establish that locally the set of initial conditions that converge to such
an equilibrium is of measure zero. To translate this to a global statement about the
size of the region of attraction technical smoothness conditions must be established
about the discrete time map. For continuous time systems, such as the replicator
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[70], these are standard. Our analysis does not require any additive noise. Also, our
system is deterministic, implying a stronger convergence result.
In the case of coordination games with isolated equilibria our theorem follows
by combining the zero measure regions of attraction of all unstable equilibria via
union bound arguments. The case of uncountably infinite equilibria is tricky and
requires specialized arguments. Intuitively the problem lies on the fact that a) black
box union bound arguments do not suffice, b) the standard convergence results in
potential games merely imply convergence to equilibrium sets, i.e., the distance of
the state from the set of equilibria goes to zero, instead of the stronger point-wise
convergence, i.e., every trajectory has a unique (equilibrium) limit point. Set-wise
convergence allows for complicated non-local trajectories that weave infinitely often
in and out of the neighborhood of an equilibrium making topological arguments hard.
Once point-wise convergence has been established (Theorem 2.3), the continuum of
equilibria can be chopped down into countable many pieces via Lindelőf’s lemma A.1
and once again standard union bound arguments suffice. Nagylaki et al. point-wise
convergence result [93] does not apply here, because their hyperbolicity assumption
is not satisfied. Further, assuming s→ 0, they analyze a continuous time dynamical
system governed by a differential equation. Unlike Nagylaki the system we analyze is
discrete MWUA, and establish point-wise convergence to pure Nash equilibria almost
always following the work of Losert and Akin [82], even if hyperbolicity is not satisfied
(uncountably many equilibria).
We close the chapter with some technical observations about the speed of diver-
gence from the set of unstable equilibria as well as discussing an average case analysis
approach for predicting the probabilities that we converge to any of the pure equilib-
ria given a random initial condition (this approach is analyzed in detail and for many
classes of games in Chapter 6). We believe that these observations could stimulate
future work in the area.
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2.4 Preliminaries
In this section we formally describe the dynamics under consideration, and its
equivalence with MWUA in evolution. Moreover, we describe some known results
about this dynamics, shown by Losert and Akin [82].
2.4.1 Haploid evolution and MWUA
Chastain et al. [23] observed that the update rule derived by Nagylaki [92] for
allele frequencies, during evolutionary process under weak selection, is exactly mul-
tiplicative weight update algorithm (MWUA) applied on coordination game, where
genes are players and alleles are their strategies. Formally, if fitness values of a genome
defined by a combination of alleles (strategy profile) is from [1− s, 1 + s] for a small
s > 0 (weak selection), then for the two-gene (two-player) case such a fitness matrix
can be written as B = 1m×n + εC
3, where each Cij ∈ R and ε  1. This, defines
a coordination game (B,B). Further, the change in allele frequencies in each new
generation is as per the following rule:
∀i, xi(t+ 1) =
xi(t)(1 + ε(Cy(t))i)
1 + εx(t)>Cy(t)



















We study convergence of discrete MWUA through this reformulation, i.e., discrete
replicator dynamics. In general, given a game (A,B)4 consider the update rule (map)
f : ∆m ×∆n → ∆m ×∆n,
For (x,y) ∈ ∆m ×∆n if (x′,y′) = f(x,y), then
∀i ∈ S1, x′i = xi (Ay)ix>Ay ,





3m,n are the number of alleles (strategies) for first and second gene (player) respectively.
4A,B have size m× n.
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Clearly, x′ ∈ ∆m,y′ ∈ ∆n, and therefore f is well-defined. Starting with (x(0),y(0)),
the strategy profile at time t ≥ 1 is (x(t),y(t)) = f(x(t−1),y(t−1)) = f t(x(0),y(0)).
2.4.2 Losert and Akin
Losert and Akin showed a very interesting result on the convergence of discrete
replicator dynamics when applied on evolutionary games [18] with positive matrix.
These games are symmetric games, where pure strategies are species and the player
is playing against itself, i.e., symmetric strategy (x = y). Consider a k × k positive
matrix A, and the following dynamics, called discrete replicator dynamics, starting
with z(0) ∈ ∆k




Clearly, z(t+ 1) ∈ ∆k, ∀t ≥ 1. Thus, there is a map fs : ∆k → ∆k corresponding to






z(t+ 1) = fs(z(t)) = f
t+1
s (z(0)). (15)
If z(t) is a fixed point of fs then z(t
′) = z(t), ∀t′ ≥ t. Losert and Akin [82] proved
that the above dynamical system converges point-wise to fixed point, and that map
f is a diffeomorphism in an open set that contains ∆k. Formally:
Theorem 2.1 (Convergence and diffeomorhism [82]). Let {z(t)} be an orbit for
the dynamic of (14). As t→∞, z(t) converges to a unique fixed point q. Additionally,
the map fs corresponding to (14) is a diffeomorphism in an neighborhood of ∆k.
2.5 Proving the result
2.5.1 Point-wise convergence and diffeomorphism
In this section we show that the discrete replicator dynamics of (13), when applied
to a two-player coordination game (B,B), converges point-wise to a fixed point of f
under weak selection. Further, map f is diffeomorphism. Essentially we will reduce
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the problem to applying discrete replicator dynamics on symmetric game with positive
matrix and then use the result of Losert and Akin [82] (Theorem 2.1).
Under weak selection regime we have Bij ∈ [1− s, 1 + s], ∀(i, j), for some s < 1.
Let ε < 1− s, and consider the following matrix
A =
 εm×m B − ε
B> − ε εn×n
 . (16)
We will show that applying dynamics of (13) on game (B,B>) starting at (x(0),y(0))





Lemma 2.2 (Reduction to replicator dynamics). Given (x(0),y(0)) ∈ ∆m×∆n,




), then ∀t ≥ 0, (x(t),y(t)) = 2 · z(t), where x(t) and y(t) are as
per (13) and z(t) is as per (14).
Proof. We will show the result by induction. By hypothesis the base case of t = 0
holds. Suppose, it holds up to time t, then let x = x(t + 1), y = y(t + 1) and































Similarly, we can show that ∀j ≤ n, y′j = yj2 , and the lemma follows.
Lemma 2.2 establishes equivalence between games (B,B) and (A,A>) in terms of
dynamics, and thus the next theorem follows using Theorem 2.1.
Theorem 2.3 (Convergence and diffeomorphism for haploid evolution). Let
{x(t),y(t)} be an orbit for the dynamic of (13). As t approaches ∞, (x(t),y(t))
converges to a unique fixed point (p,q). Additionally, the map F corresponding to
(13) is a diffeomorphism in an neighborhood of ∆m ×∆n.
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2.5.2 Convergence to pure NE almost always
In Section 2.5.1 we saw that dynamics of (13) converges to a fixed point regardless
of where we start in coordination games with weak selection. However, which equi-
librium it converges to depends on the starting point. In this section we show that it
almost always converge to a pure Nash equilibrium under mild genericity assumptions
on the game matrix. In the light of the known fact that a coordination game (B,B),
where Bijs are chosen uniformly at random from [1−s, 1+s], may have exponentially
many mixed NE [24], this result comes as a surprise.
To show the result, we use the concept of weakly stable Nash equilibrium [70]. This
is a refinement of the classic notion of equilibrium and we show that for coordination
games it coincides with pure NE under some mild assumptions. Further, we connect
them to stable fixed points of f (13) by showing that all stable fixed points of f are
weakly stable NE. Finally, using the Center-Stable Manifold Theorem 1.3 we show
that dynamics defined by f converges to stable fixed points except for a zero measure
set of starting points.
Definition 10 (Weakly stable NE). A Nash equilibrium (x,y) is called weakly
stable if fixing one of the players to choosing a pure strategy in the support of her
strategy with probability one, leaves the other player indifferent between the strategies
in his support, e.g., let T1 and T2 are supports of x and y respectively, then for
any i ∈ T1 if the first player plays i with probability one then the second player is
indifferent between all the strategies of T2, and vice-versa.
Note that pure NE are always weakly stable, and coordination games always have
pure NE. Further, for a mixed-equilibrium to be weakly stable, for any i ∈ T1 all the
Bij’s corresponding to j ∈ T2 are the same. Thus, the next lemma follows.
Lemma 2.4 (Weakly stable NE implies pure). If coordinates of a row or a
column of B are all distinct, then every weakly stable equilibrium is a pure NE.
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Proof. To the contrary suppose (x,y) is a mixed weakly stable NE, then for T1 =
{i | xi > 0} and T2 = {j | yj > 0} we have ∀i ∈ T1, Bij = Bij′ , ∀j 6= j′ ∈ T2, a
contradiction.
Remark 4. We note that the games analyzed in [24], where entries of matrix B are
chosen uniformly at random from the interval [1− s, 1 + s], will have distinct entries
in each of its rows/columns with probability one, and thereby due to Lemma 2.4 all
its weakly stable NE are pure NE.
Stability of a fixed point is defined based on eigenvalues of Jacobian matrix eval-
uated at the fixed point. So let us first describe the Jacobian matrix of function f .
We denote this matrix by J which is m+ n×m+ n, and let fk denote the function














































Now in order to use Center-Stable Manifold Theorem (see Theorem 1.3), we need
a map whose domain is full-dimensional around the fixed point. However, an n-
dimensional simplex (∆n) in Rn has dimension n− 1, and therefore the domain of f ,
namely ∆m × ∆n is of dimension m + n − 2 in space Rm+n. Therefore, we need to
take a projection of the domain space and accordingly redefine the map f . We note
that the projection we take will be fixed point dependent; this is to keep the proof of
Lemma 2.6 relatively less involved later.
Let r = (p,q) be a fixed point of map f in ∆m ×∆n. Define i(r) and j(r) to be
coordinates of p and q respectively that are non-zero, i.e., pi(r) > 0 and qj(r) > 0.
Consider the mapping zr : R
m+n → Rm+n−2 so that we exclude from each player
1, 2 the variables xi(r), yj(r) respectively. We substitute the variables xi(r) with 1 −∑
i 6=i(r) xi and yj(r) with 1−
∑
j 6=j(r) yj. Consider map f under the projection zr, and let
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× det(λI − Jr),
where Jr corresponds to Jr at r by deleting rows i, columns j with pi = 0 and qj = 0.
Lemma 2.5 (Linearly stable implies NE). Every linearly stable fixed point is a
Nash Equilibrium.
Proof. Assume that a linearly stable fixed point r is not a Nash equilibrium. Without
loss of generality suppose player t = 1 can deviate and gain. Since r is a fixed point
of map f , ∀pi > 0 ⇒ (Bq)i = p>Bq. Hence, there exists a strategy i ≤ m such that
pi = 0 and (Bq)i > p
>Bq. Then the characteristic polynomial has (Bq)i
p>Bq
> 1 as a
root, a contradiction.
We are going to show that the dynamics of (13) converge to linearly stable fixed
point except for measure zero starting conditions. However, what we want is that
it almost always converge to weakly stable NE. So, let us first establish a relation
between stable fixed points and weakly stable NE.
Lemma 2.6 (Linearly stable implies weakly stable NE). Every linearly stable
fixed point is a weakly stable Nash equilibrium.
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Proof. Let k × k be the size of matrix Jr. If k = 0 then the equilibrium is pure and
therefore is stable. For the case when k > 0, let Tp and Tq be the support of p and
q respectively, i.e., Tp = {i | pi > 0} and similarly Tq. If we show that ∀i, i′ ∈ Tp
and ∀j, j′ ∈ Tq, M i,i′,j,j′ = (Bij − Bi′j) − (Bij′ − Bi′j′) = 0, then using argument
similar to Theorem 3.8 in [70], the lemma follows. We show this using the expression
of tr((Jr)2) (tr denotes the trace).





























Proof of Claim. Since Jrii′ = 0, Jr(m+j)(m+j′) = 0 for i 6= i′ and j 6= j′, and Jrii = 1,
Jr(m+j)(m+j) = 1 we get that




We consider the following cases:
• Let i < i′ with i, i′ 6= i(r) and j < j′ with j, j′ 6= j(r) and we examine the term
1
(p>Bq)2
piqjpi′qj′ in the sum and we get that it appears with
[[M i,i
′,j,j(r)]× [M i,i(r),j,j′ ] + [M i,i′,j,j(r)]× [M i(r),i′,j,j′ ]
+[M i,i
′,j(r),j′ ]× [M i,i(r),j,j′ ] + [M i,i′,j(r),j′ ]× [M i(r),i′,j,j′ ]
=(M i,i
′,j,j′)2.
• Let i 6= i(r) and j 6= j(r). The term 1
(p>Bq)2
piqjpi(r)qj(r) in the sum appears in
multiplication with (M i,i(r),j,j(r))2.
• Let i < i′ with i, i′ 6= i(r) and j 6= j(r). The term 1
(p>Bq)2




′,j,j(r)]× [M i,i(r),j,j(r)] + [M i,i′,j,j(r)]× [M i(r),i′,j,j(r)]
=(M i,i
′,j,j(r))2.
• Similarly to the previous case, for j < j′ with j, j′ 6= j(r) and i 6= i(r). The
term 1
(p>Bq)2
piqjpi(r)qj′ in the sum appears with (M
i,i(r),j,j′)2.
The trace of (Jr)2 can not be larger than k, otherwise there exists an eigenvalue with
absolute value greater than one contradicting r being a stable fixed point. From the
above claim, it is clear that tr((Jr)2) ≥ k and it is exactly k if and only if M i,i′,j,j′ = 0,
∀i, i′ ∈ T1 and j, j′ ∈ T2, and the lemma follows.
We show that except for zero measure starting points (x(0),y(0)) the dynamics of
(13) converges to stable fixed points using the Center-Stable Manifold Theorem 1.3,
which proves the next theorem.
Theorem 2.8 (Replicator converges to stable fixed points). The set of initial
conditions in ∆m ×∆n so that the dynamical system with Equations (13) converges
to unstable fixed points has measure zero.
Proof. To prove Theorem 2.8, we will make use of Center-Stable manifold theorem
(Theorem 1.3). First we need to project the domain to a lower dimensional space. We
consider the (diffeomorphism) function g that is a projection of the points (x,y) ∈
Rm+n to Rm+n−2 by excluding a specific (the ”first”) variable for each player (we know
that the probabilities must sum up to one for each player). Let N = m + n, then
we denote this projection of ∆ ··= ∆m × ∆n by g(∆), i.e., (x,y) →g (x′,y′) where
x′ = (x2, . . . , xn) and y
′ = (y2, . . . , yn). Further, recall the fixed point dependent
projection function zr defined in Section 2.5.2, where we remove xi(r) and yj(r).
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Let f be the update of dynamical system (13). For an unstable fixed point r we
consider the function ψr(v) = zr ◦f ◦z−1r (v) which is diffeomorphism (due to theorem
2.3 in a neighborhood of g(∆)), with v ∈ RN−2. Let Br be the (open) ball derived
from Theorem 1.3 and we consider the union of these balls (transformed in RN−2)
A = ∪rAr,




r ”returns” the set Br back to RN). Set Ar is an open
subset of RN−2 (by continuity of zr and g being diffeomorphism). Due to the Lindelőf’s
Lemma A.1, we can find a countable subcover for A, i.e., there exists fixed points
r1, r2, . . . such that A = ∪∞m=1Arm .
For a t ∈ N let ψt,r(v) the point after t iteration of dynamics (13), starting with
v, under projection zr, i.e., ψt,r(v) = zr ◦ f t ◦ z−1r (v). If point v ∈ g(∆) (which
corresponds to g−1(v) in our original ∆) has as unstable fixed point as a limit, there
must exist a t0 and m so that ψt,rm ◦ zrm ◦ g−1(v) ∈ Brm for all t ≥ t0 (we have
point-wise convergence from Theorem 2.3) and therefore again from Theorem 1.3 and
the fact that g(∆) is invariant we get that ψt0,rm ◦ zrm ◦ g−1(v) ∈ W scloc(rm), hence
v ∈ g ◦ z−1rm ◦ψ−1t0,rm(W scloc(rm)∩ zrm(∆)). Hence the set of points in g(∆) whose ω-limit
has an unstable equilibrium is a subset of
C = ∪∞m=1 ∪∞t=1 g ◦ z−1rm ◦ ψ−1t,rm(W scloc(rm) ∩ zrm(∆)). (18)
Since rm is linearly unstable, it holds that dim(E
u) ≥ 1, and therefore dimension
of W scloc(rm) is at most N − 3. Thus, the set W scloc(rm)∩ zrm(∆) has Lebesgue measure
zero in RN−2. Finally since g◦z−1rm ◦ψ−1t,rm : RN−2 → RN−2 is continuously differentiable
(in a neighborhood of g(∆), by Theorem 2.3), ψt,rm is C
1 and locally Lipschitz (see
p.71 in [110]). Therefore using Lemma A.2, it preserves the null-sets, and thereby we
get that C is a countable union of measure zero sets, i.e., is measure zero as well, and
Theorem 2.8 follows.
Theorem 2.8 together with Lemmas 2.4 and 2.6 gives the following main result.
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Theorem 2.9 (Main Theorem - Convergence to pure). For all but measure
zero initial conditions in ∆m × ∆n, the dynamical system (13) when applied to a
coordination game (B,B) with Bij ∈ [1 − s, 1 + s], ∀(i, j) for s < 1, converges to
weakly stable Nash equilibria. Furthermore, assuming that entries in each row and
column of B are distinct, it converges to pure Nash equilibria.
2.6 Figure of stable/unstable manifolds in simple example




. Since this game has two agents with two strategies each, in order
to capture the state space of game it suffices to describe one number for each agent,
namely the probability with which he will play his first strategy. This game has three







. We depict them
using small circles in the figure. The mixed equilibrium has a stable manifold of zero
measure that we depict with a black line. In contrast, each pure Nash equilibrium
has region of attraction of positive measure. The stable manifold of the mixed NE
separates the regions of attraction of the two pure equilibria. The (0, 0) equilibrium
has larger region of attraction, represented by darker region in the figure. It is the risk
dominant equilibrium of the game. In Chapter 6 we provide techniques to compute
such objects (stable manifolds, volumes of region of attraction) analytically.
Figure 3: Regions of attraction for B = [1 0; 0 3], where ◦ correspond to NE points.
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2.7 Discussion
Building on the observation of [23] that the process of natural selection under weak
selection regime can be modeled as discrete Multiplicative weight update dynamics
on coordination games, we showed that it converges to pure NE almost always in the
case of two-player games. As a consequence natural selection alone seem to lead to
extinction of genetic diversity in the long term limit, a widely believed conjecture
of haploid genetics [12]. Thus, the long term preservation of genetic diversity must
be safeguarded by evolutionary mechanisms which are orthogonal to natural selection
such as mutations and speciation (see Chapter 4). This calls for modeling and study of
these latter phenomenon in game theoretic terms under discrete replicator dynamics.
Additionally below we observe that in some special cases, (i) the rate of convergence of
discrete replicator dynamics is doubly exponentially fast in some special cases, and (ii)
the expected fitness of the resulting population, starting with a random distribution,
under such dynamics is constant factor away from the optimum fitness. It will be
interesting to get similar results for the general case of two-player coordination games.
Rate of Convergence. Let’s consider a special case where B is a square diagonal
matrix. In that case, starting from any point (x(0),y(0)) observe that after one time
step, we get that x(1) = y(1) (i.e., f(x(0)) = f(y(0))). Therefore without loss of
generality let us assume that x(0) = y(0). Then both the players get the same payoff
from each of their pure strategies in the first play as B = B>. And thus it follows
that fn(x(0)) = fn(y(0)) for all n ≥ 1. Let Ui(t) be the payoff that both gets from
their i-th strategy at time t (both will get the same payoff). Suppose for i 6= j we





















Thus the ratio between payoffs from each pure strategy increases doubly exponentially,
and the next lemma follows.
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Lemma 2.10 (Rate of convergence). If z = minj
Ui∗ (0)
Uj(0)
where i∗ ∈ arg maxk Uk(0),
we get that after O(log log 1
zε
) we are ε-close to a Nash equilibrium with support
arg maxk Uk(0) (in terms of the total variation distance).
2.8 Conclusion and remarks
The results of this chapter appear in [84]. We show that standard mathematical
models of haploid evolution imply the extinction of genetic diversity in the long term
limit. This reflects a widely believed conjecture in population genetics [12]. We
prove this via recent established connections between game theory, learning theory
and genetics [24, 23]. Specifically, in game theoretic terms we show that in the
case of coordination games, under minimal genericity assumptions, discrete MWUA
converges to pure Nash equilibria for all but a zero measure of initial conditions. This
result holds despite the fact that mixed Nash equilibria can be exponentially (or even
uncountably) many, completely dominating in number the set of pure Nash equilibria.
Thus, in haploid organisms the long term preservation of genetic diversity needs to
be safeguarded by other evolutionary mechanisms such as mutations and speciation
(see Chapter 4 for mutations and dynamic environments).
The intersection between computer science, genetics and game theory has already
provided some unexpected results and interesting novel connections. As these connec-
tions become clearer, new questions emerge alongside the possibility of transferring
knowledge between these areas. In Section 2.7 we raised some novel questions that
have to do with speed of dynamics as well as the possibility of understanding the evo-
lution of biological systems given random initial conditions. Such an approach can
be thought of as a middle ground between price of anarchy (worst case scenario) and
price of stability (best case scenario) in game theory. We believe that this approach
can also be useful from the standard game theoretic lens (see Chapter 6).
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CHAPTER III
COMPLEXITY OF GENETIC DIVERSITY IN DIPLOIDS
3.1 Introduction
The beauty and complexity of natural ecosystems have always been a source of
fascination and inspiration for the human mind. The exquisite biodiversity of Gala-
pagos’ ecosystem, in fact, inspired Darwin to propose his theory of natural selection
as an explanatory mechanism for the origin and evolution of species. This revolution-
ary idea can be encapsulated in the catch phrase “survival of the fittest.”1 Natural
selection promotes the survival of those genetic traits that provide to their carriers
an evolutionary advantage.
Arguably, the most influential result in the area of mathematical biology is Fisher’s
fundamental theorem of natural selection (1930) [51]. It states that the rate of increase
in fitness of any organism at any time is equal to its genetic variance in fitness at that
time. In the classical model of population genetics (Fisher-Wright-Haldane, discrete
or continuous version) of single locus (one gene) multi-allele diploid models it implies
that the average fitness of the species populations is always strictly increasing unless
we are at an equilibrium. In fact, convergence to equilibrium is point-wise2 even
if there exist continuum of equilibria (see [82] and references therein). This strong
result was used in the previous chapter to show Theorem 2.9 (essentially by reducing
the haploid dynamics to the classic replicator dynamics). Theorem 2.9 states that
in haploids systems all mixed (polymorphic) equilibria are unstable and evolution
converges to monomorphic states. However, in the case of diploid systems the answer
1The phrase “survival of the fittest” was coined by Herbert Spencer.
2From dynamical systems perspective, this establishes that the average fitness acts as a Lyapunov
function for the system and that every trajectory converges to an equilibrium.
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to whether diversity survives or not depends crucially on the geometry of the fitness
landscape.
Besides the purely dynamical systems interpretation, an alternative, more pal-
pable, game theoretic interpretation of these (diploid) genetic systems is possible.
Specifically, these systems can be interpreted as symmetric coordination/partnership
two-agent games where both agents, starting with the same mixed initial strategy
and applying (discrete) replicator dynamics. The analogies are as follows (this is very
close to the interpretation we see in the previous chapter due to Chastain et al. [23]):
The two players are two gene locations on a chromosome pair, and the alleles are
their strategies. When both players choose a strategy, say i and j, an individual
(i, j) is defined whose fitness, say Aij, is the payoff to both players, hence we have
a coordination game. Furthermore, allele pairs are unordered so we have Aij = Aji,
i.e., A is symmetric and so is the game. The frequencies of the alleles in the initial
population, namely x := (x1, ..., xn) ∈ ∆n 3 of n different alleles, corresponds to the
initial common mixed strategy of both players. In each generation, every individual
from the population mates with another individual picked at random from the pop-







where x′i is the proportion of allele i in the next generation (for details see Section
3.4). In game theoretic language, the fundamental theorem of natural selection implies
that the social welfare x>Ax (average fitness in biology terms) of the game acts as
potential for the game dynamics. This implies convergence to fixed points of the
dynamics (see Theorem 2.1). Fixed points are superset of Nash equilibria where each
strategy played with positive probability fetches the same average payoff.
3Recall that ∆n denotes the simplex of dimension n.
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We say that population is genetically diverse if at least two alleles have non-
zero proportion in the population, i.e., allele frequencies form a mixed (polymorphic)
strategy. The game theoretic results do not provide insight on the survival of genetic
diversity. One way to formalize this question is whether there exists a mixed fixed point
that the dynamics converges to with positive probability, given a uniformly random
starting point in ∆n. The answer to this question for the minimal case of n = 2
alleles (alleles b/B, individuals bb/bB/BB) is textbook knowledge and can be traced
back to the classic work of Kalmus (1945) [64]. The intuitive answer here is that
diversity can survive when the heterozygote individuals (see A.1 for terms used in
biology), bB, have a fitness advantage. Intuitively, this can be explained by the fact
that even if evolution tries to dominate the genetic landscape by bB individuals,
the random genetic mixing during reproduction will always produce some bb, BB
individuals, so the equilibrium that this process is bound to reach will be mixed. On
the other hand, it is trivial to create instances where homozygote individuals are the
dominant species regardless of the initial condition.
As we increase the size/complexity of the fitness landscape, not only is not clear
that a tight characterization of the diversity-inducing fitness landscape exists (a ques-
tion about global stability of nonlinear dynamical systems), but also, it is even less
clear whether one can decide efficiently whether such conditions are satisfied by a
given fitness landscape (a computational complexity consideration). How can one
address this challenge and moreover, how can one account for the apparent genetic
diversity of the ecosystems around us?
Our contribution. In a nutshell, we establish that the decision version of the prob-
lem is computationally hard (see Theorems 3.27, 3.33), by sandwiching limit points
of the dynamics between various stability notions (Theorem 3.1 or 3.11). This core
result is shown to be robust across a number of directions. Deciding the existence of
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stable (mixed) polymorphic equilibria remains hard under a host of different defini-
tions of stability examined in the dynamical systems literature. The hardness results
persist even if we restrict the set of allowable landscape instances to reflect typical
instance characteristics (see Theorem 3.31). Despite the hardness of the decision
problems, randomly chosen fitness landscapes are shown to support polymorphism
with significant probability (at least 1/3, see Theorem 3.17). The game theoretic inter-
pretation of our results allow for proving hardness results for understanding standard
game theoretic dynamics in symmetric coordination games. We believe that this is
an important result of independent interest as it points out at a different source of
complexity in understanding social dynamics.
3.2 Related work
Analyzing limit sets of dynamical systems is a critical step towards understanding
the behavior of processes that are inherently dynamic, like evolution. There has been
an upsurge in studying the complexity of computing these sets. Quite few works study
such questions for dynamical systems governed by arbitrary continuous functions or
ordinary differential equations [66, 65, 131]. Limit cycles are inherently connected
to dynamical systems and recent works by Papadimitriou and Vishnoi [107] showed
that computing a point on an approximate limit cycle is PSPACE-complete. On the
positive side, in Chapter 5 we will show that a class of evolutionary Markov chains
mix rapidly, where techniques from dynamical systems are used.
The complexity of checking if a game has an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS)
has been studied first by Nisan and then by Etessami and Lochbihler [97, 46] and
has been nailed down to be ΣP2 -complete by Conitzer [31]. These decision problems
are completely orthogonal to understanding the persistence of genetic diversity. Fi-




To study survival of diversity in diploidy, we need to characterize limiting popu-
lation under evolutionary pressure. We focus on the simplest case of single locus (one
gene) species. For this case, evolution under natural selection has been shown to fol-
low replicator dynamics in symmetric two-player coordination games ([82], Equations
(14)), where the genes on two chromosomes are players and alleles are their strategies
as described in the introduction. Losert and Akin established point-wise convergence
for this dynamics through a potential function argument [82] (for more information
see Theorem 2.1); here average fitness x>Ax is the potential. The limiting popula-
tion corresponds to fixed points, and so to make predictions about diversity (if the
limiting population has support size at least 2) we need to characterize and compute
these limiting fixed points.
Let L denote the set of fixed points with region of attraction of positive (Lebesgue)
measure. Hence, given a random starting point replicator dynamics converges to such
a fixed point with positive probability. It seems that an exact characterization of L
is unlikely because we do not know necessary and sufficient conditions so that a fixed
point has a region of attraction of positive measure. Instead we try to capture it as
closely as possible through different stability notions. First we consider two standard
notions defined by Lyapunov, the stable and asymptotically stable fixed point (see
Introduction). If we start close to a stable fixed point then we stay close forever,
while in case of asymptotically stable fixed point furthermore the dynamics converges
to it (see Section 3.4.2). Thus set of asymptotically stable ⊆ L follows, i.e., an
asymptotically stable fixed point has region of attraction of positive measure (e.g., a
small ball around the fixed point).
Certain properties of these stability notions using the absolute eigenvalues (EVal)
of the Jacobian of the update rule (function) of the dynamics are well known: if
the Jacobian at a fixed point has an EVal > 1 then the fixed point is un-stable (not
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stable), and if all EVal < 1 then it is asymptotically stable. The case when all EVal
≤ 1 with equality holding for some, is the ambiguous one. In that case we can say
nothing about the stability because the Jacobian does not suffice. We call these fixed
points linearly stable (Definition 4). At a fixed point, say x, if some EVal > 1 then the
direction of corresponding eigenvector is repelling, and therefore any starting vector
with a component of this vector can never converge to x. Thus points converging
to x can not have positive measure. Using this as an intuition we show that L ⊆
set of linearly stable fixed points. In other words the set of initial points so that
the dynamics converges to linearly un-stable fixed points has zero measure (Theorem
3.6). This theorem is heavily utilized to understand (non-)existence of diversity.
Efficient computation requires efficient verification. However, note that whether
a given fixed point is (asymptotically) stable or not does not seem easy to verify. To
achieve this, one of the contributions of this chapter is the definition of two more
notions: Nash stable and strict Nash stable. 4 It is easy to see that NE of the
corresponding coordination game described in introduction are fixed points of the
replicator dynamics (Equations (19),(20)) but not vice-versa. Keeping this in mind
we define Nash stable fixed point, which is a NE and the sub-matrix corresponding
to its support satisfies certain negative semi-definiteness. The latter condition is
derived from the fact that stability is related to local optima of x>Ax and also from
Sylvester’s law of inertia [99] (see Section 3.5 and proofs). For strict Nash stable both
conditions are strict, namely strict NE and negative definite. Combining all of these
notions we show the following:
4These two notions are not the same as evolutionary stable strategies/states.
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Theorem 3.1 (Relations between stability notions).
Strict Nash stable ⊆ Asymptotically stable ⊆ L ⊆ linearly stable = Nash stable
⊇
stable ⊆ linearly stable = Nash stable
We note that the sets asymptotically stable, stable, L and linearly stable of Theorem
3.1 do not coincide in general. The example below makes the statement clear.




xt, g(xt) = xt −
1
2
x2t , h(xt) = xt +
x3t
2
, d(xt) = xt.
Then for dynamics governed by f , 0 is asymptotically stable, stable and linearly
stable, and hence is also in L. While for g it is linearly stable and is in L, but is
not stable or asymptotically stable. For d it is linearly stable and stable, but not
asymptotically stable and is not in L. Finally, for h it is only linearly stable, and
does not belong to any other class.5
Our primary goal was to see if diversity is going to survive. We formalize this by
checking whether set L contains a mixed point, i.e., where more than one alleles have
non-zero proportion, implying that diversity survives with some positive probability,
where the randomness is w.r.t the random initial x ∈ ∆m. In Section 3.7 we show that
for all five notions of stability, checking existence of mixed fixed point is NP-hard.
This gives NP-hardness for checking survival of diversity as well.
Theorem 3.2 (Informal - Hard to predict diversity). Given a symmetric matrix
A, it is NP-hard to check if replicator dynamics with payoff A has mixed (asymptot-
ically) stable, linear-stable, or (strict) Nash stable fixed points. A common reduction
for all together with Theorem 3.1 will imply that it is NP-hard to check whether di-
versity survives for a given fitness matrix.
5We also note that generically these sets coincide for replicator dynamics. It can be shown [83]
that given a fitness matrix, its entries can be perturbed to ensure that fixed points are hyperbolic.
Formally, if we consider the dynamics as an operator (called Fisher operator) then the set of hyper-















Figure 4: Matrix A of the reduction, see (24).
Our reductions are from k-clique - given an undirected graph check if it has a clique
of size k; a well known NP-hard problem. Given an instance G of k-clique, we will
construct a symmetric matrix A as shown in Figure 4, and consider coordination
game (A,A). We show that if G has a clique of size k then (A,A) has a mixed strict
Nash stable equilibrium, and if (A,A) has a mixed Nash stable equilibrium then G
has a clique of size k. This together with the fact that all other notions of stability
including our target set L are sandwiched between strict Nash stable and Nash stable
equilibria implies checking existence of mixed fixed point for any notions of the (strict)
Nash stable, (asymptotically) stable, linearly stable, and L is NP-hard.
The main idea in the construction of matrix A (Figure 4) is to use modified version
of adjacency matrix E of the graph as one of the blocks in the payoff matrix such
that, (i) clique of size k or more implies a stable Nash equilibrium in that block, and
(ii) all stable mixed equilibria are only in that block. Here E ′ is modification of E
where off-diagonal zeros are replaced with −h; h is a large (polynomial-size) number.
The fitness matrix created for hardness results is very specific, while one could
argue that real-life fitness matrices may be more random. So is it easy to check
survival of diversity for a typical matrix? Or is it easy to check if a given allele
survives? We answer negatively for both of these.
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There has been a lot of work on NP-hardness for decision versions of Nash equilib-
rium in general games [59, 32, 124, 56], where finding one equilibrium is also PPAD-
hard [25]. Whereas to the best of our knowledge these are the first NP-hardness results
for coordination games, where finding one Nash equilibrium is easy, and therefore may
be of independent interest. Finally in Section 3.6 we show that even though checking
is hard, on average things are not that bad.
Theorem 3.3 (Informal - Survival with constant probability). If the entries
of a fitness matrix are i.i.d. on an atomless distribution then with significantly high
probability, at least 1/3, diversity will surely survive.
Sure survival happens if every fixed point in L is mixed. We show that this fact is
ensured if every diagonal entry (i, i) of the fitness matrix is dominated by some entry
in its row or column. Next we lower bound the probability of latter by a constant
for a random symmetric matrix (from atomless distribution) of any size. The tricky
part is to avoid correlations arising due to symmetry and we achieve this using an
inclusion-exclusion argument.
3.4 Preliminaries
In this section we formally describe the diploid dynamics, which is exactly discrete
replicator dynamics as described in Section 2.4.2, Equations (14).
3.4.1 Infinite population dynamics for diploids
Consider a diploid single locus species, in other words species with chromosome
pair and single gene. Every gene has a set of representative alleles, like gene for eye
color has different alleles for brown, black and blue eyes. Let n be the number of alleles
for the single gene of our species, and let these be numbered 1, . . . , n. An individual
is represented by an unordered pair of alleles (i, j), and we denote its fitness by Aij.
The fitness represents its ability to reproduce during a mating. In every generation
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two individuals are picked uniformly at random from the population, say (i, j) and
(i′, j′), and they mate. The allele pair of the offspring can be any of the four possible
combinations, namely (i, i′), (i, j′), (i′, j), (j, j′), with equal probability.6 Let Xi be a
random variable that denotes the proportion of the population with allele i. After
one generation, the expected number of offsprings with allele i is proportional to
Xi · Xi · (AX)i + 2 · 12(1 − Xi)Xi · (AX)i = Xi(AX)i (X2i stands for the probability
that first individual has both his alleles i, i.e., is represented by (i, i) - and thus the
offspring will inherit allele i - and 21
2
(1 − Xi)Xi stands for the probability that the
first individual has allele i exactly once in his representation and the offspring will
inherit). Hence, if X denote the frequencies of the alleles in the population in the





We focus on the deterministic version of the equations above, which captures
the infinite population model. Thus if x ∈ ∆n represents the proportions of alleles
in the current population, under the evolutionary process of natural-selection (the
reproduction happens as described) this proportion changes as per the following multi-
variate function f : ∆n → ∆n under the infinite population model [82]; discrete
replicator dynamics (Chapter 2, Equations (14)).
x′ = f(x) where x′i = fi(x) = xi
(Ax)i
x>Ax
, ∀i ∈ [n] (20)
where x′ are the proportions of the next generation. f is a continuous function
with convex, compact domain (= range), and therefore always has a fixed point [63].
Further, limit points of f have to be fixed points.
6Punnett Square. See http://www.nature.com/scitable/topicpage/inheritance-of-traits-by-
offspring-follows-predictable-6524925 for a nice article.
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3.4.2 Stability and eigenvalues
By Definition 3 it follows that if x is asymptotically stable with respect to dynam-
ics f (20), then the set of initial conditions in ∆ so that the dynamics converge to x
has positive measure. Using the fact that under f the potential function π(x) = x>Ax
strictly decreases unless x is a fixed point, the next theorem was derived in [83].
Theorem 3.4 (Stable fixed points ⇔ local minima [83], § 9.4.7). A fixed point
r of dynamics (20) is stable if and only if it is a local maximum of π, and is asymp-
totically stable if and only if it is a strict local maximum.
As the domain of π is closed and bounded, there exists a global maximum of π in
∆n, which by Theorem 3.4 is a stable fixed point, and therefore its existence follows.
However, existence of asymptotically stable fixed point is not guaranteed, for example
if A = [1]m×n then no x ∈ ∆n is attracting under f .
To analyze limiting points of f with respect to the notion of stability in terms of
perturbation resistant, we need to use the eigenvalues of the Jacobian of f at fixed
points. Let Jr denote the Jacobian at r ∈ ∆n. The following theorem in dynam-
ics/control theory relates (asymptotically) stable fixed points with the eigenvalue of
its Jacobian. Theorem 1.2 implies that eigenvalues of the Jacobian at a stable fixed
point have absolute value at most 1, however the converse may not hold. Below we
provide the equations of the Jacobian.
Equations of Jacobian. Since f is defined on n variables while its domain is ∆n
which is of n− 1 dimension, we consider a projected Jacobian by replacing a strategy
t with xt > 0 by 1−
∑













If x is a fixed point of f , then using Remark 3.5 below the above simplifies to,
Jxii = 1 + xi
(Aii − Ait)
x>Ax









if xi, xj > 0 and J
x
ij = 0 if xi = 0.
Fact 3.5. Profile x is a fixed point of f iff ∀i ∈ [n], xi > 0⇒ (Ax)i = x>Ax.
Using properties of Jx and [82], we prove next:
Theorem 3.6 (Replicator converges to stable fixed points). The set of initial
conditions in ∆n so that the dynamics (20) converge to linearly unstable fixed points
has measure zero.
Proof. This is an application of Center-stable Manifold Theorem 1.3 and the proof
is similar to that of Theorem 2.9. To use Center-stable Manifold Theorem we need
to project the map of the dynamics (20) to a lower dimensional space. We consider
the (diffeomorphism) function g that is a projection of the points x ∈ Rn to Rn−1 by
excluding a specific (the ”first”) variable. We denote this projection of ∆n by g(∆n),
i.e., x→g (x′) where x′ = (x2, . . . , xn). Further, we define the fixed point dependent
projection function zr where we remove one variable xt so that rt > 0 (like function
g but the removed strategy must be chosen with positive probability at r).
Let f be the map of dynamical system (20). For a linearly unstable fixed point r
we consider the function ψr(v) = zr◦f ◦z−1r (v) which is C1 local diffeomorphism (due
to the point-wise convergence of f , i.e., Theorem 2.1, we know that the rule of the
dynamical system is a diffeomorphism), with v ∈ Rn−1. Let Br be the ball derived
from Theorem 1.3 and consider the union of these balls (transformed in Rn−1)
A = ∪rAr,




r ”returns” the set Br back to Rn). Set Ar is an open
subset of Rn−1 (by continuity of zr). Due to the Lindelőf’s Lemma A.1, we can
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find a countable subcover for A, i.e., there exists fixed points r1, r2, . . . such that
A = ∪∞m=1Arm .
For a t ∈ N let ψt,r(v) the point after t iteration of dynamics (20), starting with
v, under projection zr, i.e., ψt,r(v) = zr ◦ f t ◦ z−1r (v). If point v ∈ g(∆n) (which
corresponds to g−1(v) in our original ∆n) has a linearly unstable fixed point as a
limit, there must exist a t0 and m so that ψt,rm ◦ zrm ◦ g−1(v) ∈ Brm for all t ≥ t0 (we
have point-wise convergence from Theorem 2.1) and therefore again from Theorem
1.3 and the fact that g(∆n) is invariant we get that ψt0,rm ◦ zrm ◦ g−1(v) ∈ W scloc(rm),
hence v ∈ g◦z−1rm ◦ψ−1t0,rm(W scloc(rm)∩zrm(∆n)). Hence the set of points in g(∆n) whose
ω-limit has a linearly unstable equilibrium is a subset of
C = ∪∞m=1 ∪∞t=1 g ◦ z−1rm ◦ ψ−1t,rm(W scloc(rm) ∩ zrm(∆n)). (21)
Since rm is linearly unstable, it holds that dim(E
u) ≥ 1, and therefore dimension
of W scloc(rm) is at most n− 2. Thus, the set W scloc(rm)∩ zrm(∆n) has Lebesgue measure
zero in Rn−1. Finally since g ◦ z−1rm ◦ψ−1t,rm : Rn−1 → Rn−1 is continuously differentiable
(in a neighborhood of g(∆n), by Theorem 2.1), ψt,rm is C
1 and locally Lipschitz (see
[110] p.71). Therefore using Lemma A.2 below it preserves the null-sets, and thereby
we get that C is a countable union of measure zero sets, i.e., is measure zero as well,
and Theorem 3.6 follows.
In Theorem 3.6 we manage to discard only those fixed points whose Jacobian has
eigenvalue with absolute value > 1, while characterizing limiting points of f ; the
latter is finally used to argue about the survival of diversity.
3.5 Convergence, stability, and characterization
As established in Section 3.4.1, evolution in single locus diploid species is governed
by dynamics f of (20). Understanding survival of diversity requires to analyze the
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following set,
L = {x ∈ ∆n | positive measure of starting points converge to x under f}. (22)
By Definition 3 it follows that asymptotically stable ⊆ L. In addition, the charac-
terization of linearly stable fixed point from Theorem 3.6 implies L ⊆ linearly stable.
In this section we try to characterize L using various notions of stability, which have
game theoretic and combinatorial interpretation. These notions sandwich set-wise
the classic notions of stability given in the preliminaries, and thereby give us a partial
characterization of L. This characterization turns out to be crucial for our hardness
results as well as results on survival in random instances.
Given a symmetric matrix A, a two-player game (A,A) forms a symmetric coor-
dination game. We identify special symmetric NE of this game to characterize stable
fixed points of f . Given a profile x ∈ ∆n, define a transformed matrix T (A,x) of
dimension (k − 1)× (k − 1), where k = |SP (x)|, as follows.
Let SP (x) = {i1, . . . , ik}, B = T (A,x). ∀a, b < k,Bab = Aiaib + Aikik − Aiaik − Aikib .
(23)
Since A is symmetric it is easy to check that B is also symmetric, and therefore has
real eigenvalues. Recall the Definition 9 of strict symmetric NE.
Definition 11 (Notion of (strict) Nash stable). A strategy x is called (strict)
Nash stable if it is a (strict) symmetric NE of the game (A,A), and T (A,x) is negative
(definite) semi-definite.
Lemma 3.7. For any given x ∈ ∆n, T (A,x) is negative (definite) semi-definite iff
(y>Ay < 0) y>Ay ≤ 0, ∀y ∈ Rn such that ∑i yi = 0 and xi = 0⇒ yi = 0.
Proof. It suffices to assume that x is fully mixed. Let z be any vector with
∑
i zi = 0
and define the vector w = (z1 − zn, ..., zn−1 − zn) with support n − 1. It is clear
that z>Az ≤ 0 iff w>T (A,x)w ≤ 0. So if z>Az ≤ 0 for all z with ∑i zi = 0 then
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T (A,x) is negative semidefinite. If there exists a z with
∑
i zi = 0 s.t z
>Az > 0 then
w>T (A,x)w > 0, so T (A,x) is not negative semidefinite.
Since stable fixed points are local optima, we map them to Nash stable strategies.
Lemma 3.8 (Stable fixed point implies Nash stable). Every stable fixed point
r of f is a Nash stable of game (A,A).
Proof. There is a similar proof in [83] for a modified claim. Here we connect the two.
First of all, observe that if (r, r) is not Nash equilibrium for (A,A) game then there




> 1 is an eigenvalue of Jr.
Additionally, since r is stable, using Theorem 3.4 we have that r is a local max-
imum of π(x) = x>Ax, say in a neighborhood ‖x − r‖ < δ. Let y be a vector with
support subset of the support of r such that
∑
i yi = 0. Firstly we rescale it w.l.o.g
so that ‖y′‖ < δ and by setting z = y′ + r we have that
z>Az = y′>Ay′ + r>Ar + 2y′>Ar.




i = 0 , y
′ has
support subset of the support of r. Therefore y′>Ay′ + r>Ar = z>Az ≤ r>Ar, thus
y′>Ay′ ≤ 0. Hence proved using Lemma 3.7.
Since stable fixed points always exist, so do Nash stable strategies (Lemma 3.8).
Next we map strict Nash stable strategies to asymptotically stable fixed points, as
the negative definiteness and strict symmetric Nash of the former implies strict local
optima, and the next lemma follows.
Lemma 3.9 (Strict Nash stable implies asymptotically stable [83] § 9.2.5).
Every strict Nash stable is asymptotically stable.
Proof. The proof can be found in [83]. The sufficient conditions for a fixed point to
be asymptotically stable in the proof are exactly the assumptions for a fixed point to
be strict Nash stable.
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The above two lemmas show that strict Nash stable ⊆ asymptotically stable (by
definition) ⊆ stable (by definition) ⊆ Nash stable. Further, by Theorem 1.2 and the
definition of linearly stable fixed points we know that stable ⊆ linearly stable. What
remains is the relation between Nash stable and linearly stable. The next lemma
answers this.
Lemma 3.10 (Nash stable equivalent with linearly stable). Strategy r is Nash
stable iff it is a linearly stable fixed point.
Proof. Let t be the removed strategy (variable xt) to create J
r (with rt > 0). For





and Jrij = 0 for all j 6= i. Hence the
corresponding eigenvalues of Jr of the rows i that do not belong in the support of r





> 0 which are
less than or equal to 1 iff (r, r) is a NE of the game (A,A).
Let Jr be the submatrix of Jr by removing all columns/rows j /∈ SP (r). Let A′ be
the submatrix of A by removing all removing all columns/rows j /∈ SP (r). It suffices
to prove that T (A, r) is negative semi-definite iff Jr has eigenvalues with absolute
value at most 1.
Let k = |SP (r)| and the k × k matrix L with Lij = ri Aijr>Ar and i, j ∈ SP (r).






have the same eigenvalues. Therefore L has an eigenvalue 1 and the rest eigenvalues
are real between (−1, 1) and also A′ has eigenvalues with the same signs as L′.
Finally, we show that det(L − λIk) = (1 − λ) × det(J′r − λIk−1) with J′r = Jr −
Jr − Ik−1, namely L has the same eigenvalues as J′r plus eigenvalue 1. It is true for
a square matrix that by row/column to another row/column, the determinant stays
invariant. We consider L−λIk and we do the following: We subtract the t-th column
from every other column and on the resulting matrix, we add every row to the t-th
row. The resulting matrix R has the property that det(R) = (1−λ)×det(J′r−λIk−1)
and also det(R) = det(L− λIk).
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From above we get that if Jr has eigenvalues with absolute value at most 1, then
Jr − Ik−1 has eigenvalues in [−2, 0] (we know that are real from the fact that L is
symmetrizes to L′), hence L′ has eigenvalue 1 and the rest eigenvalues are in [−2, 0]
(since L is stochastic, the rest eigenvalues lie in (−1, 0]). Therefore A′ has positive
inertia 1 (see Sylvester’s law of inertia) and the one direction For the converse, T (A, r)
being negative semi-definite implies A′ has positive inertia 1, thus L′ and so L have
one eigenvalue positive (which is 1) and the rest non-positive (lie in (−1, 0] since L is
stochastic). Thus Jr−Ik−1 has eigenvalues in (−1, 0] and therefore Jr has eigenvalues
in (0, 1] (i.e., with absolute value at most 1).
Using Theorems 3.4 and 3.6, and Lemmas 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10 we get the following
characterization among all the notions of stability that we have discussed so far. We
also remind you that asymptotically stable ⊆ L ⊆ linearly stable.
Theorem 3.11 (Relations between stability notions). Given a symmetric ma-
trix A, we have
Strict Nash stable ⊆ Asymptotically stable ⊆ L ⊆ linearly stable = Nash stable
⊇
stable ⊆ linearly stable = Nash stable
As stated before, generically (random fitness matrix) we have hyperbolic fixed
points and all the previous notions coincide. Given a fitness (positive) matrix A, let
x be a limit point of dynamics f governed by (20) If it is not pure, i.e., |SP (x)| > 1
then at least two alleles survive among the population, and we say the population is
diverse in the limit.
3.6 Survival of diversity
Definition 12 (Survival of diversity). We say that diversity survives in the limit
if there exists x ∈ L such that x is not pure (is mixed), and diversity survives surely
if no x ∈ L is pure.
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We provide sufficient conditions for two extreme cases of fitness matrix for the
survival of diversity, where diversity always survives and where diversity disappears
regardless of the starting population. Using this characterization we analyze the
chances of survival of diversity when fitness matrix and starting populations are picked
uniformly at random from atomless distributions.
Since L ⊆ Nash stable = linearly stable (Theorem 3.11), there has to be at least
one mixed Nash (or linearly) stable strategy for diversity to survive (see Definition
12). Next we give a definition that captures the homozygote/heterozygote advantage
and a lemma which uses it to identify instances that lack mixed Nash stable strategies.
Definition 13 (Dominating/dominated diagonal entries). Diagonal entry Aii
is called dominated if and only if ∃j, such that Aij > Aii. And it is called dominating
if and only if Aii > Aij for all j 6= i.
Next lemma characterizes instances that lack mixed Nash stable.
Lemma 3.12 (Dominating diagonal implies no mixed stable fixed points).
If all diagonal entries of A are dominating then there are no mixed linearly stable
fixed points.
Proof. Let r be a fixed point and w.l.o.g strategy 1 is in its support and assume
that Jr is the projected Jacobian at r by removing strategy 1 (let k × k be its size).
Jr has diagonal entries 1 + ri
Aii−Ai1
r>Ar






Aii > Aij,∀i 6= j. Therefore there exists an eigenvalue with absolute value greater
than 1 if k > 0.
The next theorem follows using Theorem 3.6 and Lemma 3.12 above. Informally, it
states that if every diagonal entry of A is dominating then almost surely the dynamics
converge to pure fixed points.
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Theorem 3.13 (Homozygous advantage inhibitor of diversity). If every di-
agonal entry of A is dominating then the set of initial conditions in ∆n so that the
dynamics (20) converges to mixed fixed points has measure zero, i.e., diversity dies
almost surely.
Next we show sure survival of diversity when diagonals are dominated.
Lemma 3.14. Let r be a fixed point of f with rt = 1. If Att is dominated, then r is
linearly unstable.









and Jri,j = ri
Aij−Ait
r>Ar
= 0. The eigenvalues of Jr are
Ait
Att




> 1 as an eigenvalue.
If all pure fixed points that are linearly unstable, then all linearly stable fixed points
are mixed, and thus the next theorem follows using Theorem 3.11 and Lemma 3.14.
Theorem 3.15 (Heterozygote advantage implies diversity). If every diagonal
of A is dominated then no x ∈ L is pure, i.e., diversity survives almost surely.
The following lemma shows that when the entries of a fitness matrix are picked uni-
formly independently from an atomless distribution, there is a positive probability
(bounded away from zero for all n) so that every diagonal in A is dominated. This es-
sentially means that generically, diversity survives with positive probability, bounded
away from zero, where the randomness is taken with respect to both the payoff matrix
and initial conditions.
Lemma 3.16 (Heterozygote advantage with constant probability). Let en-
tries of A be chosen i.i.d from an atomless distribution. The probability that all









Also for n ≥ 6 we have that
P [Ei ∩ Ej ∩ Ek] ≤
1
(n− 3)3
for i 6= j 6= k 6= i. To prove this let Di correspond to the events Aii > Ait for all
t 6= i, j, k (in same way the definition of Dj, Dk). Clearly Di, Dj, Dk are independent
and thus P [Di ∩Dj ∩Dk] = 1(n−3)3 . Since Ei∩Ej ∩Ek ⊂ Di∩Dj ∩Dk the inequality
follows.
Finally by counting argument (count all the favor permutations) we get that
P [Ei ∩ Ej] ≥
2[
∑n−2










for i 6= j. For l = o(n), for example l = log n and using the fact that n−i
2n−i−1 is

















n− k − 1






n− l − 1




n− l − 1


















P [Ei ∩ Ej] +
∑
i<j<k
P [Ei ∩ Ej ∩ Ek] ,
thus
P [∩Eci ] ≥
1
2





which is bounded away from zero.
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The next theorem follows using Theorem 3.15 and Lemma 3.16.
Theorem 3.17 (Diversity survives with constant probability). Assume that
the fitness matrix has entries picked independently from an atomless distribution then
with significantly high probability, at least 1
3
− o(1), diversity will survive surely.
Remark 5 (Typical instance). Observe that letting Xi be the indicator random
variable that Aii is dominating and X =
∑
iXi we get that E[X] =
∑
i E[Xi] =∑
i P [Ei] = n × 1n = 1 so in expectation we will have one dominating element. Also





1+n(n−1)P [Ei ∩ Ej] ≈ 2−o(1) (namely V[X] ≈ 1−o(1)) so by Chebyshev’s inequality




Positive chance of survival of phenotypic (allele) diversity in the limit under the
evolutionary pressure of selection (Definition 12), implies existence of a mixed linearly
stable fixed point (Theorem 3.6). This notion encompasses all the other notions of sta-
bility (Theorem 3.11), and may contain points that are not attracting. Whereas, strict
Nash stable and asymptotically stable are attracting. Here we show that checking if
there exists a mixed stable profile, for any of the five notions of stability (Definitions
2, 3, 4 and 11), may not be easy. In particular, we show that the problem of checking
if there exists a mixed profile that satisfies any of the stability conditions is NP-hard.
In order to obtain hardness for checking survival of diversity as a result, in other
words checking if set L has a mixed strategy, we design a unifying reduction.
Our reduction also gives NP-hardness for checking if a given pure strategy is played
with non-zero probability (subset) at these. In other words, it is NP-hard to check
if a particular allele is going to survive in the limit under the evolution. Finally we
extend all the results to the typical class of matrices, where exactly one diagonal entry
is dominating (see Definition 13 and Remark 5 in Section 3.6). All the reductions are
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from k-Clique, a well known NP-complete problem [34].
Definition 14 (k-Clique). Given an undirected graph G = (V,E), with V vertices
and E edges, and integer 0 < k < |V | − 1 = n− 1, decide if G has a clique of size k.
Properties of G. Given a simple graph G = (V,E) if we create a new graph Ḡ
by adding a vertex u and connecting it to all the vertices v ∈ V , then it is easy to
see that graph G has a clique of size k if and only if Ḡ has a clique of size k + 1.
Therefore, w.l.o.g we can assume that there exists a vertex in G which is connected
to all the other vertices. Further, if n = |V |, then for us such a vertex is the n-th
vertex. By abuse of notation we will use E an adjacency matrix of Ḡ too, Eij = 1 if
edge (i, j) present in Ḡ else it is zero.
3.7.1 Hardness for checking stability
In this section we show NP-hardness (completeness for some) results for decision
versions on (strict) Nash stable strategies and (asymptotically) stable fixed points.
Given graph G = (V,E) and integer k < n, we construct the following symmetric
2n×2n matrix A, where E ′ is modification of E where off-diagonal zeros are replaced
with −h where h > 2n2 + 5.
∀i ≤ j, Aij = Aji =

E′ij if i, j ≤ n
k − 1 if |i− j| = n
h if i, j > n and i = j, where h > 2n2 + 5




A is a symmetric but is not non-negative. Next lemma maps k-clique to mixed
strategy that is also strict Nash stable fixed point. Note that such a fixed point
satisfies all other stability notions as well, and hence implies existence of mixed limit
point in L.
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Lemma 3.18 (Existence of clique implies strict Nash stable). If there exists
a clique of size at least k in graph G, then the game (A,A) has a mixed strategy p
that is strict Nash stable.
Proof. Let vertex set C ⊂ V forms a clique of size k in graph G. Construct a
maximal clique containing C, by adding vertices that are connected to all the vertices
in the current clique. Let the corresponding vertex set be S ⊂ V (C ⊂ S), and let
m = |S| ≥ k. W.l.o.g assume that S = {v1, . . . , vm}. Now we construct a strategy





1 ≤ i ≤ m
0 m+ 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n
Claim 3.19. p is a strict SNE of game (A,A).
Proof. To prove the claim we need to show that (Ap)i > (Ap)j, ∀i ∈ [m],∀j /∈
[m], and (Ap)i = (Ap)j, ∀i, j ∈ [m]. Since S forms a clique in graph G, and by



























∀n < i ≤ 2n (∵ m ≥ k and k < n− 1).
Thus the claim follows.
Next consider the corresponding transformed matrix B = T (A, [m]) as defined in
(23). Since Aij = 1 ∀i, j ∈ [m], i 6= j and Aii = 0, ∀i ∈ [m], we have
∀i, j < m, Bij = Aij + Amm − Aim − Amj = −1 if i 6= j,
= −2 if i = j.
Claim 3.20. B is negative definite.
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Proof. It is easy to check that B has all strictly negative eigenvalues. w1 = 1m−1 is
an eigenvector with eigenvalue −m, and ∀1 < i < m, vector wi, where wi1 = 1 and
wii = −1, is an eigenvector with eigenvalue −1. Further, w1, . . . ,wm−1 are linearly
independent.
Thus by Definition 11, p is a strict Nash stable for game (A,A) .
Since strict Nash stable is contained in all other sets, the above lemma implies
existence of mixed strategy for all of them if there is a clique in G. Next we want
to show the converse for all notions of stability. That is if mixed strategy exists for
any notion of the five notions of stability then there is a clique of size at least k in
the graph G. Since each of the five stability implies Nash stability, it suffices to map
mixed Nash stable strategy to clique of size k. For this, and reductions that follow,
we use the following property due to negative semi-definiteness of Nash stability.
Lemma 3.21. Given a fixed point x, if T (A,x) is negative semi-definite, then ∀i ∈
SP (x), Aii ≤ 2Aij, ∀j 6= i ∈ SP (x). Moreover if x is a mixed Nash stable then it has
in its support at most one strategy t with Att is dominating.
Proof. A negative semi-definite matrix has the property that all the diagonal elements
are non-positive. Observe that from definition of T (A, r), we can choose any strategy
to be removed that is in SP (r), hence we choose i and we look at entry Bjj =
Aii + Ajj − 2Aij with j ∈ SP (r), j 6= i which must be non-positive since T (A, r)
is negative semi-definite. Hence Aii ≤ Aii + Ajj ≤ 2Aij. Finally, if Aii, Ajj are
both dominating then Aii + Ajj > Aij + Aji = 2Aij which is contradiction since
Aii + Ajj − 2Aij ≤ 0.
Nash stable also implies symmetric Nash equilibrium. Next lemma maps (special)
symmetric NE to k-clique.
Lemma 3.22. Let p be a symmetric NE of game (A,A). If SP (p) ⊂ [n] and
|SP (p)| > 1, then there exists a clique of size k in graph G.
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Proof. Let’s define SSP(p) = {i | pi > 1n2}. We first show |SSP(p)| ≥ k.
Claim 3.23. |SSP(p)| ≥ k.
Proof. Note that
∑
i∈SP (p)\SSP(p) pi ≤ n 1n2 ≤ 1n . Therefore,
∑
i∈SSP(p) pi ≥ 1 − 1n .





n(k−1) . Now consider the payoff from strategy n+ r, which is




On the other hand we have
(Ap)r ≤ 1− pr ≤ 1−
n− 1
n(k − 1) .
Therefore,
(Ap)n+r − (Ap)r ≥ 1−
1
n
− ε− 1 + n− 1
n(k − 1) ≥
n− k




A contradiction to p being symmetric NE.
Let’s define S = {vi | i ∈ SSP(p)}. In order to prove the lemma, it suffices to
show the vertex set S forms a clique in the graph G since |S| = |SSP(p)| ≥ k.
Claim 3.24. The vertex set S forms a clique in the graph G.
Proof. It suffices to show ∀i, j ∈ SSP(p) where i 6= j we have Aij = 1. Suppose not
then ∃i′, j′ ∈ SSP(p) s.t. i′ 6= j′ and Ai′j′ 6= 1. We get Ai′j′ = −h by definition of
A. Therefore, (Ap)j′ ≤ −hpi′ + 1 ≤ −1 because pi′ ≥ 1n2 and h ≥ 2n2. On the other
hand, we have ∀i 6∈ [n], (Ap)i ≥ −ε > −1 by definition of A so we get a contradiction
to p being symmetric NE.
The proof is completed.
We obtain the next lemma essentially using Lemmas 3.21 and 3.22.
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Lemma 3.25. If game (A,A) has a mixed Nash stable strategy, then graph G has a
clique of size k.
Proof. Let p be a Nash stable strategy of game (A,A), then by definition p is a SNE
and matrix B = T (A,p) is negative semi-definite. The latter implies SP (p) ⊂ [n]
using Lemma 3.21, since for i /∈ [n] Aii = h > 2k > 2Aij,∀j 6= i. Applying Lemma
3.22 with this fact together with the p being an SNE and |SP (p)| > 1 implies G has
a clique of size k.
We mention the following, which is necessary for the main theorem of this section.
Lemma 3.26. Let A be a symmetric matrix, and B = A + c for a c ∈ R, then the
set of (strict) Nash stable strategies of B are identical to that of A.
Proof. For equivalence of (strict) Nash stable points, the set of (strict) symmetric NE
are same for games (A,A) and (B,B), and matrix T (A,x) = T (B,x),∀x ∈ ∆n.
The next theorem follows using Theorem 3.11, Lemmas 3.18 and 3.25, and the
property observed in Lemma 3.26. Since there is no polynomial-time checkable condi-
tion for (asymptotically) stable fixed points7 its containment in NP is not clear, while
for (strict) Nash stable strategies containment in NP follows from the Definition 11.
Theorem 3.27 (Main hardness result). Given a symmetric matrix A, checking
if (i) game (A,A) has a mixed (strict) Nash stable (or linearly stable) strategy is
NP-complete. (ii) dynamics f (20) has a mixed (asymptotically) stable fixed point is
NP-hard. Even if A is a positive matrix.
Note that since adding a constant to A does not change its strict Nash stable and
Nash stable strategies (see Lemma 3.26), and since these two sandwiches all other
stability notions, the second part of the above theorem follows.
7These are same as (strict) local optima of function π(x) = x>Ax, and checking if a given p is
a local optima can be inconclusive if hessian at p is (negative) semi-definite.
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As we note in Remark 5, matrix with i.i.d entries from any atomless distribution
has in expectation exactly one row with dominating diagonal (see Definition 13). One
could ask does the problem become easier for this typical case. We answer negatively
by extending all the NP-hardness results to this case as well, where matrix A has
exactly one row whose diagonal entry dominates all other entries of the row. See
Section 3.7.2 for details, and thus the next theorem follows.
Theorem 3.28. Given a symmetric matrix A, checking if (i) game (A,A) has a
mixed (strict) Nash stable (or linearly stable) strategy is NP-complete. (ii) dynamics
(20) applied on A has a mixed (asymptotically) stable fixed point is NP-hard. Even if
A is strictly positive, or has exactly one row with dominating diagonal.
3.7.2 Hardness when single dominating diagonal
A symmetric matrix, when picked uniformly at random, has in expectation exactly
one row with dominating diagonal (see Remark 5). One could ask does the problem
become easier for this typical case. We answer negatively by extending all the NP-
hardness results of Theorem 3.27 to this case as well, where matrix A has exactly
one row whose diagonal entry dominates all other entries of the row, i.e., ∃i : Aii >
Aij, ∀j 6= i.
Consider the following modification of matrix A from (24), where we add an extra
row and column. Matrix M is of dimension (2n+ 1)× (2n+ 1), described pictorially
in Figure 5. Recall that h > 2n2 + 5 and k is the given integer.
Mij = Aij if i, j ≤ 2n
M(2n+1)i = Mi(2n+1) = 0 if i ≤ n
M(2n+1)i = Mi(2n+1) = h+ ε if n < i ≤ 2n, where 0 < ε < 1
M(2n+1)(2n+1) = 3h
(25)
Clearly M has exactly one row/column with dominating diagonal, namely (2n + 1).












Figure 5: Matrix M as defined in (25)
This is because their support is a subset of [n], implying the extra strategy giving
zero payoff which is strictly less than the expected payoff. Thus, we get the following:
Lemma 3.29. If graph G has a clique of size k, then game (M,M) has a mixed
strategy that is strict Nash stable where A is from (24).
Next we show the converse. Nash stable strategies are super set of other three notion
of stability (Theorem 3.11), so it suffices to map Nash stable to a k-clique. Further,
if p is Nash stable then T (M,p) is negative semi-definite (by definition). Using this
property together with the lemmas from previous sections, we show the next lemma.
Lemma 3.30. Graph G has a clique of size k, if there is a mixed Nash stable strategy
in (M,M).
Proof. Let q be the Nash stable strategy, then it is a symmetric NE of game (M,M),
T (M,q) is negative semi-definite, and |SP (q)| > 1. Using Lemma 3.21 we have
SP (q) ⊆ [n], as for i = 2n + 1, Mii = 3h > 2Mij, ∀j 6= i implying 2n + 1 /∈ SP (q),
and ∀n < i ≤ 2n, Mii = h > 2k > 2Aij, ∀j ∈ SP (q). Thus for 2n-dimensional
vector p, where pi = qi, i ≤ 2n, we have T (A,p) = T (M,q) and p is a symmetric
NE of game (A,A). Thus, stability property of q on matrix M carries forward to
corresponding stability of p on matrix A. Rest follows using Lemma 3.25.
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The next theorem follows using Theorem 3.11, Lemmas 3.26, 3.29, and 3.30. Con-
tainment in NP follows using the Definition 11.
Theorem 3.31. Given a symmetric matrix M such that exactly one row/column in
M has a dominating diagonal,
• it is NP-complete to check if game (M,M) has a mixed Nash stable (or linearly
stable) strategy.
• it is NP-complete to check if game (M,M) has a mixed strict Nash stable.
• it is NP-hard to check if dynamics (20) applied on M has a mixed stable fixed
point.
• it is NP-hard to check if dynamics (20) applied on M has a mixed asymptotically
stable fixed point.
even if M is a assumed to be positive.
Strict positivity of the matrix in the above theorem follows using the fact that Nash
stable and strict Nash stable strategies do not change when a constant is added to
the matrix (Lemma 3.26).
3.7.3 Hardness for subset
Another natural question to ask is whether a particular allele is going to survive
with positive probability in the limit, for a given fitness matrix. We show that this
may not be easy either, by proving hardness for checking if there exists a stable
strategy p such that i ∈ SP (p) for a given i. Given a subset S of pure strategies, it
is hard to check if there exists a stable profile p such that S is a subset of SP (p).
Theorem 3.32. Given a d× d symmetric matrix M and a subset S ⊂ [d],
• it is NP-complete to check if game (M,M) has a Nash stable (or linearly stable)
strategy p s.t. S ⊂ SP (p).
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• it is NP-complete to check if game (M,M) has a strict Nash stable strategy p
s.t. S ⊂ SP (p).
• it is NP-hard to check if dynamics (20) applied on M has a stable fixed point p
s.t. S ⊂ SP (p).
• it is NP-hard to check if dynamics (20) applied on M has a asymptotically stable
fixed point p s.t. S ⊂ SP (p).
even if |S| = 1, or if M is a assumed to be positive or with exactly one row with
dominating diagonal.
Proof. The reduction is again from k-clique. Our constructions of (24) and (25) works
as is, and the target set is S = {n}.
Recall that vertex vn ∈ V is connected to every other vertex in G, and therefore
is part of every maximal clique. Thus the construction of strategy p in Lemmas 3.18
and 3.29 will have pn > 0, and therefore if k-clique exist then S ⊂ SP (p).
For the converse consider a Nash stable strategy p with {n} ⊂ SP (p). By def-
inition it is a symmetric NE, and therefore SP (p) 6= {n} as in all cases row n has
dominated diagonal, i.e., Ann = 0 < k − δ = An,2n. Thus, p is a mixed profile, and
then by applying Lemmas 3.25 and 3.30, for the respective cases we get that graph
G has a k-clique. Thus proof follows using Theorem 3.11 and Lemma 3.26.
3.7.4 Diversity and hardness
Finally we state the hardness result in terms of survival of phenotypic diversity
in the limiting population of diploid organism with single locus. For this case, as we
discussed before, the evolutionary process has been studied extensively [92, 82, 83],
and that it is governed by dynamics f of (20) has been established. Here A is
a symmetric fitness matrix; Aij is the fitness of an organism with alleles i and j
in the locus of two chromosomes. Thus, for a given A the question of deciding
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“If phenotypic diversity will survive with positive probability?” translates to “If
dynamics f converges to a mixed fixed point with positive probability?”. We wish to
show NP-hardness for this question.
Theorem 3.6 establishes that all, except for zero-measure, of starting distributions
f converges to linearly stable fixed points. From this we can conclude that “Yes”
answer to the above question implies existence of a mixed linearly stable fixed point.
However the converse may not hold. In other words, “No” answer does not imply
non-existence of mixed linearly stable fixed points. Although, in that case we can
conclude non-existence of mixed strict Nash stable strategy (Theorem 3.11). Thus,
none of the above reductions seem to directly give NP-hardness for our question.
At this point, the fact that same reduction (of Section 3.7.1) gives NP-hardness
for all four notions of stability, and in particular for strict Nash stable as well as
linearly stable (Nash stable) fixed points come to our rescue. In particular, for the
matrix A of (24) non-existence of mixed limit point in L (points where f converges
with positive probability) implies non-existence of strict Nash stable strategy, which
in turn imply non-existence of mixed linearly stable fixed point (Theorem 3.11). If
not, then graph G will have k-clique (Lemma 3.25 and Theorem 3.11), which in turn
implies existence of a mixed strict Nash stable strategy (Lemma 3.18). Therefore, we
can conclude that mixed linearly stable fixed point exist if and only if f converges to
a mixed fixed point with positive probability and thus the next theorem follows.
Theorem 3.33. Given a fitness matrix A for a diploid organism with single locus, it
is NP-hard to decide if, under (20), diversity will survive (by converging to a specific
mixed equilibrium with positive probability) when starting allele frequencies are picked
i.i.d from uniform distribution. Also, deciding if a given allele will survive is NP-hard.
Remark 6. As noted in Section 1.4.1, coordination games are very special and they
always have a pure Nash equilibrium which is easy to find; NE computation in general
game is PPAD-complete [36]. Thus, it is natural to wonder if decision versions on
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coordination games are also easy to answer.
In the process of obtaining the above hardness results, we stumbled upon NP-
hardness for checking if a symmetric coordination game has a NE (not necessarily
symmetric) where each player randomizes among at least k strategies. Again the
reduction is from k-clique. Thus, it seems highly probable that other decision version
on (symmetric) coordination games are also NP-complete.
3.8 Conclusion and remarks
The results of this chapter appear in [86]. We establish complexity theoretic
hardness results implying that even in the textbook case of single locus (gene) diploid
models, predicting whether diversity survives or not given its fitness landscape is
algorithmically intractable. Our hardness results are structurally robust along sev-
eral dimensions, e.g., choice of parameter distribution, different definitions of stabil-
ity/persistence, restriction to typical subclasses of fitness landscapes. Technically,
our results exploit connections between game theory, nonlinear dynamical systems,
and complexity theory and establish hardness results for predicting the evolution of
a deterministic variant of the well known multiplicative weights update algorithm in
symmetric coordination games; finding one Nash equilibrium is easy in these games.
Finally, we complement our results by establishing that under randomly chosen fitness
landscapes diversity survives with significant probability.
A future direction of this work would be to analyze the diploid dynamics for
multiple genes (loci). As the number of genes increases, the dynamics becomes more
complicated and is hard to perform stability analysis and characterize (partially) the
unstable fixed points. Another question could be to find out on average and in worst
case, how many steps discrete replicator needs to reach an ε-neighborhood of a fixed
point (we address the last question in Chapter 4).
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CHAPTER IV
MUTATION AND SURVIVAL IN DYNAMIC
ENVIRONMENTS
4.1 Introduction
A new, potent approach to studying evolution was initiated by Valiant [134],
namely viewing it through the lens of computation. This viewpoint has already
started yielding concrete insights by translating qualitative hypotheses in biological
systems to provable computational properties of Markov chains and other dynamical
systems (see [135, 136, 79, 23, 87] and Chapters 2, 3, 5 of this thesis). We build on
this direction whilst focusing on the challenge of evolving environments. As discussed
in Chapter 2, building on the work of Nagylaki [92], Chastain et al. [23] showed that
natural selection under sexual reproduction in haploid species (see Section A.1 for
terms used in biology) can be interpreted as the Multiplicative Weight Update Al-
gorithm (MWUA) which we call discrete replicator dynamics, in coordination games
played among genes. Theorem 2.9 (main) of Chapter 2 argues that under mild con-
ditions on the fitness matrix, replicator dynamics converges with probability one to
pure fixed points under random initial conditions1 (the biological interpretation is
that diversity disappears in the limit). Two important ingredients in this result are
the lack of mutations and the fact that the fitness matrix remains fixed.
In this chapter we address two important questions in the case of sexual reproduc-
tion: the role of mutation, especially in the presence of changes to the environment,
i.e., fitness matrix. In the case of asexual reproduction, the change of environment
was studied by Wolf et al. [139]. They modeled a changing environment via a Markov
1Any prior measure absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue satisfies the statement.
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chain and described a model in which in the absence of mutation, the population goes
extinct, but in the presence of mutation, the population survives with positive prob-
ability. The question arises whether this is enough to safeguard against extinction in
a changing environment, or if mutation is still needed.
Following Chapter 2, we consider a haploid organism with two genes. Each gene
can be viewed as a player in a game and the alleles of each gene represent strategies
of that player. Once an allele is decided for each gene, an individual is defined, and
its fitness is the payoff to each of the players, i.e., both players have the same payoff
matrix, and therefore it is a coordination/partnership game. We model the change
of environments as in [139], via a Markov chain. Each state of the Markov chain
represents an environment and has its own fitness matrix.
Our contribution. We show under the model described above, where mutations are
captured through a standard model appeared in [61], the following theorems:
Informal Theorem 1 (Mutation and survival). For a class of Markov chains
(satisfying mild conditions), a haploid species under sexual evolution2 without mu-
tation dies out with probability one (see Theorem 4.11). In contrast, under sexual
evolution with mutation the probability of long term survival is strictly positive (see
Theorem 4.15).
For each gene, if we think of its allele frequencies in a given population as defin-
ing a mixed strategy, then after reproduction, the frequencies change as per discrete
replicator dynamics, as in Chapter 2. Furthermore, in the presence of mutation
[61], every allele mutates to another allele of the corresponding gene in a small frac-
tion of offsprings. As it turns out, in every generation, the population size (of the
species) changes by a multiplicative factor of the current expected payoff (mean fit-
ness). Hence, in order to prove Theorems 4.11, 4.15, we need to analyze replicator
2We refer to ‘evolution by natural selection under sexual reproduction’ by sexual evolution for
brevity.
76
dynamics (and its variant which captures mutations) in a time-evolving coordination
game whose matrix is changing as per a Markov chain. The idea behind Theorem 4.11
is as follows: It is known that MWUA converges, in the limit, to a pure equilibrium
in coordination games, as discussed in Chapter 2. This implies that in a static envi-
ronment, in the limit, the population will be rendered monomorphic. Showing such a
convergence in a stochastically changing environment is not straightforward. We first
show that such an equilibrium can be reached fast enough in a static environment.
We then appeal to the Borel-Cantelli theorem to argue that with probability one, the
Markov chain will visit infinitely often and remain sufficiently long in one environment
at some point and hence the population will eventually become monomorphic. An
assumption in our theorem is that for each individual, there are bad environments,
i.e., one in which it will go extinct. Eventually the monomorphic population will
reach such an unfavorable environment and will die out. Although mutations seem to
hurt mean population fitness in the short run in static environments, they are critical
for survival in dynamic environments, as shown in Theorem 4.15; it is proved as fol-
lows. The random exploration done by mutations and aided by the selection process,
which rapidly boosts the frequency of alleles with good mean fitness, helps the pop-
ulation to survive. Essentially we couple the random variable capturing population
size with a biased random walk, with a slight bias towards increase. The result then
follows using a well-known lemma on biased random walks.
Polynomial time convergence in static environment. For such a reasoning
to be applicable we need a fast convergence result, which does not hold in the worst
case, since by choosing initial conditions sufficiently close to the stable manifold of
an unstable equilibrium, we are bound to spend super-polynomial time near such
unstable states. To circumvent this we take a typical approach of introducing a
small noise into the dynamics [108, 70, 58], and provide the first, to our knowledge,
polynomial convergence bound for noisy MWUA in coordination games; this result is
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of independent interest. We note that MWUA captures frequency changes of alleles
in case of infinite population, and the small noise can also be thought of as sampling
error due to finiteness of the population. In the following theorem, dependence on all
identified system parameters is necessary (see discussion in Section 4.8).
Informal Theorem 2 (Speed of convergence). In static environments under
small random noise (||.||∞ = δ), sexual evolution (without mutation) converges with






, where n is the
number of alleles, and γ the minimum fitness difference between two genotypes (see
Theorem 4.9).
Robustness to mutations. Finally we show that the convergence of discrete repli-
cator dynamics (without mutation) in static environments (see Chapter 2) can be
extended to the case where mutations are also present. The former result critically
hinges on the fact that mean fitness strictly increases under MWUA in coordination
games, and thereby acts as a potential function. This is no more the case. However,
using an inequality due to Baum and Eagon [14] we manage to obtain a new potential
function which is the product of mean fitness and a term capturing diversity of the
allele distribution. The latter term is essentially the product of allele frequencies.
Informal Theorem 3 (Convergence with mutations). In static environments,
sexual evolution with mutation converges, for any level of mutation. Specifically, if
we are not at equilibrium, at the next time generation at least one of mean population
fitness or product of allele frequencies will increase.
Besides adding computational insights to biologically inspired themes, which to
some extent may never be fully settled, we believe that our work is of interest even
from a purely computational perspective. The nonlinear dynamical systems arising
from these models are gradient-like systems of non-convex optimization problems.
Their importance and the need to develop a theoretical understanding beyond worst
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case analysis has been pinpointed as a key challenge for numerous computational
disciplines, e.g., from [7]:
“Many procedures in statistics, machine learning and nature at large –
Bayesian inference, deep learning, protein folding – successfully solve non-
convex problems . . . Can we develop a theory to resolve this mismatch be-
tween reality and the predictions of worst-case analysis?”
Our theorems and techniques share this flavor. Theorem 1 expresses time-average
efficiency guarantees for gradient-like heuristics in the case of time-evolving optimiza-
tion problems. Theorem 2 argues about speedup effects by adding noise to escape
out of saddle points, whereas Theorem 3 is a step towards arguing about robustness
to implementation details. We make this methodological similarities more precise by







Figure 6: An example of a Markov chain model of fitness landscape evolution.
4.2 Related work
In the last few years we have witnessed a rapid cascade of theoretical results in
the intersection of computer science and evolution (see discussion and references in
Sections 2.1, 2.2 and Chapter 3). It is also possible to introduce connections between
satisfiability and evolution [79]. The error threshold is the rate of errors in genetic
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mixing above which genetic information disappears [44]. Vishnoi [136] shows existence
of such sharp thresholds. Moreover, in Chapter 5 we shed light on the speed of asexual
evolution (see also [137]). Finally, in [39] Dixit et al. present finite population models
for asexual haploid evolution that closely track the standard infinite population model
of Eigen [43] (see Section 5.7.2). Wolf, Vazirani, and Arkin [139] analyze models of
mutation and survival of diversity also for asexual populations but the dynamical
systems in this case are linear and the involved methodologies are rather different.
Introducing noise in non-linear dynamics has been shown to be able to simplify
the analysis of nonlinear dynamical systems by “destroying” Turing-completeness
of classes of dynamical systems and thus making the system’s long-term behavior
computationally predictable [20]. Those techniques focus on establishing invariant
measures for the systems of interest and computing their statistical characteristics.
In our case, our unperturbed dynamical systems have exponentially many saddle
points and numerous stable fixed points and species survival is critically dependent
on the amount of time that trajectories spend in the vicinity of these points thus
much stronger topological characterizations are necessary. Adding noise to game
theoretic dynamics [70, 2, 26] to speed up convergence to approximate equilibria in
potential games is a commonly used approach in algorithmic game theory, however,
the respective proof techniques and notions of approximation are typically sensitive
to the underlying dynamic, the nature of noise added as well as the details of the
class of games.
In the last year there has been a stream of work on understanding how gradient
(and more generally gradient-like) systems escape out of the saddle fixed points fast
[58, 74]. This is critically important for a number of computer science applications,
including speeding up the training of deep learning networks. The approach pursued
by these papers is similar to our work, including past papers in the line of TCS (the-
oretical computer science) and biology/game theory literature [70] and Chapter 2 of
80
this thesis. For example, in Chapter 2 it has been established that in non-convex
optimization settings gradient-like systems (e.g., variants of Multiplicative Weights
Updates Algorithm) converge for all but a zero measure of initial conditions to local
minima of the fitness landscape (instead of saddle points even in the presence of ex-
ponentially many saddle points). Moreover, as shown in [70] noisy dynamics diverge
fast from the set of saddle points whose Jacobian has eigenvalues with large positive
real parts. Similar techniques and arguments can be applied to argue generic con-
vergence to local minima of numerous other dynamics (including noisy/deterministic
versions of gradient dynamics). Finally, in Chapter 7 we argue that gradient dynamics
converge to local minima with probability one in non-convex optimization problems
even in the presence of continuums of saddle points, answering an open question in
[74]. We similarly hope that techniques developed here about fast and robust conver-
gence can also be extended to other classes of gradient(-like) dynamics in non-convex
optimization settings.
Finite population evolutionary models over time evolving fitness landscapes are
typically studied via simulations (e.g., [77] and references therein). These models
have also inspired evolutionary models of computation, e.g., genetic algorithms, whose
study under dynamic fitness environments is a well established area with many appli-
cations (e.g., [141] and references therein) but with little theoretical understanding
and even theoretical papers on the subject typically relying on combinations of ana-
lytical and experimental results [19].
4.3 Preliminaries
4.3.1 Discrete replicator dynamics with mutation - A combinatorial in-
terpretation
For a haploid species3 (one with single set of chromosomes, unlike diploids such
as humans who have chromosome pairs) with two genes (coordinates), let S1 and S2
3See Section A.1 in the appendix for a short discussion of all relevant biological terms.
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be the set of possible alleles (types) for the first and second gene respectively. Then,
an individual of such a species can be represented by an ordered pair (i, j) ∈ S1×S2.
Let Wij be the fitness of such an individual capturing its ability to reproduce during
a mating. Thus, fitness landscape of such a species can be represented by matrix W
of dimension n× n, where we assume that n = |S1| = |S2|.
Sexual Model without mutation. In every generation, each individual (i, j) mates
with another individual (i′, j′) picked uniformly at random from the population (can
pick itself). The offspring can have any of the four possible combinations, namely
(i, j), (i, j′), (i′, j), (i′, j′), with equal probability. Let Xi be a random variable that
denotes the proportion of the population with allele i in the first coordinate, and
similarly Yj be the frequency of the population with allele j in the second coordinate.
After one generation, the expected number of offsprings with allele i in first coordinate
is proportional to Xi · Xi · (WY)i + 212(1 − Xi)Xi · (WY)i = Xi(WY)i (X2i stands
for the probability both individuals have allele i in the first coordinate - which the
offspring will inherit - and 21
2
(1 −Xi)Xi stands for the probability that exactly one
of the individuals has allele i in the first coordinate and the offspring will inherit).
Similarly the expected number of offsprings with allele j for the second coordinate is
Yj(W
>X)j. Hence, if X
′,Y′ denote the frequencies of the alleles in the population in









We are interested in analyzing a deterministic version of the equations above, which
essentially captures an infinite population model. Thus if frequencies at time t are
denoted by (x(t),y(t)), they obey the following dynamics governed by the function
g : ∆→ ∆, where ∆ = ∆n ×∆n:
Let (x(t+ 1),y(t+ 1)) = g(x(t),y(t)), where
∀i ∈ S1, xi(t+ 1) = xi(t) (Wy(t))ix>(t)Wy(t)






It is easy to see that g is well-defined when W is a positive matrix. This is the
dynamics for haploids as it appeared in Chapter 2, Section 2.4.1. Chastain et al. [23]
gave a game theoretic interpretation of deterministic Equations (26). It can be seen
as a repeated two-player coordination game (each gene is a player), the possible alleles
for a gene are its pure strategies and both players play according to dynamics (26). A
modification of these dynamics has also appeared in models of grammar acquisition
[101]. The difference between Equations (26) and those in (13) in Chapter 2 (on
game (W,W>)) is that matrix W is square here. Furthermore, we have shown in
Chapter 2 that dynamics with Equations (26) converges point-wise to a pure fixed
point, i.e., where exactly one coordinate is non-zero in both x and y, for all but
measure zero of initial conditions in ∆, when W has distinct entries.
Sexual Model with mutation. Next we extend the dynamics of (26) to incorporate
mutation. The mutation model which appears in Hofbauer’s book [61], is a two-step
process. The first step is governed by (26), and after that in each individual, and for
each of its gene, corresponding allele, say k, mutates to another allele of the same
gene, say k′, with probability τ > 0 for all k′ 6= k. After a simple calculation (see
Section 4.3.2 below for calculations) the resulting dynamics turns out to be as follows,
where f is a ∆→ ∆ function:
Let (x′,y′) = f(x,y), then
x′i = (1− nτ)xi (Wy)ix>Wy + τ, ∀i ∈ S1
y′j = (1− nτ)yj (x
>W )j
x>Wy
+ τ, ∀j ∈ S2.
(27)
4.3.2 Calculations for mutation
Let (x̂, ŷ) = g(x,y). If in every generation, allele i ∈ S1 mutates to allele k ∈ S1
with probability µik, where
∑
k µik = 1, ∀i, then the final proportion (after repro-






Similarly, if j ∈ S2 mutates to k ∈ S2 with probability δjk, then proportion of allele





If mutation happens after every selection (mating), then we get the following dy-
namics with update rule f ′ : ∆ → ∆ governing the evolution (update rule contains
selection+mutation).












, ∀j ≤ S2.
(28)
Suppose ∀k, ∀i 6= k and ∀j 6= k, we have µik = δjk = τ , where τ ≤ 1n . Since∑
k µik =
∑





























The same is true for vector y′. The dynamics of (28) where µik = δik = τ for all k 6= i
simplifies to the Equations (27) as appear in the preliminaries.
4.3.3 Our model
In this section we will analyze a noisy version of (26), (27). Essentially we add
small random noise to non-zero coordinates of (x(t),y(t)). 4
Definition 15. Given z ∈ ∆ and a small 0 < δ (δ is on(τ)), define ∆(z, δ) to be a
set of vectors {z + δ ∈ ∆ | supp(δ) = supp(z); δi ∈ {−δ,+δ}, ∀i}.5
4This is different from diffusion approximation, noise helps to avoid saddle points.
5In case the size of the support of z is odd, there will be a zero entry in δ, so |supp(δ)| =
|supp(z)| − 1.
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Note that if z is pure (has support size one), then δ is all zero vector6. Define
noisy versions of both g from (26) and f from (27) as follows: Given (x(t),y(t)) pick
δx ∈ ∆(x(t), δ) and δy ∈ ∆(y(t), δ) uniformly at random. Set with probability half
δx to zero, and with the other half set δy to zero. Then redefine dynamics g of (26)
as follows:
(x(t+ 1),y(t+ 1)) = gδ(x(t),y(t)) = g(x(t),y(t)) + (δx, δy). (29)
And redefine dynamics f of (28) capturing sexual evolution with mutation as follows.
(x(t+ 1),y(t+ 1)) = fδ(x(t),y(t)) = f(x(t),y(t)) + (δx, δy). (30)
Furthermore, we will have that if any xi, yj goes below δ, we set it to zero. This
is crucial for our theorems because otherwise the dynamics with Equations (26) and
(27) (or even (29) and (30)) can converge to a fixed point at t→∞, but never reach
a point in a finite amount of time. This is true in the main result of Chapter 2, the
dynamics converge almost surely to pure fixed points as t → ∞ but do not reach
fixation in a finite time. So xi, yj reaches fixation (set it to zero) if xi, yj < δ. We
need to re-normalize after this step.
∀i ∈ S1, if xi(t) < δ then set xi(t) = 0. Re-normalize x(t).
∀j ∈ S1, if yj(t) < δ then set yj(t) = 0. Re-normalize y(t).
(31)
Definition 16 (Negligible vector). We call a vector v negligible if there exists an
i s.t vi < δ.
Tracking population size. Suppose the size of the initial population is N0, and
let population at time t be N t. In every time period N t gets multiplied by average
fitness of the current population, namely x(t)>W (t)y(t), where (x(t),y(t)) denote
the frequencies of alleles at generation t and W (t) the matrix fitness/environment at
6There are no sampling errors in monomorphic population
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time (see discussion below about changing of environments).
Let average fitness Φt = x(t)>W (t)y(t) then E[N t+1|x(t),y(t), N t] = N tΦt+1. (32)
We will consider N t+1 = N tΦt+1 (see also [118]). Based on the value of N t, we give
the definition of survival and extinction.
Definition 17 (Survival - extinction). We say the population goes extinct if for
initial population size N0, there exists a time t so that N t < 1. On the other hand,
we say that population survives if for all times t ∈ N we have that N t ≥ 1.
Model of environment change. Following the work of Wolf et al. [139], we consider
a Markov chain based model of changing environment. Let E be the set of different
possible environments, and W e be the fitness matrix in environment e ∈ E . E denotes
the set of (e, e′) pairs if there is a non-zero probability pe,e′ ∈ (0, 1) to go from
environment e to e′. See Figure 6 for an example. For a parameter p < 1 we assume
that
∑
e′:(e,e′)∈E pe,e′ ≤ p, ∀e ∈ E . That is, after every generation of the dynamics
(29) or (30), the environment changes to one of its neighboring environment with
probability at most p < 1, and remains unchanged with probability at least (1 − p).
The graph formed by edges in E is assumed to be connected, thus the resulting
(ergodic) Markov chain eventually will stabilize to a stationary distribution πe.
Even though fitness matrices W e can be arbitrary, it is generally assumed that
W e has distinct positive entries (as in [24], and also Chapter 2). Furthermore, no
individual can survive all the environments on average. Mathematically, if πe is the
stationary distribution of this Markov chain then, ∀i, j, ∏
e∈E (W eij)πe < 1.
Furthermore, we assume that every environment has alleles of good type as well




) of at least
(1 + β) for some β > 0, and alleles of bad type are dominated by a good type allele
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point-wise7. Finally, the number of bad alleles are o(n) (sublinear in n). Let the set
of bad alleles for genes i = 1, 2 in environment e be denoted by Bei .
Putting all of the above together, the Markov chain for environment change is
defined by set E of environments and its adjacency graph, fitness matrices W e, ∀e ∈ E ,
probability 1 − p with which dynamics remains in current environment, sets Bei ⊂
Si, i = 1, 2 of bad alleles in environment e, and β > 0 to lower-bound average fitness
of good type alleles. See also Section 4.8.2 for discussion on the assumptions where
we claim that most of them are necessary for our theorems. In the next sections
we will analyze the dynamics with Equations (29), (30) in terms of convergence and
population size for fixed and dynamic environments.
Table 1: List of parameters
Symbol Interpretation
W e fitness matrix at environment e
W (t),W e(t) fitness matrix at time t
γe minimum difference between entries in fitness matrix W e
x,y frequencies of (alleles) strategies
δ noise/perturbation
Φ potential/average fitness x>Wy






≥ 1 + β
τ probability that an individual with allele k mutates to k′ (of the same gene)
4.4 Overview of proofs
The dynamical systems that we analyze, namely (29) and (30), under the evolving
environment model of Section 4.3.3 are (stochastically perturbed) nonlinear replicator-
like dynamical systems whose parameters evolve according to a (possibly slow mixing)
Markov chain. We reduce the analysis of this complex setting to a series of smaller,
modular arguments that combine as set-pieces to produce our main theorems.
Convergence rate for evolution without mutation in static environment.
7Think of bad type alleles akin to a terminal genetic illness. Such assumptions are typical in the
biological literature (e.g., [77]).
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Our starting point is Chapter 2 where it was shown that in the case of noise-free sexual
dynamics governed by (26) the average population fitness increases in each step and
the system converges to equilibria, and moreover that for almost all initial conditions
the resulting fixed point corresponds to a monomorphic population (pure/not mixed
equilibrium). Conceptually, the first step in our analysis tries to capitalize on this
stronger characterization by showing that convergence to such states happens fast.
This is critical because while there are only linearly many pure equilibria, there are
(generically) exponentially many isolated, mixed ones [24], which are impossible to
meaningfully characterize. By establishing the predictive power of pure states, we
radically reduce our uncertainty about system behavior and produce a building block
for future arguments.
Without noise we cannot hope to prove fast convergence to pure states since by
choosing initial conditions sufficiently close to the stable manifold of an unstable
equilibrium, we are bound to spend super-polynomial time near such unstable states.
In finite population models, however, the system state (proportions of different alleles)
is always subject to small stochastic shocks (akin to sampling errors). These small
shocks suffice to argue fast convergence by combining an inductive argument and a
potential/Lyapunov function argument.
To bound the convergence time to a pure fixed point starting at an arbitrary
mixed strategy (maybe with full support), it suffices to bound the time it takes to
reduce the size of the support by one, because once a strategy xi becomes zero it
remains zero under (29), i.e., an extinct allele can never come back in absence of
mutations (and then use induction). For the inductive step, we need two non trivial
arguments. First we need a lower bound on the rate of increase of the mean population
fitness when the dynamics is not at approximate fixed points8, shown in Lemma 4.1.
This requires a quantitative strengthening of potential/(nonlinear dynamical system)
8We call these states α-close points.
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arguments of Chapter 2. Secondly, we show that the noise suffices to escape fast
(with high probability) from the influence of fixed points that are not monomorphic
(these are like saddle points). This requires a combination of stochastic techniques
including origin returning random walks, Azuma type inequalities for submartingales,
and arguing about the increase in expected mean fitness x(t)>W (t)y(t) in a few steps
(Lemmas 4.4-4.8), where x and y capture allele frequencies at time step t. As a
result we show polynomial time convergence of (29) to pure equilibrium under static
environment in Theorem 4.9. This result may be of independent interest since fast
convergence of nonlinear dynamics to equilibrium is not typical [88].
Survival, extinction under dynamic environments. As described in Section
4.3.3, we consider a Markov chain based model of environmental changes, where after
every selection step, the fitness matrix changes with probability at most p. Suppose
the starting population size is N0 > 0 and let N t denote the size at time t then
in every step N t gets multiplied by the mean fitness x(t)>W (t)y(t) of the current
population (see (32)). We say that population goes extinct if for some t, N t < 1, and
it survives if N t ≥ 1, for all t.
We assume that there do not exist “all-weather” phenotypes. We encode this by
having the monomorphic population of any genotype decrease when matched to an
environment chosen according to the stationary distribution of the Markov chain.9
In other words, an allele may be both “good” and “bad” as environment changes,
sometimes leading to growth, and other times to decrease in population.
Case a) sexual evolution without mutation. If the population becomes monomor-
phic then this single phenotype can not survive in all environments, and will even-
tually wither as its population will be in exponential decline once the Markov chain
9If, for any genotype, the population increased in expectation over the randomly chosen envi-
ronment, then once monomorphic population consisting of only such a genotype is reached, the
population would blow up exponentially (and forever) as soon as the Markov chain reached its
mixing time.
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mixes. The question is whether monomorphism is achieved under changing environ-
ment; the above analysis is not applicable directly as the fitness matrix is not fixed
any more. Our first theorem (Theorem 4.9) upper bounds the amount of time T
needed to “wait” in a single environment so as the probability of convergence to a
monomorphic state is at least some constant (e.g., 1
2
). Breaking up the time history
in consecutive chunks of size T and applying Borel-Cantelli theorem implies that the
population will become monomorphic with probability one (Theorem 4.11). This is
the strongest possible result without explicit knowledge of the specifics of the Markov
chain (e.g., mixing time).
Case b) sexual evolution with mutation. As described in Section 4.3.1, we
consider a well-established model of mutation [61], where after every selection step,
each allele mutates with probability τ . The resulting dynamics is governed by (27),
and we analyze its noisy counterpart (30). This ensures that in each period the
proportion of every allele is at least τ . We show that this helps the population to
survive.
Unlike the no mutation case of Chapter 2, the average fitness x(t)>Wy(t) is no
more increasing in every step, even in absence of noise. Instead we derive another
potential function that is a combination of average fitness and entropy. Due to mu-
tations forcing exploration, natural selection weeds out the bad alleles fast (Lemma
4.12). Thus there may be initial decrease in fitness, however the decrease is upper
bounded. Furthermore, we show that the fitness is bound to increase significantly
within a short time horizon due to increase in population of good alleles (Lemma
4.13). Since population size gets multiplied by average fitness in each iteration, this
defines a biased random walk on logarithm of the population size. Using upper and
lower bounds on decrease and increase respectively, we show that the probability of
extinction stochastically dominates a simpler-to-analyze random variable pertaining
to biased random walks on the real line (Lemma 4.14). Thus, the probability of long
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term survival is strictly positive (Theorem 4.15). This completes the outline of the
proof of informal Theorem 1.
Deterministic convergence despite mutation in static environments: Finally, as an
independent result for the case of noise free dynamics (infinite population) with mu-
tation governed by (27), we show convergence to fixed points in the limit, by defining
a novel potential function which is the product of mean fitness x>Wy and a term
capturing diversity of the allele distribution (Theorem 4.16). The latter term is es-




i yi). Such convergence results are
not typical in dynamical systems literature [88], and therefore this potential function
may be useful to understand limit points of this and similar dynamics (the continuous
time analogue can be found here [61]). One way to interpret this result is a homo-
topy method for computing equilibria in coordination games, where the algorithm
always converges to fixed points, and as mutation goes to zero, the stable fixed points
correspond to the pure Nash equilibria [24].
4.5 Rate of convergence: dynamics without mutation in
fixed environments
In this section we show a polynomial bound on the convergence time of dynamics
(29), governing sexual evolution under natural selection with noise, in a static envi-
ronment. In addition, we show that the fixed points reached by the dynamics are
pure. Consider a fixed environment e and we use W to denote its fitness matrix W e.
It is known that average fitness x>Wy increases under the non-noisy counterpart
(26). In the next lemma we obtain a lower bound on this increase.
Lemma 4.1. Let (x̂, ŷ) = g(x,y) where (x,y) ∈ ∆ and g is from equation (26).
Then,















for C = 3
8·maxi,jWij .
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Let ξ be a random variable that takes value (Wy)i with probability xi. Then
E[ξ] = x>Wy, V[ξ] =
∑
i xi((Wy)i−x>Wy)2 and ξ takes values in the interval [0, µ]
with µ = maxijWij. Consider the function f(z) = z
3/2 on the interval [0, µ] and




on [0, µ] since µ ≥ p>Wq ≥ 0 for all (p,q) ∈ ∆. Observe





Claim 4.2. E[f(ξ)] ≥ f(E[ξ]) + A
2





Proof. By Taylor expansion we get that (we expand with respect to the expectation
of ξ, namely E[ξ])




and hence we have that:




































xi((Wy)i − x>Wy)2. (33)
















>x)i − x>Wy)2. (34)






































Finally we divide both sides by 2(x>Wy)2 and we get that










































since µ ≥ x>Wy. This inequality and the proof techniques can
be seen as a generalization of an inequality and proof techniques in [83].
For the rest of the section, C denotes 3
8·Wmax where Wmax = maxijWij and Wmin =
minijWij. Note that the lower bound obtained in Lemma 4.1 is strictly positive unless
(x,y) is a fixed point of (26). This gives an alternate proof of the fact that, under
dynamics (26), average fitness is a potential function, i.e., increases in every step.
On the other hand, the lower bound can be arbitrarily small at some points, and
therefore it does not suffice to bound the convergence time. Next, we define points
where this lower-bound is relatively small.
Definition 18 (α-close). We call a point (x,y) α-close for an α > 0, if for all
x′,y′ ∈ ∆ such that supp(x′) ⊆ supp(x) and supp(y′) ⊆ supp(y) we have |x>Wy −
x′>Wy| ≤ α and |x>Wy − x>Wy′| ≤ α.
α-close points, are a specific class of “approximate” stationary points, where the
progress in average fitness is not significant (see Figure 8, the big circles contain
these points). From now on, think α as a small parameter that will be determined in
the end of this section. If a given point (x,y) is not α-close and not negligible (see
Definition 16) then using Lemma 4.1 it follows that the increase in potential is at
least Cδα2. Formally:
Corollary 4.3 (Not α-close, negligible implies good progress in dynamics).
If (x,y) ∈ ∆ is neither α-close nor negligible, and (x̂, ŷ) = g(x,y), then
x̂>W ŷ ≥ x>Wy + Cδα2.
Proof. Since the vector (x,y) is neither α-close nor negligible, it follows that there
exists an index i such that |(Wy)i − x>Wy| > α and xi ≥ δ and hence xi((Wy)i −
x>Wy)2 > δα2, or |(W>x)i − x>Wy| > α and yi ≥ δ and hence yi((W>x)i −
x>Wy)2 > δα2. Therefore in Lemma 4.1, the r.h.s is at least Cδα2 and thus we get
that x̂>W ŷ − x>Wy ≥ Cδα2.
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In the analysis above we considered non-noisy dynamics governed by (26). Our
goal is to analyze finite population dynamics, which introduces noise and the result-
ing dynamics is (29). This changes how the fitness increases/decreases. The next
lemma shows that in expectation the average fitness remains unchanged after the
introduction of noise.
Lemma 4.4 (Noise is zero in expectation). Let δ = (δx, δy) be the noise vector.
It holds that Eδ[(x + δx)>W (y + δy)] = x>Wy.
Proof. Vectors (δx, δy), (−δx, δy), (δx,−δy), (−δx,−δy) appear with the same proba-
bility, and observe that
(x + δx)
>W (y + δy) + (x− δx)>W (y + δy)
+ (x + δx)
>W (y − δy) + (x− δx)>W (y − δy)
= 4x>Wy,
and the claim follows.
Next, we show how random noise can help the dynamic escape from a polytope
of α-close points. We first analyze how adding noise may help increase fitness with
high enough probability. A simple application of Catalan numbers shows that:
Lemma 4.5. The probability of a (unbiased) random walk on the integers that consist
of 2m steps of unit length, beginning at the origin and ending at the origin, that never
becomes negative is 1
m+1
.
We define γ = min(i,j)6=(i′,j′) |Wij−Wi′j′ |. The following lemma is essentially a corollary
of Lemma 4.5.
Lemma 4.6. Let δy be a random noise with support size m. For all i in the support
of x we have that (Wδy)i ≥ γδm2 with probability at least 11+m/2 (same is true for δx
and y).
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Proof. Assume w.l.o.g that we have Wi1 ≥ Wi2 ≥ ... (otherwise we permute them so
that are in decreasing order). Consider the case where the signs are revealed one at a
time, in the order of indices of the sorted row. The probability that + signs dominate
− signs through the process is 1
m/2+1
(ballot theorem/Catalan numbers) (see 4.5). It











We will also need the following theorem due to Azuma [41] on submartingales.
Theorem 4.7 (Azuma inequality [41]). . Suppose {Xk, k = 0, 1, 2, ..., N} is a
submartingale and also |Xk−Xk−1| < c almost surely then for all positive integers N
and all t > 0 we have that
P [XN −X0 ≤ −t] ≤ e−
t2
2Nc2 .
Towards our main goal of showing polynomial time convergence of the noisy dy-
namics (29) (shown in Theorem 4.9), we need to show that the fitness increases within
a few iterations of the dynamics with high probability. It suffices to show that the
average fitness under some transformation is a submartingale, and then the result
will follow using Azuma’s inequality.
Lemma 4.8 (Potential is a submartingale). Let Φt be the random variable which
corresponds to the average fitness at time t. Assume that for the time interval t =
0, ..., 2T the trajectory (x(t),y(t)) has the same support. Let m = max{|supp(x(t))|,





2α)2 ≥ δα2 then we have that
E[Φ2t+2|Φ2t, ...,Φ0] ≥ Φ2t + Cδα2.
In other words, the sequence Zt ≡ Φ2t − t · Cδα2 for t = 1, ..., T is a submartingale
and also |Zt+1 − Zt| ≤ Wmax −Wmin.
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Proof. First of all, since the average fitness is increasing in every generation (before
adding noise) and by Lemma 4.4 we get that for all t ∈ {0, ..., 2T}
E[Φt+1|Φt] ≥ Φt,
namely the average fitness is a submartingale (00).
Let (xt,yt) ··= (x(t),y(t)) be the frequency vector at time t which has average
fitness Φt ≡ Φ(xt,yt) = xt>Wyt (abusing notation we use Φ(x,y) for function x>Wy
and Φt for the value of average fitness at time t), also we denote (x̂t, ŷt) = g(xt,yt)
and recall that (xt+1,yt+1) = (x̂t + δtx, ŷ
t + δty). Assume that in the next generation
(x̂2t, ŷ2t) = g(x2t,y2t) the average fitness before the noise, namely x̂2t TW ŷ2t will be
at least Φ2t + Cδα2. Hence by Lemma 4.4 we get that
E[Φ2t+1|Φ2t] = x̂2t TW ŷ2t ≥ Φ2t + Cδα2 (01). Therefore we have that












≥ Φ2t + Cδα2,
where second inequality is Expression (01) and the first inequality comes from in-
equality 4.1 (since the r.h.s of inequality 4.1 is non-negative). The first, third equality
comes from model definition and second equality comes from Lemma 4.4.
Assume now that in the next generation (x̂2t, ŷ2t) = g(x2t,y2t) the average fitness
before the noise, namely x̂2t TW ŷ2t will be less than Φ2t+Cδα2. This means that the
vector (x2t,y2t) is α-close by Corollary 4.3, so after adding the noise by the definition
of α-close we get that x̂2t TW ŷ2t + α ≥ Φ2t+1 ≥ x̂2t TW ŷ2t − α (02). From Lemma




that (Wy2t+1)i ≥ (W ŷ2t)i + γδm2 for




y with probability half) (03). The same argument works if we perturb x, so w.l.o.g
we work with perturbed vector y which has support of size at least 2. Essentially by
inequality 4.1 we get the following inequalities:































≥ Φ2t + Cδα2,
where last inequality comes from the assumption and second inequality comes from
claim (00), (02), (03). Hence by induction we get that
E[Φ2t+2 − (t+ 1) · Cδα2|Φ2t] ≥ Φ2t − t · Cδα2.
It is easy to see that Wmax ≥ Φt ≥ Wmin for all t.
Using all the above analysis and Azuma’s inequality (Theorem 4.7), we establish
our first main result on convergence time of the noisy dynamics governed by (29) for
sexual evolution under natural selection and without mutation.
Theorem 4.9 (Main 2 - Speed of convergence). For all conditions (x(0),y(0)) ∈
∆, the dynamics governed by (29) in an environment represented by fitness matrix









Proof. It suffices to show that support size of the x or y reduces by one in a bounded
number of iterations with at least 1− ε
2n
probability.
Using Lemma 4.8 we have that the random variable Φ2t−t·Cδα2 is a submartingale
and since Wmin ≤ Φt ≤ Wmax we use Azuma’s inequality 4.7 and we get that
P
[











) we get that the average fitness after 2t steps will be





) + t · Cδα2 with probability at least 1− ε
2n
. By setting







we have that the average fitness at time 2t will be greater than
Wmax with probability 1− ε2n , but since the potential is at most Wmax for all vectors
in the simplex, it follows that at some point the frequency vector becomes negligible,
i.e., a coordinate of x or y becomes less than δ. Hence, the probability that the
support size decreased during the process is at least 1− ε
2n
.
By union bound (the initial support size is at most 2n) we conclude that dynamics














− 2α)2 ≥ δα2 used in Lemma 4.8
to hold for 2 ≤ m ≤ n, we set α to be such that α ≤ γδ
4




1 > δ. Using such an α it follows that dynamics (29) reaches a pure fixed point with










4.6 Changing environment: survival or extinction?
In this section we analyze how evolutionary pressures under changing environ-
ment may lead to survival/extinction depending on the underlying mutation level.
Motivated from Wolf et al. work [139], we use Markov chain based model to capture
the changing environment, where every state captures a particular environment (see
Section 4.3.3 for details).
4.6.1 Extinction without mutation
We show that the population goes extinct with probability one, if the evolution
is governed by (29), i.e., natural selection without mutations under sexual repro-
duction. The proof of this result critically relies on polynomial-time convergence to
monomorphic population shown in Theorem 4.9 in case of fixed environment.
As discussed in Section 4.3.3, we have assume that the Markov chain is such that
99





πe < 1. (35)
Thus, if we can show convergence to monomorphic population under evolving envi-
ronments as well, then the extinction is guaranteed using (35) and the fact that popu-
lation size N t gets multiplied by current average fitness (see (32)). However, showing
convergence in stochastically changing environment is tricky because environment
can change in any step with some probability and then the argument described in the
previous section breaks down. To circumvent this we will make use of Borel-Cantelli
theorem where we say that an event happens if environment remains unchanged for
a large but fixed number of steps.
Theorem 4.10 (Second Borel-Cantelli [50]). Let E1, E2, ... be a sequence of events.
If the events En are independent and the sum of the probabilities of the En diverges
to infinity, then the probability that infinitely many of them occur is 1.
Using the above theorem with appropriate event definition, we prove the first part
of Theorem 1 stated in introduction.
Theorem 4.11 (Main 1a - Extinction without mutation). Regardless of the
initial distributions (x(0),y(0)) ∈ ∆, the population goes extinct with probability one
under dynamics governed by (29), capturing sexual evolution without mutation under
natural selection.
Proof. Let T e be the number of iterations the dynamics (29) need to reach a pure
fixed point with probability 1
2








. Let T =
maxe T
e. We consider the time intervals 1, ..., T , T + 1, ..., 2T ,... which are multiples
of T . The probability that Markov chain will remain at a specific environment e in
the time interval kT + 1, ..., (k + 1)T is ρk = (1 − p)T . We define the sequence of
events E1, E2, ..., where Ei corresponds to the fact that the chain remains in the same
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environment from time (i− 1)T + 1, ..., iT . It is clear that Ei’s are independent and
also
∑∞
i=1 P [Ei] =
∑∞
i=1 ρi = ∞. From Borel-Cantelli Theorem 4.10 it follows that
Ei’s happen infinitely often with probability 1. When Ei happens there is a time
interval of length T that the chain remains in the same environment, and therefore
with probability 1
2
, the dynamics will reach a pure fixed point. After Ei happen for
k times, the probability to reach a pure fixed point is at least 1 − 1
2k
. Hence with
probability one (letting k →∞), the dynamics (29) will reach a pure fixed point.
To finish the proof, let Tpure be a random variable that captures the time when a
pure fixed point, say (i, j), is reached. The population will have size at most N0V Tpure
where V = maxeW
e
max. Under the assumption on the entries (see inequality (35))
it follows that at any time T ′, sufficiently large, we get that the population at time












By choosing T ′ ≥ ln(N0V Tpure )
− ln((W eij)πe)
(and also satisfying that it is much greater than the
mixing time) it follows that NT
′+Tpure < 1 and hence the population dies. So, the
population goes extinct with probability one in the dynamics without mutation.
4.6.2 Survival with mutation
In this section we consider evolutionary dynamics governed by (30) capturing sex-
ual evolution with mutation under natural selection. Contrary to the case where there
are no mutations we show that population survives with positive probability. Fur-
thermore, this result turns out to be robust in the sense that it holds even when every
environment has some (few) very bad type alleles. Also, the result is independent of
the starting distribution of the population.
The main intuition behind proving this result is that, as for the mutation model in
[61], every allele is carried by at least τ fraction of the population in every generation.
Therefore even if a“good” allele becomes “bad” as the environment changes, as far
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as the new environment has a few fit alleles, there will be some individuals carrying
those who will then procreate fast, spreading their alleles further and leading to overall
survival. However, unlike in the no mutation case (see Chapter 2), average fitness is
no more a potential function even for non-noisy dynamics, i.e., it may decrease, and
therefore showing such an improvement is tricky.
First we show that if some small amount of time is spent in an environment then
the frequencies of the bad alleles become small and their effect is negligible. Recall
the assumption on good/bad type alleles (Section 4.3.3). Formally, let Bei be the set
of bad type alleles for i = 1, 2 in environment e,






≥ 1 + β, and ∀i ∈ S1 \Be1,∀k ∈ Be1,W eij ≥ W ekj, ∀j






≥ 1 + β, and ∀j ∈ S2 \Be2, ∀k ∈ Be2,W eij ≥ W eik, ∀i
(36)
Lemma 4.12 (Frequencies of bad alleles become small). Suppose that the en-
vironment e is static for time at least t ≥ ln(2n)
nτ














with Be = Be1 ∪Be2.
Proof. Consider one step of the dynamics that starts at (x,y) and has frequency
vector (x̃, ỹ) in the next step before adding the noise. Let i∗ be the bad allele that
has the greatest fitness at it, namely (W ey)i∗ ≥ (W ey)i for all i ∈ Be1. It holds that∑
i∈Be1




















































xi + τ |Be1|,
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where inequality (*) is true because if a
b




for all a, b, c positive. Hence
after we add noise δ with ||δ||∞ = δ, the resulting vector (x′,y′) (which is the next







By setting St =
∑
i∈Be1
xi(t) it follows that St+1 ≤ (1−nτ)St+(τ+δ)|Be1| and also S0 ≤
1. Therefore St ≤ (τ + δ)|Be1|1−(1−nτ)
t
nτ













where we used the assumption
that δ = on(τ). The same argument holds for B
e
2.
Using the fact that number of individuals with bad type alleles decreases very fast,
established in Lemma 4.12, we can prove that within an environment while there may
be decrease in average fitness initially, this decrease is lower bounded. Moreover, it
will later increase fast enough so that the initial decrease is compensated.
Lemma 4.13 (Phase transition on the size of population). Suppose that the
environment e is static for time t and also τ ≤ β
16n
, |Be|  nβ then there ex-
ists a threshold time Tthr such that for any given initial distributions of the alleles
(x(0),y(0)) ∈ ∆, if t < Tthr then the population size will experience a loss factor of at
most 1
d




and Wmin = mineW
e
min.
Proof. By Lemma 4.12, after ln(2n)
nτ










We consider the average fitness function x>W ey which is not increasing (as has
already been mentioned). Let τ = τ · (1, ..., 1)>, (x̃, ỹ) = f(x,y) and (x̂, ŷ) = g(x,y)
with fitness matrix W e and also denote by (x′,y′) the resulting vector after noise δ
is added. It is easy to observe that
x̃>W eỹ = (1− nτ)2x̂>W eŷ + (1− nτ)x̂>W eτ + (1− nτ)τ>W eŷ + τ>W eτ
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and also that









where Wmax = maxeW
e
max. Under the assumption (36) we have the following lower
bounds:






















First assume that x>W ey ≤ 1 + β
2
. We get the following system of inequalities:
x′>W ey′
x>W ey
≥ (1− onτ (1))
x̃>W eỹ
x>W ey
























≥ (1− onτ (1))
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Second inequality comes from the fact that x̂>W eŷ ≥ x>W ey (the average fitness is
increasing for the no mutation setting) and also since x>W ey ≤ 1+ β
2
. The third and
the fourth inequality use the fact that |Be|  nβ and τ ≤ β
16n
. Therefore, the fitness
increases in the next generation for the mutation setting as long as the current fitness
x>W ey ≤ 1 + β
2
with a factor of 1 + nτ β
2+β
(i). Hence the time we need to reach the









the total loss factor is at most 1
d




)t1 . Let t2 be the time for the
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average fitness to reach 1+ β
4




is dominated by t1. By similar argument, let’s now assume that x



































Hence x′>W ey′ ≥ (1 − 2nτ)(1 + β
2
), namely x′>W ey′ ≥ 1 + β
4
(ii) for τ < β
16n
.
Therefore as long as the fitness surpasses 1+ β
4
, it never goes below 1+ β
4
(conditioned
on the fact you remain at the same environment). This is true from Claims (i) and
(ii). When the fitness is at most 1 + β
2
, it increases in the next generation and
when it is greater than 1 + β
2
, it remains at least 1 + β
4
in the next generation.
To finish the proof we compute the times. The time t3 to have a total gain factor

















> 3t3 > t1 + t2 + t3 the proof finishes.
To show the second part of Theorem 1 (main result), we will couple the random
variable corresponding to the number of individuals at every iteration with a biased
random walk on the real line. This can be done since in Lemma 4.13 we estab-
lished that the decrease and increase in average fitness is upper and lower bounded,
respectively. We will apply the following lemma about the biased random walks.
Lemma 4.14 (Biased random walk). Assume we perform a random walk on the
real line, starting from point k ∈ N and going right (+1) with probability q > 1
2
and





Using Lemma 4.13 together with the biased random walk Lemma 4.14, we show
our next result on survival of population under mutation in the following theorem.
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, independent of N0.
Proof. The probability that the chain remains at a specific environment for least Tthr
iterations is (1− p)Tthr > 1− pTthr (from the moment it enters the environment until
it departs) and hence the probability that the chain stays at an environment for time




>W e(j)y(j) (see (32) where here
e(j) corresponds to the environment at time j) the number of individuals at time t
and Zi be the position of the biased random walk at time i as defined in Lemma
4.14 with q = 1− pTthr and assume that Z0 = blogdN0c (d is from lemma 4.13). Let
t1, t2, ... be the sequence of times where there is a change of environment (with t0 = 0)
and consider the trivial coupling where when the chain changes environment then a
move is made on the real line. If the chain remained in the environment for time
less than Tthr then the walk goes left, otherwise it goes right. It is clear by Lemma
4.13 that random variable logdN
ti dominates Zi. Hence, the probability that the
population survives is at least the probability that Zi never reaches zero (Zi > 0 for
all i ∈ N). By Lemma 4.14 this is at most ( pTthr
1−pTthr
)blogdN
0c and thus the probability of










depends on n, τ and fitness
matrices W e in particular, the minimum Wmin = mineW
e
min, and also from Lemma
4.13 we have that ln d ≈ ln 2n
Wminnτ
.
4.7 Convergence of discrete replicator dynamics with mu-
tation in fixed environments
In this section we extend the convergence result, i.e., Theorem 2.9 of Chapter
2 for dynamics (26) in static environment to dynamics governed by (28) where mu-
tations are also present. The former result critically hinges on the fact that mean
fitness strictly increases unless the system is at a fixed point, and thereby acts as a
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potential function. Despite the fact that this is no longer the case when mutations
are introduced, we manage to show that the system still converges and follows an
intuitively clear behavior. Namely, in every step of the dynamics, either the average





both) will increase. This latter quantity is a measure of how mixed/diverse the pop-
ulation is. To argue this we apply Inequality (1.1) due to Baum and Eagon and we
establish a potential function P for the dynamics governed by (28), capturing sexual
evolution with mutation. This will imply convergence for the dynamics. Note that
feasible values of τ are in [0, 1
n
], since τ represents the fraction of allele i mutating to
allele i′ of the same gene, implying nτ ≤ 1.
Theorem 4.16 (Main 3 - Convergence with mutations). Given a static environ-
ment W , dynamics governed by (28) with mutation parameter τ ≤ 1
n
has a potential








i that strictly increases, unless an equilib-
rium (fixed point) is reached. Thus, the system converges to equilibria in the limit.




























































where the first equality comes from the fact that
∑n
i=1 xi(Wy)i = x
>Wy. The same
is true for yi
∂L
∂yi
. Since L is a homogeneous polynomial of degree 2λ, from Theorem 1.1
we get that L is strictly increasing along the trajectories, namely
L(f(x,y)) > L(x,y),
unless (x,y) is a fixed point (f is the update rule of the dynamics, see also (27)).
So P (x,y) = L1/κ(x,y) is a potential function for the dynamics. To prove the result
for irrational τ , we just have to see that the proof of [14] holds for all homogeneous
polynomials with degree d, even irrational.
To finish the proof, let Ω ⊂ ∆ be the set of limit points of an orbit z(t) =
(x(t),y(t)) (frequencies at time t for t ∈ N). P (z(t)) is increasing with respect to
time t by above and so, because P is bounded on ∆, P (z(t)) converges as t→∞ to
P ∗ = supt{P (z(t))}. By continuity of P , we get that P (v) = limt→∞ P (z(t)) = P ∗
for all v ∈ Ω. So P is constant on Ω. Also v(t) = limk→∞ z(tk+ t) as k →∞ for some
sequence of times {ti} and so v(t) lies in Ω, i.e., Ω is invariant. Thus, if v ≡ v(0) ∈ Ω,
the orbit v(t) lies in Ω and so P (v(t)) = P ∗ on the orbit. But P is strictly increasing
except on equilibrium orbits and so Ω consists entirely of fixed points.
As a consequence of the above theorem we get the following:
Corollary 4.17. Along every nontrivial trajectory of dynamics governed by (28) at





increases at each step.
4.8 Discussion on the assumptions and examples
In this section, we discuss why our assumptions are necessary and their significance.
4.8.1 On the parameters











example, if we consider the entries of fitness matrices W e to be uniform from interval
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(1 − σ, 1 + σ) for some positive σ > 0 then γ is of order Θ( 1
n2
). If the entries of the
matrix are constants (in weak selection scenario they lie in the interval (1−σ, 1 +σ))
then the convergence time of dynamics (29) is polynomial with respect to n (size of
fitness matrices W e is n×n). We note that the main result of Chapter 2 for dynamics
(26) has been derived under the assumption that the entries of the fitness matrix are
all distinct. It is proven that this assumption is necessary by giving examples where
the dynamic doesn’t converge to pure fixed points if the fitness matrix has some
entries that are equal (the trivial example is when W has all entries equal, then every
frequency vector in ∆ is a fixed point). This is an indication that γ is needed to
analyze the running time and is not artificial. The noise vector δ has coordinates
±δ, so it is uniformly chosen from hypercube, but there is no dependence on the
current frequency vector (δ is independent of current (x,y)). Finally, β should be
thought of as a small constant (like in weak selection) independent of n, and τ to be
O( 1
n
). Observe that 1 − nτ ≥ 0 must hold so that the dynamics with mutation are
meaningful and from Lemma 4.13, it must hold that τ ≤ β
16n
.
4.8.2 On the environments
We analyze a finite population model where N t is the population size at time t.
It is natural to define survival if N t ≥ 1 for all t ∈ N (number of people is at least 1
at all times) and extinction if N t < 1, for some t (if the number of people is less than
one at some point then the population goes extinct). As described in preliminaries,
N t = N t−1 · Φt where Φt = x(t)>W e(t)y(t) is the average fitness at time t and W e(t)
is the fitness matrix of environment e(t).
Fix a fitness matrix W (i.e., fix an environment). If Wij > 1 + ε for all (i, j) then
x>Wy ≥ 1 for all (x,y) ∈ ∆ and thus the number of individuals is increasing along
the generations by a factor of 1 + ε (the population survives). On the other hand,
if Wij < 1 − ε for all (i, j) then x>Wy < 1 − ε for all (x,y) ∈ ∆, so it is clear that
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the number of individuals is decreasing with a factor of 1 − ε (thus population goes
extinct). So either extreme makes the problem irrelevant.
Finally, it is natural to assume that complete diversity should favor survival, i.e., if
the population is uniform along the alleles/types then the population size must not
decrease in the next generation. Therefore, we assume that the average fitness under
uniform frequencies is ≥ 1 +β (for all but few number of bad alleles that can be seen
as deleterious). The alleles that are good should dominate entry-wise the bad alleles.
Example Figure 7 shows that this assumption is necessary. In Figure 7, τ = 0.03
and W e =
 0.99 0.37
0.56 2.09
 . If we start from any vector (x,y) in the shaded area,
the dynamics converges to the stable fixed point B. The average fitness x>Wy at
B is less than the maximum at the corner which is W e1,1 = 0.99 < 1. So if the size
of population is Q when entering e, after t generations on the environment e, the
population size will be at most Q ·0.99t (which decreases exponentially). In that case
Theorem 4.15 does not hold, even if 0.99+0.37+0.56+2.09
4
= 1.0025 > 1 and β = 0.0025
(qualitatively we would have the same picture for any τ ∈ [0, 0.03] and W e).
The assumption defined in (35) is necessary as well for the following reason: As-





πe ≥ 1 (**). In that case
we can have one of the environments so that xi = 1, yj = 1 is a stable fixed point
and hence there are initial frequencies such that the dynamics (29) converge to it.
After that, it is easy to argue that this monomorphic population survives on average
because of (**), so the probability of survival in that case is non-zero.
4.8.3 Explanation of figure 6
Figure 6 in Section 4.1 shows the adjacency graph of a Markov chain. There are
3 environments with fitness matrices, say W e1 ,W e2 ,W e3 , and the entries of every
matrix are distinct. Take pii = 1− p and pij = p2 so that the stationary distribution
is (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). Observe that W e11,1 ·W e21,1 ·W e31,1 = 1.12 · 1.02 · 0.87 < 0.994 < 1. The
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same is true for entries (1,2),(2,1),(2,2). So the assumption defined in (35) is satisfied.
Moreover, observe that if we choose β = 0.005, and hence τ = 0.005
32
, it follows
that the assumptions defined in (36) are satisfied (also the bad alleles are dominated
entry-wise by the good alleles). Hence, in case of no mutation, from Theorem 4.11
the population dies out with probability 1, for all initial population sizes N0 and all
initial frequency vectors in ∆. In case of mutation, and for sufficiently large initial
population size N0, for all initial frequency vectors in ∆, the probability of survival
is positive (Theorem 4.15).
4.9 Figures
To draw the phase portrait of a discrete time system f : ∆→ ∆, we draw vector
f(x)− x at point x.
Figure 7: Example where population goes extinct in environment e for some initial
frequency vectors (x,y) that are close to stable point B (inside the shaded area).
Mutation probability is τ = 0.03 and the fitness matrix of environment e is W e1,1 =






Figure 8: Example of dynamics without mutation in specific environment W e1,1 =




2,1 = 0.56. The circles qualitatively show all the
points that slow down the increase in the average fitness x>W ey, i.e., α-close points
or negligible.
4.10 Conclusion and remarks
The results of this chapter appear in [85]. In this chapter we show various aspects
of discrete replicator-like/MWUA dynamics and show three results: Two for dynamics
with fixed parameters, and one where the parameters evolve over time as per a Markov
chain. Theorem 4.9 establishes that a noisy version of discrete replicator dynamics
converges polynomially fast to pure fixed points in coordination games. Due to the
connections established by Chastain et al. [23], this implies that evolution under
sexual reproduction in haploids converges fast to a monomorphic population if the
environment is static (fitness/payoff matrix is fixed). Introducing mutations to this
model, as in [61], augments the replicator dynamics, and our second result shows
convergence for this augmented replicator in coordination games. The proof is via a
novel potential function, which is a combination of mean payoff and entropy, which
may be of independent interest.
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Finally, for the replicator dynamics with noise, capturing finite populations, we
show that assuming some mild conditions, the population size will eventually be-
come zero with probability one (extinction) under (standard) replicator, while under
augmented replicator (with mutations) it will never wither out (survival) with a non-
trivial probability.
A host of novel questions arise from this model and there is space for future work:
• For the fast convergence result (first result above), we assumed that the random
noise δ lies in a subset of hypercube of length δ, i.e., every entry δi is ±1 times
magnitude δ and
∑
i δi = 0. Can the result be generalized for a different class
of random noise, where the noise also depends on the distribution of the alleles
at every step and or population size?
• The second result talks about convergence to fixed points, which happens at
the limit (time t → ∞). Therefore, an interesting question would be to settle
the speed of convergence. Additionally, for the no mutations case, Theorem
2.9 shows that all the stable fixed points are pure. It would be interesting to
perform stability analysis for the replicator with mutations as well.
• Mutation can be modeled in an alternate way, where an individual can mutate
to a completely new allele that is not part of some fixed (in advance) set of
alleles. This is equivalent to adding a strategy to the coordination game. It will
be interesting to define and analyze dynamics where mutation is modeled in
such a way. Finally, what happens if environment changes are not completely





We start this chapter by a motivating example. Given a total number of N red
and blue balls we have the following process:
• (Reproduction step): From the N balls, each red ball is replaced by ar ∈ Z+
new red balls and each blue ball is replaced by aB ∈ Z+ new blue balls.
• (Selection step): N of these offsprings are randomly selected with replacement.
• (Mutation step): Each of N balls from the previous step flips color with prob-
ability µ and keeps the same color with probability 1− µ.
The stochastic process above is a Markov chain with state space all the (x, y) ∈ N2
with x+ y = N , i.e., it has N + 1 states. As long as µ > 0, it is easy to see that the
Markov chain is ergodic and it converges to a unique stationary distribution. The
main question is how fast it converges, and as discussed in the section 1.3 this is
captured by the mixing time. The mixing time of a Markov chain, tmix, is defined to
be the smallest time t such that for all x ∈ Ω, the distribution of the Markov chain
starting at x after t-time steps is within an `1-distance of 1/4 of the steady state.
1
In this chapter we will give some generic theorems about bounding the mixing
time of Markov chains that have the same flavor as the above process, which we
call evolutionary Markov chains. These processes arise in the context of evolution
and have also been used to model a wide variety of social, economical and cultural
1Recall that if one is willing to pay an additional factor of log 1/ε, one can bring down the error
from 1/4 to ε for any ε > 0; see [75].
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phenomena, see [100]. Typically, in such Markov chains, each state consists of a






, and it is huge even for constant m.2 At a very high level, in each
iteration, the different types in the current generation reproduce according to some
fitness function f , the reproduction could be asexual or sexual and have mutations
that transform one type into another. This gives rise to an intermediate population
that is subjected to the force of selection; a sample of size N is selected giving us the
new generation. The specific way in which the reproduction, mutation and selection
steps happen determine the transition matrix of the corresponding Markov chain.
Most questions in evolution reduce to understanding the statistical properties
of the steady state of an evolutionary Markov chain and how it changes with its
parameters. However, in general, there seems to be no way to compute the desired
statistical properties other than to sample from (close to) the steady state distribution
by running the Markov chain for sufficiently long [39]. The examples we examine in
Section 5.7 have the property that the underlying Markov chains are ergodic but
not reversible, and so we do not have a another way to compute or approximate
the stationary distribution, apart from running the chain. Apart from dictating the
computational feasibility of sampling procedures, the mixing time also gives us the
number of generations required to reach the steady state; an important consideration
for validating evolutionary models [133, 39].
5.1.1 Evolutionary Markov chains
It is convenient to think of each state of an evolutionary Markov chain as a vector
which captures the fraction of each type in the current population. Thus, each state is
2For example, even when m = 40 and the population is of size 10, 000, the number of states is
more than 2300, i.e., more than the number of atoms in the universe!
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a 1/N-integral point (each coordinate is a multiple of 1/N) in the m-dimensional prob-
ability simplex ∆m,
3 and we can think of the state space Ω ⊆ ∆m. We are also given
a (fitness) function f : ∆m 7→ ∆m. If X(t) is the current state of the chain, inspired
by the Wright-Fisher model, the state at t+ 1 is obtained by sampling N times inde-
pendently from the distribution f(X(t)). In other words, X(t+1) ∼ 1
N
Mult(N, f(X(t)))
(multiplied by renormalization factor 1/N so that X(t+1) ∈ ∆m), where Mult(n,p)
denotes the multinomial distribution with parameters (n,p ··= (p1, ..., pm)). We will
say that this evolutionary Markov chain is a stochastic evolution guided by f . It is






where the expectation is over one step of the chain. This quantity is called the expected
motion of the chain at X(t). Notice that xk+1 = f(xk) is a discrete dynamical system in
the simplex. What can the expected motion of a Markov chain tell us about the mixing
time of a Markov chain? Of course, for general Markov chains we do not expect a
very interesting answer, but since we get N samples i.i.d to compute the next state,
additional structure is imposed to the equation (38) (e.g., we have concentration
around the expectation due to Chernoff bounds, see Theorem 5.5).
Our contribution. Our key contribution is to connect the mixing time of an evo-
lutionary Markov chain with the geometry of the corresponding dynamical system it
induces (its expected motion). More formally, we prove the following mixing time
bounds which depend on the structure of the limit sets of the expected motion:
• One unique fixed point which is stable4 – the mixing time is O(logN),
see Theorem 5.7
3Recall that the probability simplex ∆m is {p ∈ Rm : pi ≥ 0 ∀i,
∑
i pi = 1}.
4Abusing the definition, when we say stable in this chapter, we mean that the spectral radius of
the Jacobian at the fixed point is less than one. Moreover by unstable, we mean that the Jacobian
has spectral radius greater than one.
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(a) One stable fixed point ⇒ fast
mixing
(b) 3 stable fixed points ⇒ slow
mixing
Figure 9: One/multiple stable fixed points.
• One stable fixed point and multiple unstable fixed points – the mixing time is
O(logN), see Theorem 5.8.
• Multiple stable fixed points – the mixing time is eΩ(N), see Theorem 5.9.
• Periodic orbits – the mixing time is eΩ(N), see Theorem 5.10.
Roughly, this is achieved by using the geometry of the dynamical system around the
fixed points (for the first two theorems we construct a contractive coupling).
Moreover we provide two applications in Section 5.7. Theorem 5.7 enables us to
establish rapid mixing for evolutionary Markov chains which capture the evolution of
species (RSM or Eigen’s dynamics [43]) where reproduction is asexual (see Theorem
5.11). Finally, combining Theorems 5.7, 5.9 we are able to show a phase transition
result in a model which captures how children acquire grammar [101, 71] and which
can be interpreted as a process in which the species reproduce is sexual (see Theorem
5.12). While we describe these models later, we note that, as one changes the pa-
rameters of the model, the limit sets of the expected motion can exhibit the kind of
complex behavior mentioned above and a finer understanding of how they influence
the mixing time is desired.
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5.2 Related Work
There have been glimpses in the probability literature that connections between
Markov chains and dynamical systems might be useful, see [109, 15, 140, 81, 55, 80]
and references therein. We study the connection between dynamical systems and
the mixing time of Markov chains formally in this chapter. Technically, our results
strengthen the connection between Markov chains/stochastic processes and dynamical
systems. We focus on a class of Markov chains called evolutionary and inspired by
the Wright-Fisher model in population genetics.
The motivating example (as an infinite population dynamics) which also appears
in Section 5.7.1 and belongs to the class of Markov chains we focus on, was proposed
in the pioneering work of Eigen and co-authors [43, 45]. Importantly, this particular
dynamical system has found use in modeling rapidly evolving viral populations (such
as HIV), which in turn has guided drug and vaccine design strategies. As a result,
these dynamics are well-studied; see [39, 135, 137] for an in depth discussion.
However, even in the simplest of stochastic evolutionary models there has been
a lack of rigorous mixing time bounds for the full range of evolutionary parameters;
see [42, 49, 47] for results under restricted assumptions. Our Theorems give rigorous
bounds for mixing times under minimal assumptions.
5.3 Preliminaries and formal statement of results
5.3.1 Important Definitions and Tools
In preparation for formally stating our results, we first discuss some definitions
and technical tools that will be used later on. We then formally state our main
theorems in Section 5.3.2 and our applications in Section 5.7. We start this section
by defining formally the class of evolutionary Markov chains we focus on for the rest
of this chapter.
Definition 19 (Stochastic evolution Markov chains). Given an f : ∆m → ∆m
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which is twice differentiable in the relative interior of ∆m with bounded second deriva-
tive and a population parameter N , we define a Markov chain called the stochastic
evolution guided by f as follows. The state at time t is a probability vector X(t) ∈ ∆m.
The state X(t+1) is then obtained in the following manner. Define Y(t) = f(X(t)). Ob-
tain N independent samples from the probability distribution Y(t), and denote by Z(t)




Z(t) and therefore E[X(t+1)|X(t)] = f(X(t)).
We call f the expected motion of the stochastic evolution.
Operators and norms. The following theorem, stated here only in the special case
of the 1→ 1 norm, relates the spectral radius with other matrix norms.
Theorem 5.1 (Gelfand’s formula, specialized to the 1 → 1 norm). For any
square matrix M , we have





Theorem 5.2 (Taylor’s theorems, truncated). Let f : Rm → Rm be a twice
differentiable function, and let J(z) denote the Jacobian of f at z. Let x,y ∈ Rm be
two points, and suppose there exists a positive constant B such that at every point on
the line segment joining x to y, the Hessians of each of the m co-ordinates fi of f
have operator norm at most 2B. Then, there exists a v ∈ Rm such that
f(x) = f(y) + J(y)(x− y) + v,
and |vi| ≤ B ‖x− y‖22 for each i ∈ [m].
Theorem 5.3 (Taylor’s theorem, first order remainder). Let f : Rm → R be
differentiable and x,y ∈ Rm. Then there exists some ξ in the line segment from x to
y such that f(y) = f(x) +∇f(ξ)(y − x).
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Remark 7 (On the zero eigenvalue of Jacobian of f : ∆m → ∆m). Since
f : ∆m → ∆m and hence
∑
i fi(x) = 1 for all x ∈ ∆m, if we define hi(x) = fi(x)∑
i fi(x)





= 0 for all j ∈ [m]. This
means without loss of generality we can assume that the Jacobian J(x) of f has 1>
(the all-ones vector) as a left eigenvector with eigenvalue 0.
The definition below quantifies the instability of a fixed point as is standard in the
literature. Essentially, an α unstable fixed point is repelling in any direction.
Definition 20 (α-unstable fixed point). Let z be a fixed point of a dynamical
system f. The point z is called α-unstable if |λmin(J(z))| > α > 1 where λmin corre-
sponds to the minimum eigenvalue of the Jacobian of f at the fixed point z, excluding
the eigenvalue 0 that corresponds to the left eigenvector 1>.
Also we need to define what a stable periodic orbit is, since we use it in Theorem
5.10. Let C = {x1, . . . ,xk} be a periodic orbit of size k. We call C a stable periodic




< ρ < 1, where
Jfk(x1) denotes the Jacobian of function f
k at x1.
Couplings and mixing times. We revisit from Introduction some facts about
couplings and mixing times, adjusted to the problem of this chapter. Let p,q ∈ ∆m be
two probability distributions on m objects. A coupling C of p and q is a distribution
on ordered pairs in [m] × [m], such that its marginal distribution on the first co-
ordinate is equal to p and that on the second coordinate is equal to q. A simple, if
trivial, example of a coupling is the joint distribution obtained by sampling the two
coordinates independently, one from p and the other from q.
Couplings allow a very useful dual characterization of the total variation distance,
as stated in the following well known lemma (see also 1.4).
Lemma 5.4 (Coupling lemma [4]). Let p,q ∈ ∆m be two probability distributions
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‖p− q‖1 = minC P(A,B)∼C [A 6= B] ,
where the minimum is taken over all valid couplings C of p and q.
Moreover, the coupling in the lemma can be explicitly described. We use this
coupling extensively in our arguments, hence we record some of its properties here.
Definition 21 (Optimal coupling). Let p,q ∈ ∆m be two probability distributions
on m objects. For each i ∈ [m], let si ··= min(pi, qi), and s ··=
∑m
i=1 si. Sample
U, V,W independently at random as follows:
P [U = i] =
si
s
, P [V = i] =
pi − si
1− s , and P [W = i] =
qi − si
1− s , for all i ∈ [m].
We then sample (independent of U, V,W ) a Bernoulli random variable H with mean
s. The sample (A,B) given by the coupling is (U,U) if H = 1 and (V,W ) otherwise.
It is easy to verify that A ∼ p, B ∼ q and P [A = B] = s = 1 − ‖p− q‖TV.
Another easily verified but important property is that for any i ∈ [m]
P [A = i, B 6= i] =

0 if pi < qi,
pi − qi if pi ≥ qi.
A standard technique for obtaining upper bounds on mixing times is to use the




2 are two evolutions of an ergodic chain
M such that their evolutions are coupled according to some coupling C. Let T be the




2 . Then, if it can be shown that P [T > t] ≤ 1/e




2 ), then it follows that tmix ··= tmix(1/e) ≤ t.
Concentration. We discuss some concentration results that are used extensively
in our later arguments. We begin with standard Chernoff-Hoeffding type bounds.
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Theorem 5.5 (Chernoff-Hoeffding bounds [41]). Let Z1, Z2, . . . , ZN be i.i.d Bernoulli
random variables with mean µ. We then have





















≤ exp (−Nµδ/3) .













An important tool in our later development is the following lemma, which bounds
additional “discrepancies” that can arise when one samples from two distribution p
and q using an optimal coupling. The important feature for us is the fact that the
additional discrepancy (denoted as e in the lemma) is bounded as a fraction of the
“initial discrepancy” ‖p− q‖1. However, such relative bounds on the discrepancy are
less likely to hold when the initial discrepancy itself is very small, and hence, there is a
trade-off between the lower bound that needs to be imposed on the initial discrepancy
‖p− q‖1, and the desired probability with which the claimed relative bound on the
additional discrepancy e is to hold. The lemma makes this delicate trade-off precise.
Lemma 5.6. Let p and q be probability distributions on a universe of size m, so that
p,q ∈ ∆m. Consider an optimal coupling of the two distributions, and let x and y be
random frequency vectors with m co-ordinates (normalized to sum to 1) obtained by
taking N independent samples from the coupled distributions, so that E [x] = p and
E [y] = q. Define the random error vector e as
e ··= (x− y)− (p− q).
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with probability at least 1− 2m exp (−t/3).
Proof. The properties of the optimal coupling of the distributions p and q imply that
since the N coupled samples are taken independently,
1. |xi − yi| = 1N
∑N
j=1 Rj, where Rj are i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with
mean |pi − qi|, and
2. xi − yi has the same sign as pi − qi.
The second fact implies that |ei| = ||xi − yi| − |(pi − qi)||. By applying the concen-






N |pi − qi|
· |pi − qi|
]
≤ 2 exp (−t/3) , if t






N |pi − qi|
· |pi − qi|
]
≤ exp (−t/3) , if t
N |pi − qi|
> 1.
One of the two bounds applies to every i ∈ [m] (except those i for which |pi− qi| = 0,
but in those cases, we have |ei| = 0, so the bounds below will apply nonetheless).
Thus, taking a union bound over all the indices, we see that with probability at least































‖p− q‖1 . (40)
Here, (39) uses Cauchy-Schwarz inequality to bound the first term while (40) uses
the hypothesis in the lemma that ctm
N
≤ ‖p− q‖1. The claim follows since c > 1.
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For concreteness, in the rest of this chapter, we use tmix to refer to tmix(1/e)
(though any other constant smaller than 1/2 could be chosen as well in place of 1/e
without changing any of the claims).
5.3.2 Main theorems
We are now ready to state our main theorem. We begin by formally defining the
conditions on the evolution function required by Theorem 5.7.
Definition 22 (Smooth contractive evolution). A function f : ∆m → ∆m is said
to be a (L,B, ρ) smooth contractive evolution if it has the following properties:
Smoothness f is twice differentiable in the interior of ∆m. Further, the Jacobian J
of f satisfies ‖J(x)‖1 ≤ L for every x in the interior of ∆m, and the operator
norms of the Hessians of its co-ordinates are uniformly bounded above by 2B at
all points in the interior of ∆m.
Unique fixed point f has a unique fixed point τ in ∆m which lies in the interior
of ∆m.
Contraction near the fixed point At the fixed point τ , the Jacobian J(τ) of f
satisfies
sp (J(τ)) < ρ < 1.
Convergence to fixed point For every ε > 0, there exists an ` such that for any
x ∈ ∆m, ∥∥f `(x)− τ∥∥
1
< ε.
Remark 8. Note that the last condition implies that ‖f t(x)− τ‖1 = O(ρt) in the
light of the previous condition and the smoothness condition (see Lemma 5.18). Also,
it is easy to see that the last two conditions imply the uniqueness of the fixed point,
i.e., the second condition. However, the last condition on global convergence does not
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by itself imply the third condition on contraction near the fixed point. Consider, e.g.,
g : [−1, 1] → [−1, 1] defined as g(x) = x − x3. The unique fixed point of g in its
domain is 0, and we have g′(0) = 1, so that the third condition is not satisfied. On
the other hand, the last condition is satisfied, since for x ∈ [−1, 1] satisfying |x| ≥ ε,
we have |g(x)| ≤ |x| (1 − ε2). In order to construct a function f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] with
the same properties, we note that the range of g is [−x0, x0] where x0 = 2/(3
√
3),
and consider f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] defined as f(x) = x0 + g(x − x0). Then, the unique
fixed point of f in [0, 1] is x0, f
′(x0) = g
′(0) = 1, the range of f is contained in
[0, 2x0] ⊆ [0, 1], and f satisfies the fourth condition in the definition but does not
satisfy the third condition.
Given an f which is a smooth contractive evolution, and a population parameter
N , our first result is the following:
Theorem 5.7 (Unique stable). Let f be a (L,B, ρ) smooth contractive evolution.
Then, the mixing time of the stochastic evolution guided by f is O(logN).
Moreover, in the second theorem we allow f to have multiple unstable fixed points,
but still a unique stable.
Theorem 5.8 (One stable/multiple unstable). Let f : ∆m → ∆m be twice dif-
ferentiable in the interior of ∆m with bounded second derivative. Assume that f(x)
has a finite number of fixed points z0, . . . , zl in the interior, where z0 is a stable fixed
point, i.e., sp (J(z0)) < ρ < 1 and z1, . . . , zl are α-unstable fixed points (α > 1).
Furthermore, assume that limt→∞ f
t(x) exists for all x ∈ ∆m. Then, the stochastic
evolution guided by f has mixing time O(logN).
In the third result, we allow f to have multiple stable fixed points (in addition to
any number of unstable fixed points). For this setting, we prove that the stochastic
evolution guided by f has mixing time eΩ(N). The phase transition result on model
discussed in Section 5.7.3 relies crucially on Theorem 5.9.
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Theorem 5.9 (Multiple stable). Let f : ∆m → ∆m be continuously differentiable
in the interior of ∆m. Assume that f(x) has at least two stable fixed points in the
interior z1, . . . , zl, i.e., sp (J(zi)) < ρi < 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , l. Then, the stochastic
evolution guided by f has mixing time eΩ(N).
Finally, we allow f to have a stable limit cycle. We prove that in this setting the
stochastic evolution guided by f has mixing time eΩ(N). This result seems important
for evolutionary dynamics as periodic orbits often appear [112, 107].
Theorem 5.10 (Stable limit cycle). Let f : ∆m → ∆m be continuously differen-
tiable in the interior of ∆m. Assume that f(x) has a stable limit cycle with points
w1, . . . ,ws of size s ≥ 2 in the sense that sp (
∏s
i=1 J(ws−i+1)) < ρ < 1. Then the
stochastic evolution guided by f has mixing time eΩ(N).
We also provide two applications of the theorems above for two specific dynamics,
discussed extensively in Section 5.7.
Theorem 5.11 (Rapid mixing for RSM model). The mixing time of the RSM
model is O(logN) for all matrices Q,A and values of m.
Theorem 5.12 (Phase transition for grammar acquisition). There is a criti-
cal value τc of the mutation parameter τ such that the mixing time of the grammar
acquisition dynamics is: (i) exp(Ω(N)) for 0 < τ < τc and (ii) O(logN) for τ > τc
where N is the size of the population.
5.4 Technical overview
5.4.1 Overview of Theorem 5.7
We analyze the mixing time of our stochastic process by studying the time required
for evolutions started at two arbitrary starting states X(0) and Y(0) to collide. More
precisely, let C be any Markovian coupling of two stochastic evolutions X and Y,
both guided by a smooth contractive evolution f , which are started at X(0) and Y(0).
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Let T be the first (random) time such that X(T ) = Y(T ). It is well known that if
it can be shown that P [T > t] ≤ 1/4 for every pair of starting states X(0) and Y(0)
then tmix(1/4) ≤ t. We show that such a bound on P [T > t] holds if we couple the
chains using the optimal coupling of two multinomial distributions (see Section 5.3
for a definition of this coupling).
Our starting point is the observation that the optimal coupling and the definition










Now, if f were globally contractive, so that the right hand side of (41) was always
bounded above by ρ′
∥∥X(t) −Y(t)∥∥
1
for some constant ρ′ < 1, then we would get that
the expected distance between the two copies of the chains contracts at a constant
rate. Since the minimum possible positive `1 distance between two copies of the chain
is 1/N , this would have implied an O(logN) mixing time using standard arguments.
However, such a global assumption on f , which is equivalent to requiring that the
Jacobian J of f satisfies ‖J(x)‖1 < 1 for all x ∈ ∆m, is far too strong. In particular,
it is not satisfied by standard systems such as Eigen’s dynamics discussed later in
Section 5.7.1.
Nevertheless, these dynamics do satisfy a more local version of the above condition.
That is, they have a unique fixed point τ to which they converge quickly, and in the
vicinity of this fixed point, some form of contraction holds. These conditions motivate
the “unique fixed point”, “contraction near the fixed point”, and the “convergence
to fixed point” conditions in our definition of a smooth contractive evolution (22).
However, crucially, the “contraction near the fixed point” condition, inspired from
the definition of “asymptotically stable” fixed points in dynamical systems, is weaker
than the stepwise contraction condition described in the last paragraph, even in the
vicinity of the fixed point. As we shall see shortly, this weakening is essential for
generalizing the earlier results of [137] to the m > 2 case, but comes at the cost of
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making the analysis more challenging.
However, we first describe how the “convergence to fixed point” condition is used
to argue that the chains come close to the fixed point in O(logN) time. This step
of our argument is the only one technically quite similar to the development in [137];
our later arguments need to diverge widely from that paper. Although this step is
essentially an iterated application of appropriate concentration results along with the
fact that the “convergence to fixed point” condition implies that the deterministic
evolution f comes close to the fixed point τ at an exponential rate, complications
arise because f can amplify the effect of the random perturbations that arise at each
step. In particular, if L > 1 is the maximum of ‖J(x)‖1 over ∆m, then after ` steps, a
random perturbation can become amplified by a factor of L`. As such, if ` is taken to
be too large, these accumulated errors can swamp the progress made due to the fast
convergence of the deterministic evolution to the fixed point. These considerations
imply that the argument can only be used for ` = `0 logN steps for some small
constant `0, and hence we are only able to get the chains within Θ(N
−γ) distance
of the fixed point, where γ < 1/3 is a small constant. In particular, the argument
cannot be carried out all the way down to distance O(1/N), which, if possible, would
have been sufficient to show that the coupling time is small with high probability.
Nevertheless, it does allow us to argue that both copies of the chain enter an O(N−γ)
neighborhood of the fixed point in O(logN) steps.
At this point, [137] showed that in the m = 2 case, one could take advantage
of the contractive behavior near the fixed point to construct a coupling obeying (41)
in which the right hand side was indeed contractive: in essence, this amounted to a
proof that ‖J‖1 < 1 was indeed satisfied in the small O(N−γ) neighborhood reached
at the end of the last step. This allowed [137] to complete the proof using standard
arguments, after some technicalities about ensuring that the chains remained for a
sufficiently long time in the neighborhood of the fixed point had been taken care of.
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The situation however changes completely in the m > 2 case. It is no longer
possible to argue in general that ‖J(x)‖1 < 1 when x is in the vicinity of the fixed
point, even when there is fast convergence to the fixed point. Instead, we have to
work with a weaker condition (the “contraction to the fixed point” condition alluded
to earlier) which only implies that there is a positive integer k, possibly larger than
1, such that in some vicinity of the fixed point,
∥∥Jk∥∥
1
< 1. In the setting used
by [137], k could be taken to be 1, and hence it could be argued via (41) that the
distance between the two coupled copies of the chains contracts in each step. This
argument however does not go through when only a kth power of J is guaranteed to
be contractive while J itself could have 1 → 1 norm larger than 1. This inability to
argue stepwise contraction is the major technical obstacle in our work when compared
to the work of [137], and the source of all the new difficulties that arise in this more
general setting.
As a first step toward getting around the difficulty of not having stepwise contrac-
tion, we prove 5.13, which shows that the eventual contraction after k steps can be
used to ensure that the distance between two evolutions x(t) and y(t) close to the fixed
point contracts by a factor ρk < 1 over an epoch of k steps (where k is as described
in the last paragraph), even when the evolutions undergo arbitrary perturbations u(t)
and v(t) at each step, provided that the difference u(t) − v(t) between the two pertur-
bations is small compared to the difference x(t−1) − y(t−1) between the evolutions at
the previous step. The last condition actually asks for a relative notion of smallness,









where δ is a constant specified in the theorem. Note that the theorem is a statement
about deterministic evolutions against possibly adversarial perturbations, and does
not require u(t) and v(t) to be stochastic, but only that they follow the required
conditions on the difference of the norm (in addition to the implied condition that
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the evolution x(t) and y(t) remain close to the fixed point during the epoch).




the two coupled chains contracts after every k iterations of (41), we need to argue
that the required condition on the perturbations in (42) holds with high probability
over a given epoch during the coupled stochastic evolution of X(t) and Y(t). (In fact,
we also need to argue that the two chains individually remain close to the fixed point,
but this is easier to handle).
However, at this point, a complication arises from the fact that 5.13 requires




at time t−1. In other words, the upper bounds required
on the ξ(t) become more stringent as the two chains come closer to each other. This
fact creates a trade-off between the probability with which the condition in (42) can
be enforced in an epoch, and the required lower bound on the distance between
the chains required during the epoch so as to ensure that probability (this trade-off is
technically based on 5.6). To take a couple of concrete examples, when
∥∥X(t) −Y(t)∥∥
1
is Ω(logN/N) in an epoch, we can ensure that (42) remains valid with probability
at least 1−N−Θ(1) (see the discussion following 5.16), so that with high probability
Ω(logN) consecutive epochs admit a contraction allowing the distance between the
chains to come down from Θ(N−γ) at the end of the first step to Θ(logN/N) at the
end of this set of epochs.
Ideally, we would have liked to continue this argument till the distance between
the chains is Θ(1/N) and (due to the properties of the optimal coupling) they have a
constant probability of colliding in a single step. However, due to the trade-off referred
to earlier, when we know only that
∥∥X(t) −Y(t)∥∥
1
is Ω(1/N) during the epoch, we can
only guarantee the condition of (42) with probability Θ(1) (see the discussion following
the proof of 5.16). Thus, we cannot claim directly that once the distance between the
chains is O(logN/N), the next Ω(log logN) epochs will exhibit contraction in distance
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leading the chain to come as close as O(1/N) with a high enough positive probability.
To get around this difficulty, we consider O(log logN) epochs with successively weaker
guaranteed upper bounds on
∥∥X(t) −Y(t)∥∥
1
. Although the weaker lower bounds on
the distances lead in turn to weaker concentration results when 5.16 is applied, we
show that this trade-off is such that we can choose these progressively decreasing
guarantees so that after this set of epochs, the distance between the chains is O(1/N)
with probability that it is small but at least a constant. Since the previous steps,
i.e., those involving making both chains come within distance O(N−γ) of the fixed
point (for some small constant γ < 1), and then making sure that the distance
between them drops to O(logN/N), take time O(logN) with probability 1 − o(1),
we can conclude that under the optimal coupling, the collision or coupling time T
satisfies
P [T > O(logN)] ≤ 1− q, (43)
for some small enough constant q, irrespective of the starting states X(0) and Y(0)
(note that here we are also using the fact that once the chains are within distance
O(1/N), the optimal coupling has a constant probability of causing a collision in a
single step). The lack of dependence on the starting states allows us to iterate (43)
for Θ (1) consecutive “blocks” of time O(logN) each to get
P [T > O (logN)] ≤ 1
4
,
which gives us the claimed mixing time.
5.4.2 Overview of Theorem 5.8
The main difficulty to prove this theorem is the existence of multiple unstable
fixed points in the simplex from which the Markov chain should get away fast. As
before, we study the time T required for two stochastic evolutions with arbitrary
initial states X(0) and Y(0), guided by some function f , to collide. By the conditions
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of Theorem 5.8, function f has a unique stable fixed point z0 with
sp (J(z0)) < ρ < 1.
Additionally, it has α-unstable fixed points. Moreover, for all starting points x0 ∈ ∆m,
the sequence (f t(x0))t∈N has a limit. We can show that there exists constant c0 such
that P [T > c0 logN ] ≤ 14 , from which it follows that tmix(1/4) ≤ c0 logN . In order
to show collision after O(logN) steps, it suffices first to run each chain independently




) after at most O(logN) steps, for some ε > 0.5 As long as this is true,
the coupling constructed for proving Theorem 5.7 can be used to show collision. To
explain why our claim holds, we break the proof into three parts.











after O(logN) steps. Step (a) has the technical difficulty
that as long as a chain starts from a o( 1√
N
) distance from an unstable fixed point,
the variance of the process dominates the expansion due to the fact the fixed point
is unstable.
(b) Assuming (a), we show that with probability 1− 1
poly(N)
the Markov chain reaches
distance Θ(1) from any unstable fixed point after O(logN) steps.
(c) Finally, if the Markov chain has Θ(1) distance from any unstable fixed point
(the fixed points have pairwise `1 distance independent of N , i.e., they are “well
separated”), it will reach some 1
N1−ε
-neighborhood of the stable fixed point z0 expo-
nentially fast (i.e., after O(logN) steps). For showing (a) and (b), we must prove
an expansion argument for ‖f t(x)−w‖1 as t increases, where w is an α-unstable
fixed point and also taking care of the random perturbations due to the stochastic
5B(x, r) denotes the open ball with center x and radius r in `1, which we call an r-neighborhood
of x.
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i.e., one step expansion. The first important fact is that f−1 is well-defined in a small












where x is in some neighborhood of w and J−1(w) is the pseudoinverse of J(w) (see
the Remark 7 in Section 5.3). However even if w is α-unstable and sp (J−1(w)) < 1
α
,
it can hold that ‖J−1(w)‖1 > 1. At this point, we use Gelfand’s formula (Theorem
5.1). Since limt→∞(‖At‖1)1/t → sp (A) , for all ε > 0, there exists a k0 such that for






















)k − ε ≤ 1
αk
.
By taking advantage of the continuity of the J−1(x) around the unstable fixed point
w, we can show expansion for every k steps of the dynamical system. It remains to
show for (a) and (b) how one can handle the perturbations due to the randomness








, even with the
expansion we have from the deterministic dynamics (as discussed above), variance
dominates. We examine case (b) first, which is relatively easy (the drift dominates at











(this captures the deviation on running the stochastic evolution for
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k steps vs running the deterministic dynamics for k steps, both starting from X(t))

















For (a), first we show that with probability Θ(1), after one step the Markov chain has
distance Ω( 1√
N
) of w. This claim just uses properties of the multinomial distribution.





, we can use again the idea of expansion and being
careful with the variance and we can show expansion with probability at least 1
2
, every






reached after O(log logN) steps and basically we finish with (b). For (c), we use a
couple of lemmas , i.e., Lemma 5.18, Claim 58 and Lemma 5.25. Let ∆ be some
compact subset of ∆m, where we have excluded all the α-unstable fixed points along
with some open ball around each unstable fixed point of constant radius. We can




) for some ε > 0 as long as the dynamical system converges for all starting
points in ∆ (and it should converge to the stable fixed point z0). We have roughly
that the dynamical system converges exponentially fast for every starting point in B
to the stable fixed point z0 and that with probability 1− 1poly(n) two arbitrary chains
independently will reach a 1
Nε
neighborhood of the stable fixed point z0. Therefore
by (a), (b), (c) and the coupling from the proof of Theorem 5.7, we conclude the proof
of Theorem 5.8.
5.4.3 Overview of Theorems 5.9 and 5.10
To prove Theorem 5.10, we make use of Theorem 5.9, i.e., we reduce the case of
the stable limit cycle to the case of multiple stable fixed points. If s is the length of
the limit cycle, roughly the bound eΩ(N) on the mixing time loses a factor 1
s
compared
to the case of multiple stable fixed points. We now present the ideas behind the proof
of Theorem 5.9. First as explained above, we can show contraction after k steps (for
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some constant k) for the deterministic dynamics around a stable fixed point z with












To do that, we use Gelfand’s formula, Taylor’s theorem and continuity of J(x) where
x lies in a neighborhood of the fixed point z. Hence, due to the above contraction of
the `1 norm and the concentration of Chernoff bounds, it takes a long time for the
chain X(t) to get out of the region of attraction of the fixed point z. Technically, the
error that aggregates due to the randomness of the stochastic evolution guided by f
does not become large due to the convergence of the series
∑∞
i=0 ρ
i. Hence, we focus
on the error probability, namely the probability the stochastic evolution guided by
f deviates a lot from the dynamical system with rule f if both have same starting




with probability at most 2me−2ε
2N , an exponential number of steps is required for
the above to be violated. Finally, as we have shown that it takes exponential time to
get out of the region of attraction of a stable fixed point z we do the following easy
(common) trick. Since the function has at least two fixed points, we start the Markov
chain very close to the fixed point that its neighborhood has mass at most 1/2 in the
stationary distribution (this can happen since we have at least 2 fixed points that are
well separated). Then, after exponential number of steps, it will follow that the total
variation distance between the distribution of the chain and the stationary will be at
least 1/4.
5.4.4 Overview of Theorem 5.11
Our first step towards the proof of Theorem 5.11 is to show that the RSM model
(see Section 5.7.1 for description of the model) can be seen as a stochastic evolution
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guided by the function f defined by f(p) = (QAp)t‖QAp‖1
, where Q and A are matrices with
positive entries. Then we show that the dynamical system with update rule f has
a unique fixed point (due to Perron-Frobenius) and for all initial conditions in ∆m,
the dynamics converges to it (analogue to power method). Finally, we show that the
spectral radius of the Jacobian of f at the unique fixed point is λ2
λ1
where λ1, λ2 are
the largest and second largest eigenvalues in absolute value of QA, and hence < 1.
Thus the conditions of Theorem 5.7 are satisfied and the result follows.
5.4.5 Overview of Theorem 5.12
Below we give the necessary ingredients of the proof of Theorem 5.12. Our pre-
vious results, along with some analysis on the fixed points of g (function of grammar
acquisition dynamics) suffice to show the phase transition result. To prove Theorem
5.12, initially we show that the model (finite population) is essentially a stochastic
evolution (see Definition 19) guided by g as defined in Section 5.7.3 and proceed as
follows: We prove that in the interval 0 < τ < τc, the function g has multiple fixed
points whose Jacobian have spectral radius less than 1. Therefore due to Theorem
5.9 discussed above, the mixing time will be exponential in N . For τ = τc a bifurca-
tion takes place which results in function g of grammar acquisition dynamics having
only one fixed point inside simplex (specifically, the uniform point (1/m, . . . , 1/m)). In
dynamical systems, a local bifurcation occurs when a parameter (in particular the
mutation parameter τ) change causes two (or more) fixed points to collide or the
stability of an equilibrium (or fixed point) to change. To prove fast mixing in the
case τc < τ ≤ 1/m, we make use of Theorem 5.7. One of the assumptions is that the
dynamical system with g as update rule needs to converge to the unique fixed point
for all initial points in simplex. To prove convergence to the unique fixed point, we
define a Lyapunov function P such that
P (g(x)) > P (x) unless x is a fixed point. (44)
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As a consequence, the (infinite population) grammar acquisition dynamics converge to
the unique fixed point (1/m, . . . , 1/m). To show Equation (44), we use an inequality that
dates back in 1967 (see Theorem 1.1), which intuitively states the discrete analogue
of proving that for a gradient system dx
dt
= ∇V (x) it is true that dV
dt
≥ 0.
5.5 Unique stable fixed point
5.5.1 Perturbed evolution near the fixed point
As discussed in 5.4, the crux of the proof of our main theorem is analyzing how the
distance between two copies of a stochastic evolution guided by a smooth contractive
evolution evolves in the presence of small perturbations at every step. In this section,
we present our main tool, 5.13, to study this phenomenon. We then describe how
the theorem, which itself is presented in a completely deterministic setting, applies
to stochastic evolutions.
Fix any (L,B, ρ)-smooth contractive evolution f on ∆m, with fixed point τ . As
we noted in 5.4, since the Jacobian of f does not necessarily have operator (or 1→ 1)
norm less than 1, we cannot argue that the effect of perturbations shrinks in every
step. Instead, we need to argue that the condition on the spectral radius of the
Jacobian of f at its fixed point implies that there is eventual contraction of distance
between the two evolutions, even though this distance might increase in any given
step. Indeed, the fact that the spectral radius sp (J) of the Jacobian at the fixed
point τ of f is less than ρ < 1 implies that a suitable iterate of f has a Jacobian with
operator (and 1→ 1) norm less than 1 at τ . This is because Gelfand’s formula (5.1)




We now use the above condition to argue that after k steps in the vicinity of the fixed
point, there is indeed a contraction of the distance between two evolutions guided by
f , even in the presence of adversarial perturbations, as long as those perturbations
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are small. The precise statement is given below; the vectors ξ(i) in the theorem model
the small perturbations.
Theorem 5.13 (Perturbed evolution I). Let f be a (L,B, ρ)-smooth contractive
evolution, and let τ be its fixed point. For all positive integers k > k0 (where k0
is a constant that depends upon f) there exist ε, δ ∈ (0, 1] depending upon f and
















of vectors with x(i),y(i) ∈ ∆m and ξ(i) orthogonal to 1, which satisfy the following
conditions:
1. (Definition). For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, there exist vectors u(i) and v(i) such that
x(i) = f(x(i−1)) + u(i), y(i) = f(y(i−1)) + v(i), and ξ(i) = u(i) − v(i).




















In the theorem, the vectors x(i) and y(i) model the two chains, while the vectors
u(i) and v(i) model the individual perturbations from the evolution dictated by f .
The theorem says that if the perturbations ξ(i) to the distance are not too large, then
the distance between the two chains indeed contracts after every k steps.
Proof. As observed above, we can use Gelfand’s formula to conclude that there exists
a positive integer k0 (depending upon f) such that we have
∥∥J(τ)k∥∥
1
< ρk for all
k > k0. This k0 will be the sought k0 in the theorem, and we fix some appropriate
k > k0 for the rest of the section.
Since f is twice differentiable, J is continuous on ∆m. This implies that the
function on ∆km defined by z1, z2, . . . , zk 7→
∏k
i=1 J(zi) is also continuous. Hence,
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≤ ρk − ε2. (45)
Further, since ∆m is compact and f is continuously differentiable, ‖J‖1 is bounded
above on ∆m by some positive constant L, which we assume without loss of generality
to be greater than 1. Similarly, since f has bounded second derivatives, it follows
from the multivariate Taylor’s theorem that there exists a positive constant B (which
we can again assume to be greater than 1) such that for any x,y ∈ ∆m, we can find
a vector ν such that ‖ν‖1 ≤ Bm ‖x− y‖
2
2 ≤ Bm ‖x− y‖
2
1 such that
f(x) = f(y) + J(y)(x− y) + ν. (46)







≤ 1, and δ = 2Bmε ≤ 1.
With this setup, we are now ready to proceed with the proof. Our starting point is
the use of a first order Taylor expansion to control the error x(i) − y(i) in terms of
x(i−1) − y(i−1). Indeed, Equation (46) when applied to this situation (along with the
hypotheses of the theorem) yields for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k that
x(i) − y(i) = f(x(i−1))− f(y(i−1)) + ξ(i)







. Before proceeding, we first take
note of a simple consequence of (47). Taking the `1 norm of both sides, and using











Since both x(i−1) and y(i−1) are within distance ε of τ by the hypothesis of the theorem,










where in the last inequality we use 4Bmε ≤ ε2 ≤ 1. This, in turn, implies via







We now return to the proof. By iterating (47), we can control x(k) − y(k) in terms of
a product of k Jacobians, as follows:






















≤ ε by the hypothesis of the theorem, we get from (66) that the





We now proceed to estimate the terms in the summation. Our first step to use
the conditions on the norms of ν(i) and ξ(i) and the fact that ‖J‖1 ≤ L uniformly to










Now, recalling that x(i) and y(i) are both within an ε `1-neighborhood of τ so that∥∥x(i) − y(i)∥∥
1


























where the first inequality is an application of (48), and the last uses the definitions of




for the first term, this yields the result.
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Remark 9. Note that k in the theorem can be chosen as large as we want. However,
for simplicity, we fix some k > k0 in the rest of the discussion, and revisit the freedom
of choice of k only toward the end of the proof of the Theorem (5.7).
5.5.2 Evolution under random perturbations.
We now explore some consequences of the above theorem for stochastic evolu-
tions. Our main goal in this subsection is to highlight the subtleties that arise in
ensuring that the third “small perturbations” condition during a random evolution,
and strategies that can be used to avoid them. However, we first begin by showing
the second condition, that of “closeness to the fixed point” is actually quite simple
to maintain. It will be convenient to define for this purpose the notion of an epoch,
which is simply the set of (k + 1) initial and final states of k consecutive steps of a
stochastic evolution.
Definition 23 (Epoch). Let f be a smooth contractive evolution and let k be as in
the statement of 5.13 when applied to f . An epoch is a set of k+ 1 consecutive states
in a stochastic evolution guided by f . By a slight abuse of terminology we also use
the same term to refer to a set of k + 1 consecutive states in a pair of stochastic
evolutions guided by f that have been coupled using the optimal coupling.
Suppose we want to apply 5.13 to a pair of stochastic evolutions guided by f .
Recall the parameter ε in the statement of 5.13. Ideally, we would likely to show
that if both the states in the pair at the beginning of an epoch are within some
distance ε′ < ε of the fixed point τ , then (1) all the consequent steps in the epoch are
within distance ε of the fixed point (so that the closeness condition in the theorem
is satisfied), and more importantly (2) that the states at the last step of the epoch
are again within the same distance ε′ of the fixed point, so that we have the ability
to apply the theorem to the next epoch. Of course, we also need to ensure that the
condition on the perturbations being true also holds during the epoch, but as stated
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above, this is somewhat more tricky to maintain than the closeness condition, so we
defer its discussion to later in the section. Here, we state the following lemma which
shows that the closeness condition can indeed be maintained at the end of the epoch.
Lemma 5.14 (Remaining close to the fixed point). Let w < w′ < 1/3 be fixed
constants. Consider a stochastic evolution X(0),X(1), . . . on a population of size N
guided by a (L,B, ρ)-smooth contractive evolution f : ∆m → ∆m with fixed point τ .





. If N is chosen large enough (as a func-

















To prove the lemma, we need the following simple concentration result.
Lemma 5.15. Let X(0),X(1), . . . be a stochastic evolution on a population of size
N which is guided by a (L,B, ρ)-smooth contractive evolution f : ∆m → ∆m with
fixed point τ . For any t > 0 and γ ≤ 1/3, it holds with probability at least 1 −
2mt exp (−Nγ/2) that





for all 1 ≤ i ≤ t.
Proof. Fix a coordinate j ∈ [m]. Since X(i) is the normalized frequency vector ob-
tained by taking N independent samples from the distribution f(X(i−1)), Hoeffding’s
inequality yields that
P
[∣∣∣X(i)j − f(X(i−1))j∣∣∣ > N−γ] ≤ 2 exp (−N1−2γ) ≤ 2 exp (−Nγ) ,
where the last inequality holds because γ ≤ 1/3. Taking a union bound over all








≤ 2m exp (−Nγ) . (49)
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For ease of notation let us define the quantities s(i) ··=
∥∥X(i) − f i(X(0))∥∥
1
for 0 ≤ i ≤ t.
Our goal then is to show that it holds with high probability that s(i) ≤ (L+1)im
Nγ
for all
i such that 0 ≤ i ≤ t.
Now, by taking an union bound over all values of i in (49), we see that the following
holds for all i with probability at least 1− 2mt exp (−Nγ):
s(i) =












where the first term is estimated using the probabilistic guarantee from (49) and the
second using the upper bound on the 1 → 1 norm of the Jacobian of f . However,
(51) implies that s(i) ≤ m(L+1)i
Nγ
for all 0 ≤ i ≤ t, which is what we wanted to prove.
To see the former claim, we proceed by induction. Since s0 = 0, the claim is trivially
true in the base case. Assuming the claim is true for s(i), we then apply (51) to get
s(i+1) ≤ m
Nγ
+ Ls(i) ≤ m
Nγ
(














, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. (52)

















, for 1 ≤ i ≤ k. (53)
Combining (52),(53), we already get the first item in the lemma. However, for i = k,
we can do much better than the above estimate (and indeed, this is the most important
part of the lemma). Recall the parameter ε in 5.13. If we choose N large enough so
that









the sequences y(i) = f i(X(0)) and z(i) = τ (for 0 ≤ i ≤ k) satisfy the hypotheses of




















Thus, (since ρ < 1) we only need to choose N so that
Nw
′−w ≥ (L+ 1)
km
α(1− ρk) (56)
in order to get the second item in the lemma. Since w > 0 and w′ > w, it follows that
all large enough N will satisfy the conditions in both (54), (56), and this completes
the proof.
5.5.3 Controlling the size of random perturbations.
We now address the “small perturbations” condition of 5.13. For a given smooth
contractive evolution f , let α,w,w′ be any constants satisfying the hypotheses of
Lemma 5.14 (the precise values of these constants will specified in the next section).
For some N as large as required by the lemma, consider a pair X(t),Y(t) of stochastic
evolutions guided by f on a population of size N , which are coupled according to
the optimal coupling. Now, let us call an epoch decent if the first states X(0) and






≤ αN−w. The lemma (because
of the choice of N made in 54) shows that if an epoch is decent, then except with
probability that is sub-exponentially small in N ,
1. the current epoch satisfies the “closeness to fixed point” condition in 5.13, and
2. the next epoch is decent as well.
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Thus, the lemma implies that if a certain epoch is decent, then with all but sub-
exponential (in N) probability, a polynomial (in N) number of subsequent epochs
are also decent, and hence satisfy the “closeness to fixed point” condition of Theorem
5.13. Hypothetically, if these epochs also satisfied the “small perturbation” condition,
then we would be done, since in such a situation, the distance between the two chains
will drop to less than 1/N within O(logN) time, implying that they would collide.
This would in turn imply a O(logN) mixing time.
However, as alluded to above, ensuring the “small perturbations” condition turns
out to be more subtle. In particular, the fact that the perturbations ξ(i) need to




in achieving adequate concentration, and we cannot hope to prove that the “small




is very small. As such, we need to break the ar-
guments into two stages based on the starting differences at the start of the epochs
lying in the two stages.
To make this more precise (and to state a result which provides examples of the
above phenomenon and will also be a building block in the coupling proof), we define
the notion of an epoch being good with a goal g. As before let X(t) and Y(t) be
two stochastic evolutions guided by f which are coupled according to the optimal
coupling, and let ξ(i) be the perturbations as defined in 5.13. Then, we say that a
decent epoch (which we can assume, without loss of generality, to start at t = 0)
is good with goal g if one of following two conditions holds. Either (1) there is a j,
0 ≤ j ≤ k− 1 such that
∥∥f(X(j))− f(Y(j))∥∥
1
≤ g, or otherwise, (2) it holds that the





for 0 ≤ i ≤ k,
where δ again is as defined in 5.13. Note that if an epoch is good with goal g,
then either the expected difference between the two chains drops below g sometime
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during the epoch, or else, all conditions of 5.13 are satisfied during the epoch, and
the distance between the chains drops by a factor of ρk. Further, in terms of this
notion, the preceding discussion can be summarized as “the probability of an epoch
being good depends upon the goal g, and can be small if g is too small”. To make
this concrete, we prove the following theorem which quantifies this trade-off between
the size of the goal g and the probability with which an epoch is good with that goal.
Theorem 5.16 (Goodness with a given goal). Let the chains X(t), Y(t), and the
quantities N,m,w,w′, k, L, ε and δ be as defined above, and let β < (logN)2. If N









Proof. Let X(0) and Y(0) denote the first states in the epoch. Since the current
epoch is assumed to be decent, 5.14 implies that with probability at least 1 −
2mk exp(−N−w′/2), the “closeness to fixed point” condition of 5.13 holds through-
out the epoch, and the next epoch is also decent. If there is a j ≤ k − 1 such that∥∥f(X(j))− f(Y(j))∥∥
1








for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
However, in this case, we can apply the concentration result in 5.6 with c = 4L2/δ2










for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
Hence, both conditions (“closeness to fixed point” and “small perturbations”) for
being good with goal g hold with the claimed probability.
Note that we need to take β to a large constant, at least Ω(log(mk)), even to
make the result non-trivial. In particular, if we take β = 3 log(4mk), then if N is
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large enough, the probability of success is at least 1/e. However, with a slightly larger
goal g, it is possible to reduce the probability of an epoch not being good to oN(1): if
we choose β = logN , then a decent epoch is good with the corresponding goal with
probability at least 1−N−1/4, for N large enough.
In the next section, we use both these settings of parameters in the above theorem
to complete the proof of the mixing time result. As described in 5.4, the two settings
above will be used in different stages of the evolution of two coupled chains in order
to argue that the time to collision of the chains is indeed small.
Proof of the main theorem: Analyzing the coupling time.
Our goal is now to show that if we couple two stochastic evolutions guided by the
same smooth contractive evolution f using the optimal coupling, then irrespective of
their starting positions, they reach the same state in a small number of steps, with
reasonably high probability. More precisely, our proof would be structured as follows.
Fix any starting states X(0) and Y(0) of the two chains, and couple their evolutions
according to the optimal coupling. Let T be the first time such that X(T ) = Y(T ).
Suppose that we establish that P [T < t] ≥ q, where t and p do not depend upon the
starting states (X(0),Y(0)). Then, we can dovetail this argument for ` “windows” of
time t each to see that P [T > ` · t] ≤ (1− q)`: this is possible because the probability
bounds for T did not depend upon the starting positions (X(0),Y(0)) and hence can
be applied again to the starting positions (X(t),Y(t)) if X(t) 6= Y(t). By choosing `
large enough so that (1 − q)` is at most 1/e (or any other constant less than 1/2),
we obtain a mixing time of `t. We therefore proceed to obtain an upper bound on
P [T < t] for some t = Θ(logN).
As discussed earlier, we need to split the evolution of the chains into several stages
in order to complete the argument outlined above. We now describe these four differ-
ent stages. Recall that f is assumed to be a (L,B, ρ)-smooth contractive evolution.
Without loss of generality we assume that L > 1. The parameter r appearing below
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is a function of these parameters and k and is defined in 5.18. Further, as we noted
after the proof of 5.13, k can be chosen to be as large as desired. We now exercise
this choice by choosing k to be large enough so that
ρk ≤ e−1. (57)
The other parameters below are chosen to ease the application of the framework
developed in the previous section.








for 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 1,







. We show below that









for N large enough.









Then, we define T0 to be the smallest number of steps needed after Tstart such









We prove below that when N is large enough




where t0 ··= 1k log(1/ρ) .
3. Coming within distance Θ(1/N). Let β0 and h be as defined in the last item.





random variables T1, T2, . . . T`. We
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begin by defining the stopping time S0 ··= Tstart +T0. For i ≥ 1, Ti is defined to
be the smallest number of steps after Si−1 such that the corresponding stopping














Note that Ti is defined to be 0 if setting Si = Si−1 already satisfies the above
conditions. Define βi = ρ
ikβ0. We prove below that when N is large enough
P [Ti > k + 1] ≤ 4mk exp (−(βi logN)/8) , for 1 ≤ i ≤ `1. (60)
4. Collision. Let β0 and h be as defined in the last two items. Note that after











Then, from the properties of the optimal coupling we have that X(S`1+1) =





which is at least exp (−Lβ0h)
when N is so large that N > hLβ0.
Assuming (60), (59), (58), we can complete the proof of 5.7 as follows.
Proof of 5.7. Let X(0), Y(0) be the arbitrary starting states of two stochastic evo-
lutions guided by f , whose evolution is coupled using the optimal coupling. Let T
be the minimum time t satisfying X(t) = Y(t). By the Markovian property and the
probability bounds in items 1 to 4 above, we have (for large enough N)
P [T ≤ tstart logN + kt0 logN + (k + 1)`1]















1− 4mk exp(−(ρikβ0 logN)/8)
)








where the last inequality is true for large enough N . Applying 5.19 to the above sum
(with the parameters x and α in the lemma defined as x = exp(−(β0 logN)/8) and












where the first inequality follows from the lemma and the fact that log logN
k log(1/ρ)
≤ `1 ≤
1 + log logN
k log(1/ρ)
, and the last inequality uses the definition of β0 and m, k ≥ 1. Thus, for
large enough N , we have
P [T ≤ c logN ] ≥ q,
where c ··= 2(tstart +kt0) and q ··= (3/4) exp (−Lβ0h− 1). Since this estimate does not
depend upon the starting states, we can bootstrap the estimate after every c logN
steps to get





is the mixing time of the chain for total variation distance 1/e, when N is large
enough.
We now proceed to prove the claimed equations, starting with (58). Let t ··=











with probability at least 1 − 2mt exp(−N1/3). From the triangle inequality and the


















where α,w are as defined in item 1 above. Now, if we instead looked at the chain
starting at some i < k, the same result would hold for X(t+i). Further, the same
analysis applies also to Y(t+i). Taking an union bound over these 2k events, we get
the required result.
Before proceeding with the proof of the other two equations, we record an impor-
tant consequences of 58. Let w, α be as defined above, and let w′ > w be such that
w′ < 1/3. Recall that an epoch starting at time 0 is decent if both X(t) and Y(t) are
within distance α/Nw of τ .
Observation 5.17. For large enough N , it holds with probability at least 1−exp(−Nw′/4)
that for 1 ≤ i ≤ kN , X(Tstart+i),Y(Tstart+i) are within `1 distance α/Nw of τ .
Proof. We know from item 1 that the epochs starting at times Tstart + i for 0 ≤ i < k
are all decent. For large enough N , 5.14 followed by a union bound implies that the
N consecutive epochs starting at T + j + k` where ` ≤ N and 0 ≤ j ≤ N are also
all decent with probability at least 1− 2mk2N exp(−Nw′/2), which upper bounds the
claimed probability for large enough N .
We denote by E the event that the epochs starting at Tstart + i for 1 ≤ i ≤ kN are
all decent. The above observation says that P (E) ≥ 1 − exp(−N−w′/4) for N large
enough.
We now consider T0. Let g0 ··= hβ0 logNN(1+δ) , where h is as defined in items 2 and 3
above. From 5.16 followed by a union bound, we see that the first t1 logN consecutive
epochs starting at Tstart, Tstart + k, Tstart + 2k, . . . are good with goal g0 (they are
already known to be decent with probability at least P (E) from the above observation)
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logN − P (¬E),
which is larger than 1 − N−β0/7 for N large enough (since δ < 1). Now, if we have∥∥f(X(i))− f(Y(i))∥∥
1
≤ g for some time i during these t1 logN good epochs then
T0 ≤ kt1 logN follows immediately. Otherwise, the goodness condition implies that
the hypotheses of 5.13 are satisfied across all these epochs, and we get











where the second last inequality is true for large enough N .
Finally, we analyze Ti for i ≥ 1. For this, we need to consider cases according
to the state of the chain at time Si−1. However, we first observe that plugging our









which is at least 1−2mk exp(−(βi logN)/7) forN large enough (since δ < 1). Further,
since we can assume via the above observation that all the epochs we consider are
decent with probability at least P (E), it follows that the epoch starting at Si−1 (and
also the one starting at Si−1 + 1) is good with goal gi with probability at least
p ··= 1− 2mk exp(−(βi logN)/7)− P (¬E) ≥ 1− 2mk exp(−(βi logN)/8),
where the last inequality holds whenever βi ≤ logN and N is large enough (we will
use at most one of these two epochs in each of the exhaustive cases we consider below).
Note that if at any time Si−1 + j (where j ≤ k + 1) during one of these two good
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epochs it happens that
∥∥f(X(Si−1+j))− f(Y(Si−1+j))∥∥
1
≤ gi, then we immediately get
Ti ≤ k + 1 as required. We can therefore assume that this does not happen, so that
the hypotheses of 5.13 are satisfied across these epochs.





. Since we are












Thus, in this case, we have Ti ≤ k with probability at least p as defined in the last
paragraph.





in which case Ti is









Since h = 4L
2m
δ2
, the first inequality allows us to use 5.6 with the parameters c and t
in that lemma set to c = 4/δ2 and t = βiL
2 logN , and we obtain∥∥X(Si−1+1) −Y(Si−1+1)∥∥
1






with probability at least 1 − 2m exp (−(βiL2 logN)/3). Using the same analysis as
the first case from this point onward (the only difference being that we need to use
the epoch starting at Si−1 +1 instead of the epoch starting at Si−1 used in that case),
we get that




≥ 1− 4mk exp (−(βi logN)/8) ,
since L, k > 1. Together with (61), this completes the proof of (60).
5.5.4 Proofs omitted from Section 5.5
Lemma 5.18 (Exponential convergence I). Let f be a smooth contractive evolu-
tion, and let τ and ρ be as in the conditions described in Section 5.3.2. Then, there
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Proof. Let ε and k be as defined in 5.13. From the “convergence to the fixed point”






Note that this implies that f `+i(z) is within distance ε of τ for i = 0, 1, . . . , k, so
that 5.13 can be applied to the sequence of vectors f `(z), f `+1 (z) , . . . , f `+k(z) and










Since ρ < 1, we see that the epoch starting at ` + k also satisfies (62) and hence we
can iterate this process. Using also the fact that the 1 → 1 norm of the Jacobian of
f is at most L (which we can assume without loss of generality to be at least 1), we
















where in the last line we use the facts that L > 1, ρ < 1 and j < k. Noting that any
t ≥ ` is of the form `+ki+ j for some i and j as above, we have shown that for every








ρt ‖z− τ‖1 . (63)
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Similarly, for t < `, we have, for any z ∈ ∆m∥∥f t(z)− τ∥∥
1












ρt ‖z− τ‖1 , (65)
where in the last line we have again used L > 1, ρ < 1 and t < `. From (65), (63),






5.5.5 Sums with exponentially decreasing exponents
The following technical lemma is used in the proof of 5.7.
Lemma 5.19. Let x, α be positive real numbers less than 1 such that α < 1
e
. Let ` be



























yi, since 0 < y ≤ 1 and α < 1/e,
≤ y
1− y .
5.6 Multiple fixed points
5.6.1 One stable, many unstable fixed points
We start this section by proving some technical lemmas that will be very useful
for the proofs. The following lemma roughly states that there exists a k (derived
155
from Theorem 5.1) such that after k steps in the vicinity a stable fixed point z, there
is as expected a contraction of the `1 distance between the frequency vector of the
deterministic dynamics and the fixed point.
Lemma 5.20 (Perturbed evolution II). Let f : ∆m → ∆m and z be a stable
fixed point of f with sp (J(z)) < ρ. Assume that f is continuously differentiable
for all x with ‖x− z‖1 < δ for some positive δ. From Gelfand’s formula (Theorem
5.1) consider a positive integer k such that
∥∥Jk[z]∥∥
1
< ρk. There exist ε ∈ (0, 1], ε






vectors with x(i) ∈ ∆m which satisfy the following conditions:
1. For 1 ≤ i ≤ k, it holds that
x(i) = f(x(i−1)).










Proof. We denote the set {x : ‖x− z‖1 < δ} by B(z, δ). Since f is continuously differ-
entiable on B(z, δ), ∇fi(x) is continuous on B(z, δ) for i = 1, ...,m. Let A(y1, . . . ,ym)
be a matrix so that Aij(y1, ...,ym) = (∇fi(yi))j.6 This implies that the function
on ×mki=1B(z, δ) defined by w11,w12, . . . ,w1m,w21, . . .wmk 7→
∏k
i=1A(wi1, . . . ,wim) is
also continuous. Hence, there exist ε1, ε2 > 0 smaller than 1 such that if ‖wij − z‖ ≤
ε1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ m then∥∥∥∥∥
k∏
i=1






− ε2 < ρk. (66)
From Taylor’s theorem (Theorem 5.3) we have that x(t+1) = A(ξ
(k−t)





i lies in the line segment from z to x
(t) for i = 1, . . . ,m. By induction
6Easy to see that A(z, . . . , z) = J(z).
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we get that









We choose ε = min(ε1, δ). Therefore since ξ
(j)
i ∈ B(z, ε) for i = 1, . . . ,m and j =







Lemma 5.21 below roughly says that the stochastic evolution guided by f does
not deviate by much from the deterministic dynamics with update rule f after t steps,
for t some small positive integer.
Lemma 5.21. Let f : ∆m → ∆m be continuously differentiable in the interior of
∆m. Let X
(0) be the state of a stochastic evolution guided by f at time 0. Then
with probability 1 − 2t · m · e−2ε2N we have that
∥∥X(t) − f t(X(0))∥∥
1
≤ tβtεm, where
β ··= supx∈∆m ‖J(x)‖1.
Proof. We proceed by induction. For t = 1 the result follows from concentration
(Chernoff bounds, Theorem 5.5). Using the triangle inequality we get that













and also by the fact that ‖f(x)− f(x′)‖1 ≤ β ‖x− x′‖1 and induction we get that




∥∥X(t) − f t(X(0))∥∥
1
≤ β · tβtεm. (68)
It is easy to see that εm + tβt+1εm ≤ (t + 1)βt+1εm, hence from inequalities 67 and
68 the result follows with probability at least 1− 2(t+ 1) ·m · e−2ε2N .
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Existence of Inverse function. For the rest of this section when we talk about
the inverse of the Jacobian of a function f at an α-unstable fixed point, we mean the
pseudoinverse which also has left eigenvector all ones 1> with eigenvalue 0 (see also
Remark 7). Since we use a lot the inverse of a function f around a neighborhood
of α-unstable fixed points in our lemmas, we need to prove that the inverse is well
defined.
Lemma 5.22. Let f : ∆m → ∆m be continuously differentiable in the interior of
∆m. Let z be an α-unstable fixed point (α > 1). Then f
−1(x) is well-defined in a
neighborhood of z and is also continuously differentiable in that neighborhood. Also
Jf−1(z) = J
−1(z) where Jf−1(z) is the Jacobian of f
−1 at z.
Proof. This comes from the Inverse function theorem. It suffices to show that J(z)x =
0 iff
∑
i xi = 0, namely the differential is invertible on the simplex ∆m. This is true
by assumption since the minimum eigenvalue λmin of (J(z)), excluding the one with
left eigenvector 1>, will satisfy λmin > α > 1 > 0. Finally the Jacobian of f
−1 at z is








Lemma 5.23. Let f : ∆m → ∆m be continuously differentiable in the interior of
∆m. Let X
(0) be the state of a stochastic evolution guided by f at time 0 and also














after at most O(logN) steps.
Proof. We assume that X(t) is in a neighborhood of z which is oN(1) for the rest of
the proof, otherwise the lemma holds trivially. Let q be a positive integer such that
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‖(J−1(z))q‖1 < 1αq < 25 (using Gelfand’s formula 5.1 and the fact that α > 1). First








then with probability at least





(this is true because the
variance of binomial is Θ(N) and by CLT). We choose c =
√
2 log(4mq)qβqm where
β ··= supx∈∆m ‖J(x)‖1. From Lemma 5.21 we get that with probability at least 12 the
deviation between the deterministic dynamics and the stochastic evolution after q
steps is at most log(4mq)qβ
qm√
2N
(by substitute ε = log(4mq)√
2N
in Lemma 5.21). Hence, using
Lemma 5.20 for the function h = f−1 around z and k = q, sp (J−1[z]) < 1
α
, after






with probability at least 1
2
c1.





























with t to be at most
2/3(log logN) with probability at least c1
(logN)2/3
. Since we have made no assump-
tions on the position of the chain (except the distance), it follows that after at most
c2(logN)




from the fixed point with probability Θ(1).
Distance Θ(1). Combining Lemma 5.23 with the lemma below we can show that
after O(logN) number of steps, the Markov chain will have distance from an α-
unstable fixed point lower bounded by a constant Θ(1) with sufficient probability.
Lemma 5.24. Let f : ∆m → ∆m be continuously differentiable in the interior of
∆m. Let X
(0) be the state of a stochastic evolution guided by f at time 0 and also z be











is r ··= Θ(1) after at most O(logN) steps.
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Proof. Let r be such that we can apply Lemma 5.20 for f−1 with fixed point z and
parameters ρ = 1
a
and q such that aq < 1
2
since sp (J−1(z)) < 1
a
and q is given from










from z, with probability at least 1−2 mq
N2γ
. Then by induction




















Therefore, after at most T = q logN steps we get that
∥∥X(T ) − z∥∥
1
≥ r with proba-
bility at least 1− 2mq2 logN
N2γ
from union bound (and choose γ = 2).
Below we show the last technical lemma of the section. Intuitively says that given
a dynamical system where the update rule is defined in the simplex, if for every
initial condition, the dynamics converges to some fixed point z, then z cannot be an
α-unstable unless the initial condition is z.
Lemma 5.25. Let f : ∆m → ∆m be continuously differentiable and assume that f has
z0, . . . , zl+1 (l is finite) fixed points, where z0 is stable such that sp (J(z0)) < ρ < 1
and z1, . . . , zl+1 are α-unstable with α > 1. Assume also that limq→∞ f
q(x) exists
for all x ∈ ∆m (and it is some fixed point). Let B = ∪li=1B(zi, ri), where B(zi, ri)
denotes the open ball of radius ri around zi and set ∆ = ∆m − B. Then for every ε,
there exists a t such that ∥∥f t(x)− z0∥∥1 < ε
for all x ∈ ∆.
Proof. If ∆ is empty, then it holds trivially. By assumption we have that for all
x ∈ ∆, limq→∞ f q(x) = zi for some i = 0, . . . , l + 1. Let z be an α-unstable fixed
point. We claim that the if limt→∞ f
t(x) = z then x = z. Let us prove this claim.
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Assume x0 ∈ ∆ and that x0 is not a fixed point. By assumption limq→∞ f q(x0) = zi
for some i > 0, hence for every δ > 0, there exists a q0 such that for q ≥ q0 we








we consider an ε such that Theorem 5.20 holds for function f−1 and k. We pick
δ = min(ε,ri)
2
and assume a q0 such that by convergence assumption ‖f q(x0)− zi‖1 ≤ δ
for q ≥ q0. Hence Theorem 5.20 holds for the trajectory (f t+q0(x0))t∈N. Set s =







it holds that ‖f t(x0)− zi‖1 ≥
at−q0 ‖f q0(x0)− z‖1 ≥ 2δ (due to Lemma 5.20), i.e., we reached a contradiction.
Hence limt→∞ f
t(x) = z0 for all x ∈ ∆. The rest follows from Lemma 5.26 which is
stated below.
Lemma 5.26. Let S ⊂ ∆m be compact and assume that limt→∞ f t(x) = z for all
x ∈ S. Then for every ε, there exists a q such that
‖f q(x)− z‖1 < ε
for all x ∈ S.
Proof. Because of the convergence assumption, for every ε > 0 and every x ∈ S, there




Define the sets Ai = {y ∈ S | ‖f i(y)− z‖1 < ε} for each positive integer i. Then,
since f i is continuous, the sets Ai are open in S, and therefore, by the above condition,
form an open cover of S (since every y must lie in some Ai). By compactness, some
finite collection of them must therefore cover S, and hence by taking q to be the
maximum of the indices of the sets in this finite collection the lemma follows.
We are now able to prove the main theorem of the section, i.e., Theorem 5.8.
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Proof of Theorem 5.8. Consider r1, . . . , rl as can occur from Lemma 5.23 and assume
without loss of generality that the open balls B(zi, ri) for i = 1, . . . , l, with center zi
and radius ri (in `1 distance) are disjoint sets and that ∆ ··= ∆m\∪li=1B(zi, ri) is not
empty (otherwise we could decrease ri’s since they remain constants and Lemma 5.23
would still hold). We consider two chains X(0),Y(0). We claim that with probability
Θ(1) (which can be boosted to any constant) each chain reaches within 1
Nw
distance
of the stable fixed point z0 for some w > 0, after at most T = O(logN) steps. Then
the coupling constructed to prove 5.7 works because it uses the smoothness of f and
the stability of the fixed point, as long as the two chains are within 1
Nw
for some w > 0




they collide after O(logN) steps (with probability Θ(1) which also can be boosted to
any constant) and hence the mixing time will be O(logN). To prove the claim, we
first use Lemmas 5.24 and 5.23. It occurs that with probability say Θ(1) after at most
O(log2/3N log logN) +O(logN) steps, each chain will have reached the compact set
∆. Moreover, from Lemma 5.28 we have that for all x ∈ ∆, f t(x) converges to fixed
point z0 exponentially fast. Hence, using claim (58) (by choosing z0, ρ,∆ same as in
the proof of Theorem 5.8 and r from Lemma 5.28) follows that after O(logN) steps,
each chain that started in ∆ comes within 1
Nw
distance of z0 with sufficiently enough
probability.
5.6.2 Multiple stable fixed points and limit cycles
Staying close to fixed point. We prove the main lemma of this section, then
our second result will be a corollary. The main lemma states that as long as the
Markov chain starts from a neighborhood of one stable fixed point, it takes at least
exponential time to get away from that neighborhood with probability say 9
10
.
Lemma 5.27. Let f : ∆m → ∆m be continuously differentiable in the interior of ∆m
with stable fixed points z1, . . . , zl and k (independent of N) be such that
∥∥J(zi)k∥∥1 <
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ρki < 1 for all i = 1, . . . , l. Let X
(0) be the state of a stochastic evolution guided by f
at time 0. There exists a small constant εi (independent of N) such that given that
X(0) satisfies
∥∥X(0) − zi∥∥1 ≤ mεi for some stable fixed point zi, after t = e2εi2N20mk steps
it holds that
∥∥X(t) − zi∥∥1 ≤ (k+1)βkεim1−ρi with probability at least 910 .














, it follows that
∥∥X(t) − z∥∥
1
≤ (t + 1)βtεim with probability at least
1 − 2m · ke−2ε2iN for t = 1, . . . , k − 1. Assume that
∥∥X(t) − z∥∥
1
≤ (t + 1)βtεim is
true for t = 1, . . . , k − 1. We choose εi small enough constant such that Lemma 5.20
holds with ε = (k+1)β
kεim
1−ρi . To prove the lemma, we use induction on t and show that∥∥X(t) − zi∥∥1 ≤ ((k + 1)βkεim) ·(∑tj=0 ρji) < ((k+1)βkεim)1−ρi < ε and hence Lemma 5.20
will hold. For t = k we have that
∥∥X(k) − zi∥∥1 ≤ ∥∥fk(X(0))− zi∥∥1 + ∥∥fk(X(0))−X(k)∥∥1 (triangle inequality)
≤ ρki
∥∥X(0) − zi∥∥1 + kβkεim (Lemma 5.20 and Lemma 5.21)




ρji )(k + 1)β
kεim.
Let t′ = t− k, be a time index. We do the same trick as for the base case and we get
that







































The error probability, i.e., at least one of the steps above fails and the chain gets





· 2mk · e−2ε2iN = 1
10
(by Lemma 5.21).
We can now prove Theorem 5.9 which follows as a corollary from Lemma 5.27.
Proof of Theorem 5.9. Two stable fixed points suffice; let z1, z2. Consider the εi’s
from the previous lemma (Lemma 5.27) and set Si = {x : ‖x− zi‖1 ≤ (k+1)β
kεim
1−ρi }
for i = 1, 2 where β ··= supx∈∆m ‖J(x)‖1. We can choose ε1, ε2 so small such that





and y = z1 if µ(S1) ≤ 12 , otherwise set S = S2, T = e
2ε22N
20mk
and y = z2. Assume∥∥X(0) − y∥∥
1
≤ εm. Therefore from Lemma 5.27 we get that P
[





also by assumption µ(S̄) ≥ 1
2




∣∣µ(S̄)− P [X(T ) ∈ S̄]∣∣ > 1
4
and the result follows, i.e., tmix(1/4) is e
Ω(N).
Stable limit cycle. This part technically is small, because it depends on the pre-
vious section. We denote by w1, . . . ,ws (s ≥ 2) the points in the stable limit cycle.
Again we assume that wi’s are well separated.
Proof of Theorem 5.10. Let h(x) = f s(x). It is clear to see that the Markov chain
guided by h satisfies the assumptions of 5.9. The fixed points of h are just the
points in the limit cycle, i.e., w1, . . . ,ws. Additionally, it easy to see (via chain rule)
that Jfs(wi) = Jfs−1(f(wi))J(wi) = Jfs−1(wi+1)J(wi), where we denote by Jf i the








Matrices don’t commute in general but it is true that AB,BA have the same eigenval-
ues hence sp (Jh(wi)) < ρ is the same for all i = 1, . . . , s. Finally, let k be such that
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∥∥Jfs(wi)k∥∥1 < ρk (using Gelfand’s formula 5.1). For each wi consider εi as in the proof
of 5.27, for function h and upper bound ρ on the spectral radius of Jfs(wi). Then anal-
ogously for t = e
2ε2i N




∥∥X(t) −wi∥∥1 ≤ (k+1)βkεim1−ρ
and the proof for eΩ(N) mixing comes from Theorem 5.9.
5.6.3 Proofs omitted from Section 5.6
Lemma 5.28 (Exponential convergence II). Choose z0, ρ,∆ as in the proof of
Theorem 5.8, and set β ··= supx∈∆m ‖J [x]‖1. Then there exist a positive r such that
for every x ∈ ∆, and every positive integer t,
∥∥f t(x)− z0∥∥1 ≤ rρt.
Proof. This is almost identical to the proof of Lemma 5.18. Let ε and k be as defined
in 5.20. From Lemma 5.25, we know that there exists an ` such that for all x ∈ ∆,
∥∥f `(x)− z0∥∥1 ≤ εβk . (69)
Note that this implies that f `+i(x) is within distance ε of z0 for i = 0, 1, . . . , k, so
that 5.20 can be applied to the sequence of vectors f `(x), f `+1 (x) , . . . , f `+k(x) and
z0. Thus, we get
∥∥f `+k(x)− z0∥∥1 ≤ ρk ∥∥f `(x)− z0∥∥1 ≤ ρkεβk .
Since ρ < 1, we can iterate this process. Using also the fact that the 1→ 1 norm of
the Jacobian of f is at most β (which we can assume without loss of generality to be
at least 1), we therefore get for every x ∈ ∆, and every i ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ j < k








where in the last line we use the facts that β > 1, ρ < 1 and j < k. Noting that any
t ≥ ` is of the form `+ki+ j for some i and j as above, we have shown that for every
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t ≥ ` and every x ∈ ∆
∥∥f t(x)− z0∥∥1 ≤ (βρ
)k+`
ρt ‖x− z0‖1 . (70)
Similarly, for t < `, we have, for any z ∈ ∆











ρt ‖x− z0‖1 , (71)
where in the last line we have again used β > 1, ρ < 1 and t < `. From (71), (70), we






5.7 Models of Evolution and Mixing times
5.7.1 Eigen’s model (RSM)
An individual of type i has a fitness (that translates to the ability to reproduce)
which is specified by a positive integer ai, and captured as a whole by a diagonal
m×m matrix A whose (i, i)th entry is ai. The reproduction is error-prone and this is
captured by anm×m stochastic matrixQ whose (i, j)th entry captures the probability
that the jth type will mutate to the ith type during reproduction.7 The population is
assumed to be infinite and its evolution deterministic. The population is assumed to
be unstructured, meaning that only the type of each member of the population matters
and, thus, it is sufficient to track the fraction of each type. One can then track the
fraction of each type at step t of the evolution by a vector x(t) ∈ ∆m (the probability




. Of interest is the steady state8 or the limiting distribution of this
process and how it changes as one changes the evolutionary parameters Q and A.
This model was proposed in the pioneering work of Eigen and co-authors [43, 45].
One stochastic version of this dynamics, motivated by the Wright-Fisher model in
7We follow the convention that a matrix if stochastic if its columns sum up to 1.
8Note that there is a unique steady state, called the quasispecies, when QA > 0.
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population genetics, was studied by Dixit et al. [39]. Here, the population is again
assumed to be unstructured and fixed to a size N. Thus, after normalization, the
composition of the population is captured by a random point in ∆m; say X
(t) at
time t. In the replication (R) stage, one first replaces an individual of type i in the
current population by ai individuals of type i: the total number of individuals of type
i in the intermediate population is therefore aiNX
(t)
i . In the selection (S) stage, the
population is culled back to size N by sampling with replacement N individuals from
this intermediate population. In analogy with the Wright-Fisher model, we assume
that the N individuals are sampled with replacement.9 Finally, since the evolution
is error prone, in the mutation (M) stage, one then mutates each individual in this
intermediate population independently and stochastically according to the matrix Q.
The vector X(t+1) then is the normalized frequency vector of the resulting population.
In the next section we show a rapid mixing result for RSM (Theorem 5.11).
5.7.2 Mixing time for Eigen’s model
We first show that the Eigen or RSM model discussed in Section 5.7.2 is a special
case of the abstract model defined in the last section, and hence satisfies the mixing
time bound in Theorem 5.7. Our first step is to show that the RSM model can be
seen as a stochastic evolution guided by the function f defined by f(p) = (QAp)t‖QAp‖1
,
where Q and A are matrices with positive entries, with Q stochastic (i.e., columns
summing up to 1), as described in the introduction. We will then show that this f is
a smooth contractive evolution, which implies that Theorem 5.7 applies to the RSM
process.
We begin by recalling the definition of the RSM process. Given a starting pop-
ulation of size N on m types represented by a 1/N -integral probability vector p =
9Culling via sampling without replacement was considered in [39], but the Wright-Fisher inspired
sampling with replacement is the natural model for culling in the more general setting that we
consider in this chapter.
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(p1, p2, . . . , pm), the RSM process produces the population at the next step by inde-
pendently sampling N times from the following process:
1. Sample a type T from the probability distribution Ap‖Ap‖1
.
2. Mutate T to the result type S with probability QST .
We now show that sampling from this process is exactly the same as sampling from
the multinomial distribution f(p) = QAp‖QAp‖1
. To do this, we only need to establish
the following claim:






Proof. We first note that ‖QAp‖1 =
∑







‖Ap‖1, where in the last equality we used the fact that the columns of Q sum up to
1. Now, we have














From 5.29, we see that producing N independent samples from the process de-
scribed above (which corresponds exactly to the RSM model) produces the same dis-
tribution as producing N independent samples from the distribution (QAp)‖QAp‖1
. Thus,
the RSM process is a stochastic evolution guided by f(x) := QAx‖QAx‖1
. We now pro-
ceed to verify that this f is a smooth contractive evolution. We first note that the
“smoothness” condition is directly implied by the definition of f . For the “unique-
ness of fixed point” condition, we observe that every fixed point of QAx‖QAx‖1
in the
simplex ∆m must be an eigenvector of QA. Since QA is a matrix with positive en-
tries, the Perron-Frobenius theorem implies that it has a unique positive eigenvector
v (for which we can assume without loss of generality that ‖v‖1 = 1) with a positive
eigenvalue λ1. Therefore f(x) has a unique fixed point τ = v in the simplex ∆m
which is in its interior. The Perron-Frobenius theorem also implies that for every
x ∈ ∆m, limt→∞(QA)tx/λt1 → v. In fact, this convergence can be made uniform
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over ∆m (meaning that given an ε > 0 we can choose t0 such that for all t > t0,
‖(QA)tx/λt1 − v‖1 < ε for all x ∈ ∆m) since each point x ∈ ∆m is a convex com-
bination of the extreme points of ∆m and the left hand side is a linear function of
x. From this uniform convergence, it then follows easily that limt→∞ f
t(x) = v, and
that the convergence in this limit is also uniform. The “convergence to fixed point”
condition follows directly from this observation.
Finally, we need to establish that the spectral radius of the Jacobian J ··= J(v)
of f at its fixed point is less than 1. A simple computation shows that the Jacobian
at v is J = 1
λ1
(I − V )QA where V is the matrix each of whose columns is the vector
v. Since QA has positive entries, we know from the Perron-Frobenius theorem that
λ1 as defined above is real, positive, and strictly larger in magnitude than any other
eigenvalue of QA. Let λ2, λ3, . . . , λm be the other, possibly complex, eigenvalues
arranged in decreasing order of magnitude (so that λ1 > |λ2|). We now establish the
following claim from which it immediately follows that sp (J) = |λ2|
λ1
< 1 as required.
Claim 5.30. The eigenvalues of M ··= (I − V )QA are λ2, λ3, . . . , λm, 0.
Proof. Let D be the Jordan canonical form of QA, so that D = U−1QAU for some
invertible matrix U . Note that D is an upper triangular matrix with λ1, λ2, . . . , λm on
the diagonal. Further, the Perron-Frobenius theorem applied to QA implies that λ1
is an eigenvalue of both algebraic and geometric multiplicity 1, so that we can assume
that the topmost Jordan block in D is of size 1 and is equal to λ1. Further, we can
assume the corresponding first column of U is equal to the corresponding positive
eigenvector v satisfying ‖v‖1 = 1. It therefore follows that U−1V = U−1v1T is the
matrix e11
T , where e1 is the first standard basis vector.
Now, since U is invertible, M has the same eigenvalues as U−1MU = (U−1 −
U−1V )QAU = (I − e11TU)D, where in the last line we use UD = QAU . Now, note
that all rows except the first of the matrix e11
TU are zero, and its (1, 1) entry is 1
since the first column of U is v, which in turn is chosen so that 1Tv = 1. Thus, we
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get that (I − e11TU)D is an upper triangular matrix with the same diagonal entries
as D except that its (1, 1) entry is 0. Since the (1, 1) entry of D was λ1 while its other
diagonal entries were λ2, λ3, . . . , λm, it follows that the eigenvalues of (I − e11TU)D
(and hence those of M) are λ2, λ3, . . . , λm, 0, as claimed.
We thus see that the RSM process satisfies the condition of being guided by a
smooth contractive evolution and hence has the mixing time implied by Theorem 5.7.
5.7.3 Dynamics of grammar acquisition and sexual evolution
We begin by describing the evolutionary processes for grammar acquisition and
sexual evolution. As we will explain, the two turn out to be identical and hence we
primarily focus on the model for grammar acquisition in the remainder of the section.
The starting point of the model is Chomsky’s Universal Grammar theory [27].10
In his theory, language learning is facilitated by a predisposition that our brains have
for certain structures of language. This universal grammar (UG) is believed to be
innate and embedded in the neuronal circuitry. Based on this theory, an influential
model for how children acquire grammar was given by appealing to evolutionary
dynamics for infinite and finite populations respectively in [101] and [71]. We first
describe the infinite population model, which is a dynamical system that guides the
stochastic, finite population model. Each individual speaks exactly one of the m
grammars from the set of inherited UGs {G1, . . . , Gm}; denote by xi the fraction
of the population using Gi. The model associates a fitness to every individual on
the basis of the grammar she and others use. Let Aij be the probability that a
person who speaks grammar j understands a randomly chosen sentence spoken by
an individual using grammar i. This can be viewed as the fraction of sentences
according to grammar i that are also valid according to grammar j. Clearly, Aii =
10Like any important problem in the sciences, Chomsky’s theory is not uncontroversial; see [52]
for an in-depth discussion.
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1. The pairwise compatibility between two individuals speaking grammars i and j
is Bij ··= Aij+Aji2 , and the fitness of an individual using Gi is fi ··=
∑m
j=1 xjBij,
i.e., the probability that such an individual is able to meaningfully communicate
with a randomly selected member of the population.
In the reproduction phase each individual produces a number of offsprings propor-
tional to her fitness. Each child speaks one grammar, but the exact learning model
can vary and allows for the child to incorrectly learn the grammar of her parent. We
define the matrix Q where the entry Qij denotes the probability that the child of
an individual using grammar i learns grammar j (i.e., Q is column stochastic ma-
trix); once a child learns a grammar it is fixed and she does not later use a different
grammar. Thus, the frequency x′i of the individuals that use grammar Gi in the next
generation will be





(with g : ∆m 7→ ∆m encoding the update rule). Nowak et al. [101] study the sym-
metric case, i.e., Bij = b and Qij = τ ∈ (0, 1/m] for all i 6= j and observe a threshold:
When τ, which can be thought of as quantifying the error of learning or mutation,
is above a critical value, the only stable fixed point is the uniform distribution (all
1/m) and below it, there are multiple stable fixed points.
Finite population models can be derived from the grammar acquisition dynamics
in a standard way. We describe the Wright-Fisher finite population model for the
grammar acquisition dynamics. The population size remains N at all times and the
generations are non-overlapping. The current state of the population is described
by the frequency vector X(t) at time t which is a random vector in ∆m and notice
also that the population that uses Gi is NX
(t)
i . In the replication (R) stage, one





(t)))i and the total population has size N
2X(t)>BX(t).11 In the selection
(S) stage, one selects N individuals from this population by sampling independently
with replacement. Since the evolution is error prone, in the mutation (M) stage, the
grammar of each individual in this intermediate population is mutated independently
at random according to the matrix Q to obtain frequency vector X(t+1). Given these
rules, note that
E[X(t+1)|X(t)] = g(X(t)).
In other words, in expectation, fixing X(t), the next generation’s frequency vector
X(t+1) is exactly g(X(t)), where g is the grammar acquisition dynamics. Of course,
this holds only for one step of the process. This process is a Markov chain with state
space {(y1, . . . , ym) : yi ∈ N,
∑





. If Q > 0 then it is ergodic
(i.e., it is irreducible and aperiodic) and thus has a unique stationary distribution. In
our analysis, we consider the symmetric case as in Nowak et al. [101], i.e., Bij = b
and Qij = τ ∈ (0, 1/m] for all i 6= j.
Note that the grammar acquisition model described above can also be seen as a
(finite population) sexual evolution model: Assume there are N individuals and m
types. Let Y(t) be a vector of frequencies at time t, where Y
(t)
i denotes the fraction of
individuals of type i. Let F be a fitness matrix where Fij corresponds to the number
of offspring of type i, if an individual of type i chooses to mate with an individual
of type j (assume Fij ∈ N). At every generation, each individual mates with every
other individual. It is not hard to show that the number of offspring after the matings
will be N2(Y(t)>FY(t)) and there will be N2Y
(t)
i (FY
(t))i individuals of type i. After
the reproduction step, we select N individuals at random with replacement, i.e., we






. Finally in the mutation
step, every individual of type i mutates with probability τ (mutation parameter) to




(t))i is an integer since the
individuals are whole entities; this can be achieved by scaling and is without loss of generality.
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some type j. Let Fii = A, Fij = B for all i 6= j with A > B (this is called homozygote
advantage) and set b = B
A
< 1. It is self-evident that this sexual evolution model is
identical with the (finite population) grammar acquisition model described above
since both end up having the same reproduction, selection and mutation rule. It
holds that E[X(t+1)|X(t)] = g(Xt)12 with












where Bii = 1, Bij = b with i 6= j.13 For the aforementioned Markov chains (symmet-
ric case), we prove Theorem 5.12 in the next section.
5.7.4 Mixing time for grammar acquisition and sexual evolution
Sampling from distribution g(x). In this section, we prove that the finite popula-
tion grammar acquisition model discussed in preliminaries can be seen as a stochastic
evolution guided by the function g defined by g(x) = (1−mτ)xi(Bx)i
x>Bx
+ τ (we assume
that we have m grammars and g : ∆m → ∆m, see Definition 19 to check what a
stochastic evolution guided by a function is). Given a starting population of size N
on m types represented by a 1/N -integral probability vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm) we
consider the following process P1:
1. Reproduction, i.e., the number of individuals that use grammar Gi becomes
N2xi(Bx)i and the total number is N
2x>Bx.
2. Each individual that uses grammar S can end up using grammar T with prob-
ability QST .
We now show that sampling from P1 is exactly the same as sampling from the multi-
nomial distribution g(x). Taking one sample (individual) we compute the probability
to use grammar t.
12We use same notation for the update rule as before, i.e., g because it turns out to be the same
function.
13Observe that this rule is invariant under scaling of fitness matrix B.
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From 5.31, we see that producing N independent samples from the process P1 de-
scribed above (which is the finite grammar acquisition model discussed in the intro-
duction) produces the same distribution as producing N independent samples from
the distribution g(x). So, we assume that the finite grammar acquisition model is a
stochastic evolution guided by g (see Definition 19).
Analyzing the Infinite Population Dynamics. In this section we prove several
structural properties of the grammar acquisition dynamics. We start this section by
proving that the grammar acquisition dynamics converges to fixed points. 14
Theorem 5.32 (Convergence of grammar acquisition dynamics). The gram-
mar acquisition dynamics converges to fixed points. In particular, the Lyapunov






i is strictly increasing along the trajectories for
0 ≤ τ ≤ 1/m.
Proof. We first prove the results for rational τ ; let τ = κ/λ. We use the theorem of





14This requires proof since convergence to limit cycles or the existence of strange attractors are a































where the first equality comes from the fact that
∑m
i=1 xi(Bx)i = x
>Bx. Since L is
a homogeneous polynomial of degree 2λ, from Theorem 1.1 we get that L is strictly
increasing along the trajectories, namely
L(g(x)) > L(x)
unless x is a fixed point. So P (x) = L1/κ(x) is a potential function for the dynamics.
To prove the result for irrational τ , we just have to see that the proof of [14] holds
for all homogeneous polynomials with degree d, even irrational.
To finish the proof let Ω ⊂ ∆m be the set of limit points of an orbit x(t) (frequen-
cies at time t for t ∈ N). P (x(t)) is increasing with respect to time t by above and so,
because P is bounded on ∆m, P (x(t)) converges as t → ∞ to P ∗ = supt{P (x(t))}.
By continuity of P we get that P (y) = limt→∞ P (x(t)) = P
∗ for all y ∈ Ω. So P is
constant on Ω. Also y(t) = limn→∞ x(tn + t) as n → ∞ for some sequence of times
{ti} and so y(t) lies in Ω, i.e., Ω is invariant. Thus, if y ≡ y(0) ∈ Ω the orbit y(t)
lies in Ω and so P (y(t)) = P ∗ on the orbit. But P is strictly increasing except on
equilibrium orbits and so Ω consists entirely of fixed points.










for all i, j. (72)
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The previous equations can be derived by solving zi = (1 − mτ)zi zi(Bz)iz>Bz + τ . By




for zi(Bz)i 6= zj(Bz)j.
Fact 5.33. The uniform point (1/m, . . . , 1/m) is a fixed point of the dynamics for all
values of τ .
To see why 5.33 is true, observe that gi(1/m, . . . , 1/m) = (1−mτ) 1m + τ = 1m for all i
and hence g(1/m, . . . , 1/m) = (1/m, . . . , 1/m). The fixed points satisfy the following
property:
Lemma 5.34 (Two Distinct Values). Let (x1, . . . , xm) be a fixed point. Then
x1, . . . , xm take at most two distinct values.






(1− b)(xi + xj) + b
.
Hence if xj′ 6= xi then
xj′
(1− b)(xi + xj′) + b
=
xj
(1− b)(xi + xj) + b
from which follows that xj = xj′ . Finally, the uniform fixed point satisfies trivially
the property.
We shall compute the threshold τc such that for 0 < τ < τc the dynamics has
multiple fixed points and for 1/m ≥ τ > τc we have only one fixed point (which by
Fact 5.33 must be the uniform one). Let
h(x) = −x2(m− 2)(1− b)− 2x(1 + b(m− 2)) + 1 + b(m− 2).
By Bolzano’s theorem and the fact that h(0) = 1 + b(m − 2) > 0 and h(−1) < 0,
h(1) = 1−m < 0, it follows that there exists one positive solution for h(x) = 0 which
is between 0 and 1; we denote it by s1.
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We can now define
τc ··=
(1− b)s1(1− s1)
(m− 1)b+ (1− b)(1 + (m− 2)s1)
.
Lemma 5.35 (Bifurcation). If τc < τ ≤ 1/m then the only fixed point is the uniform
one. If 0 ≤ τ < τc then there exist multiple fixed points.
Proof. Assume that there are multiple fixed points (apart from the uniform, see 5.33)
and let (x1, . . . , xm) be a fixed point, where x and y being the two values that the
coordinates xi take (by Lemma 5.34). Let k ≥ 1 be the number of coordinates with
value x and m− k the coordinates with values y where m > k and kx+ (m− k)y = 1
(in case k = 0 or m = k we get the uniform fixed point). Solving by τ we get that
τ = xy(1−b)
b+(1−b)(x+y) . We set y =
1−kx
m−k and we analyze the function
f(x, k) =
(1− b)x(1− kx)
(m− k)b+ (1− b)(1 + (m− 2k)x)
It follows that f is decreasing with respect to k (assuming x < 1/k+1 such that y > 0,
see Appendix A.3 for Mathematica code for proving f(x, k) is decreasing with respect
to k). Hence the maximum is attained for k = 1. Hence, we can consider
f(x) ··= f(x, 1) =
(1− b)x(1− x)
(m− 1)b+ (1− b)(1 + (m− 2)x) .
By solving df
dx
= 0 it follows that h(x) = 0 (where h(x) is the numerator of the
derivative of f). This occurs at s1. For τ > τc there exist no fixed points whose
coordinates can take on more than one value by construction of f , namely the only
fixed point is the uniform one.

















− xj(Bx)j · 2(Bx)i
(x>Bx)2
)
for j 6= i. (74)
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Fact 5.36. The all ones vector (1, . . . , 1) is a left eigenvector of the Jacobian with
corresponding eigenvalue 0.














We will focus on two specific classes of fixed points. The first one is the uniform,
i.e., (1/m, . . . , 1/m) which we denote by zu and the other one is (y, . . . , y, x︸︷︷︸
ith
, y, . . . , y)
with x+ (m− 1)y = 1 and x > s1, which we denote by zi (for 1 ≤ i ≤ m).




Lemma 5.37. If τu < τ ≤ 1/m, then sp (J(zu)) < 1 and if 0 ≤ τ < τu, then
sp (J(zu)) > 1.



















1 + (m− 1)b
)
Im
where Im is the identity matrix of size m × m. The matrix Wu has eigenvalue 0






1. Hence the eigenvalues of J(zu) are 0 with multiplicity 1 and (1−mτ)(1+ 1−b1+(m−1)b)
with multiplicity m− 1. Thus, the Jacobian of zu has spectral radius less than one if
and only if −1 < (1−mτ)(1 + 1−b
1+(m−1)b) < 1. By solving with respect to τ it follows
that
1− b
m(2− 2b+mb) < τ <
3− 3b+ 2bm
m(2− 2b+mb) .
Because 1/m < 3−3b+2bm
m(2−2b+mb) (as b ≤ 1), the first part of the lemma follows. In case
0 ≤ τ < 1−b
m(2−2b+mb) then (1−mτ)(1 + 1−b1+(m−1)b) and the second part follows.
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Hence, we conclude that τu is the threshold below which the uniform fixed point
satisfies sp (J(zu)) > 1 and above which sp (J(zu)) < 1.
Stability of zi.
Lemma 5.38. If 0 ≤ τ < τc then sp (J(zi)) < 1.
Proof. Consider the matrix
Wi ··= J(zi)− (1−mτ)
y + b+ (1− 2b)y
z>i Bzi
Im
where Im is the identity matrix of size m×m. The matrix Wi has eigenvectors of the
form
(w1, . . . , wi−1, 0, wi+1, . . . , wm)
with
∑m
j=1,j 6=iwj = 0 (the dimension of the subspace is m − 2) and corresponding
eigenvalues 0. Hence the Jacobian has m−2 eigenvalues of value (1−mτ)y+b+(1−2b)y
z>i Bzi
.
It is true that 0 < (1−mτ)y+b+(1−2b)y
z>i Bzi
< 1 (see Appendix A.3 for Mathematica code).
Finally, since J(zi) has an eigenvalue zero (see Fact 5.36), the last eigenvalue is
Tr(J(zi))− (1−mτ)(m− 2)
y + b+ (1− 2b)y
z>i Bzi
= (1−mτ)·(
2b+ (2− b)x+ ((m− 3)b+ 2)y
z>i Bzi
− 2x(b+ (1− b)x)




which is also less than 1 and greater than 0 (see Appendix A.3 for Mathematica
code).
Remark 10. In the case where m = 2 it follows that τu = τc =
1−b
4
. For m > 2 we
have τu < τc (see Mathematica code in Lemma A.3.3).
Analyzing the Mixing Time. We prove our result concerning the grammar ac-
quisition model (finite population). The structural lemmas proved in the previous
section are used here. Now, we proceed by analysing the mixing time of the Markov
chain for the two intervals (0, τc) and (τc, 1/m].
Regime 0 < τ < τc.
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Lemma 5.39. For the interval 0 < τ < τc. the mixing time of the Markov chain is
exp(Ω(N)).
Proof. By Lemma 5.38 it is true that there exist m fixed points zi with sp (J(zi)) <
1 and their pairwise distance is some positive constant independent of N (well-
separated). Hence using Theorem 5.9 and because the Markov chain is a stochastic
evolution guided by g (see 5.31), we conclude that the mixing time is eΩ(N).
Regime τc < τ ≤ 1/m. We prove the second part of Theorem 5.12.
Lemma 5.40. For the interval τc < τ ≤ 1/m, the assumptions of Theorem 5.7 are
satisfied, namely the mixing time of the Markov chain is O(logN).
Proof. By Lemma 5.35, we know that in the interval τc < τ ≤ 1/m there is a unique
fixed point (the uniform zu) and also by Lemma 5.37 that sp (J(zu)) < 1. It is trivial
to check that g is twice differentiable with bounded second derivative. It suffices
to show the 4th condition in the Definition 22. Due to Theorem 5.32 we have
limk→∞ g
k(x) → zu for all x ∈ ∆m. The rest follows from Lemma 5.26 (by setting
S = ∆m).
Our result on grammar acquisition model is a consequence of 5.39, 5.40.
Remark 11. For τ = 1/m the Markov chain mixes in one step. This is trivial since
g maps every point to the uniform fixed point zu.
5.8 Conclusion and Remarks
The results of this chapter appear in [104, 105]. We examine the mixing time of
a class of Markov chains that are guided by dynamical systems on the simplex. We
make an interesting connection between the mixing time of the Markov chains and the
geometry of the underlying dynamical systems (structure of limit points, convergence,
stability). We prove that when the dynamical system has one stable fixed point then
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the mixing time of the corresponding Markov chain is rapidly mixing, something that
is not true when there are multiple fixed points. We also provide two applications,
i.e., RSM and grammar acquisition models. We prove that the RSM model has
mixing time O(logN) whereas in the grammar acquisition model we show a phase
transition result. Questions that arise:
• Study the mixing at the threshold for the grammar acquisition model. More
generally, how can we handle the case where the spectral radius of the Jacobian
of the update rule of the dynamics is one?
• A natural next step is to study the evolution of structured populations. Roughly,
this setting extends the evolutionary Markov chains by introducing an addi-
tional input parameter, a graph on N vertices. The graph provides structure
to the population by locating each individual at a vertex, and the main differ-
ence from the is that at time t+ 1, an individual determines its new vertex by
sampling with replacement from among its neighbors in the graph at time t;
see [76] for more details. Here, it is no longer sufficient to just keep track of the
fraction of each type. The stochastic evolution model can be seen as a special
case when the underlying graph is the complete graph on N vertices, so that
the locations of the individuals in the population are of no consequence. Our
results do not seem to apply directly to this setting and it is a challenging open
problem to prove bounds in the general graph setting.
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CHAPTER VI
AVERAGE CASE ANALYSIS IN POTENTIAL GAMES
6.1 Introduction
The study of game dynamics is a basic staple of game theory with several books
dedicated exclusively to it [61, 54, 142, 22, 121]. Historically, the golden standard for
classifying the behavior of learning dynamics in games has been to establish conver-
gence to equilibria. Thus, it is hardly surprising that a significant part of the work
on learning in games focuses on potential games (and slight generalizations thereof)
where many dynamics (e.g., replicator, smooth fictitious play) are known to converge
to equilibrium sets. The structure of the convergence proofs is essentially universal
across different learning dynamics and boils down to identifying a Lyapunov/potential
function that strictly decreases along any nontrivial trajectory. In potential games,
as their name suggests, this function is part of the description of the game and pre-
cisely guides self-interested dynamics towards critical points of these functions that
correspond to equilibria of the learning process.
Potential games are also isomorphic to congestion games [89]. Congestion games
have been instrumental in the study of efficiency issues in games. They are amongst
the most extensively studied class of games from the perspective of price of anarchy
and price of stability with many tight characterization results for different subclasses
of games (e.g., linear congestion games [120], symmetric load balancing [98] and
references therein).
Our contribution. We show that this is far from the case. We focus on simple
systems where replicator dynamic, arguably one of the most well studied game dy-
namics, is applied to linear congestion games and (network) coordination games. We
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resolve a number of basic open questions in the following results:
(A) Point-wise convergence to equilibrium. In the case of linear congestion
games and (network) coordination games we prove convergence to equilibrium instead
of equilibrium sets. Convergence to equilibrium sets implies that the distance of
system trajectories from the sets of equilibria converges to zero (see Theorems 6.2,
A.3). On the other hand, convergence to equilibrium, also referred to as point-wise
convergence, implies that every system trajectory has a unique limit point, which
is an equilibrium. In games with continuums of equilibria, (e.g., N balls N bins
games1 with N ≥ 4), the first statement is more inclusive that the second. In fact,
system equilibration is not implied by set-wise convergence, and the limit set of a
trajectory may have complex topology (e.g., the limit of social welfare may not be well
defined). Despite numerous positive convergence results in classes of congestion games
[53, 17, 48, 16, 2], this is the first to our knowledge result about deterministic point-
wise convergence for any concurrent dynamic. The proof is based on combining global
Lyapunov functions arguments with local information theoretic Lyapunov functions
around each equilibrium.
(B) Global stability analysis. Although the point-wise convergence result is in-
teresting in itself, it critically enables all other results of this chapter. Specifically,
we establish that modulo point-wise convergence, all but a zero measure set of initial
conditions converge to equilibrium points which are weakly stable Nash equilibria
(see Definition 10, Theorem 6.4, Corollary 6.5). This is a technical result that com-
bines game theoretic arguments with tools from dynamical systems (Center-Stable
Manifold Theorem 1.3) and analysis (Lindelőf’s lemma A.1).
(C) Invariant functions. Sometimes a game may have multiple (weakly) stable
equilibria. In this case we would like to be able to predict which one will arise given
1These are symmetric load balancing games with N agents and N machines where the cost
function of each machine is the identity function.
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a specific (or maybe a randomly chosen) initial condition. Systems invariants allows
us to do exactly that. A system invariant is a function defined over the system
state space such that it remains constant along every system trajectory. Establishing
invariant properties of replicator dynamics in generalized zero-sum games has helped
prove interesting topological properties of the system trajectories such as (near) cycles
[112, 111, 106]. In the case of bipartite coordination games with fully mixed Nash
equilibria, we can establish similar invariant functions. Specifically, the difference
between the sum of the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergences of the evolving mixed
strategies of the agents on the left partition from their fully mixed Nash equilibrium
strategy and the respective term for the agents in the right partition remains constant
along any trajectory. In the special case of star graphs, we show how to produce n
such invariants where n is the degree of the star. This allows for creating efficient
oracles for predicting to which Nash equilibrium the system converges provably for
any initial condition without simulating explicitly the system trajectory.
Applications. The tools that we have developed allow for novel insights in classic
and well studied class of games. We group our results into two clusters, average case
performance analysis and estimating risk dominance/regions of attraction:
Average Case Performance. We propose a novel quantitative framework for an-
alyzing the efficiency of potential games with many equilibria. Informally, we define
the expected system performance as the weighted average of the social costs of all
equilibria where the weight of each equilibrium is proportional to the volume (or more
generally measure) of its region of attraction. The main idea is as follows: The agents
start participating in the game having some prior beliefs about which are the best
actions for them. We will typically assume that the initial beliefs are chosen accord-
ing to a uniform prior given that we want to assume no knowledge about the agents’
internal beliefs2. Given this initial condition the agents start interacting through the
2Our techniques extend to arbitrarily correlated beliefs, any prior over initial mixed strategies.
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game and update their beliefs (i.e., their randomized strategies) up until they reach
equilibrium. At this point the measure of the region of attraction of an equilibrium
captures exactly the likelihood that we will converge to that state. So the average
case performance computes, as its names suggests, what will be the resulting system
performance on average. As is typical in algorithmic game theory, we can normalize
this quantity by dividing with the performance of the optimal state. We define this
ratio as the average price of anarchy. In our convergent systems it always lies be-
tween the price of stability and the price of anarchy. We analyze the average price
of anarchy in a number of settings which include, N balls N bins games, symmetric
linear load balancing games (with agents of equal weights),3 parametric versions of
coordination games as well as star network extensions of them. These are games with
large gaps between the price of stability and price of anarchy and replicator is shown
to be able to zero in on the good equilibria with high enough probability so that the
average price of anarchy is always a small constant. This measure of performance
could help explain why some games are easy in practice, despite having large price of
anarchy. We aggregate these results below:
Table 2: Our APoA results
Average PoA Techniques PoS Pure PoA PoA
n balls n bins game 1 A & B 1 1 Θ(log n/ log log n)
Symmetric Load Balancing [1, 1.5] A & B 1 1 Ω(log n/ log log n)
w-Coordination Game [1.15, 1.21] A & B & C 1 Θ(w) Θ(w)
N -Star w-Coordination Game4 [1.15, 3.6] A & B & C 1 Θ(w) Θ(w)
Risk dominance/Regions of attraction. Risk dominance is an equilibrium re-
finement process that centers around uncertainty about opponent behavior. A Nash
equilibrium is considered risk dominant if it has the largest basin of attraction5. The
3We focus mostly on the makespan as a measure of social cost.
5Although risk dominance [60] was originally introduced as a hypothetical model of the method
by which perfectly rational players select their actions, it may also be interpreted [91] as the result
of evolutionary processes.
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benchmark example is the Stag Hunt game, shown in Figure 10(a). In such symmet-
ric 2x2 coordination games a strategy is risk dominant if it is a best response to the
uniformly random strategy of the opponent. We show that the likelihood of the risk




3π) ≈ 0.7364 (instead of
merely knowing that it is at least 1/2, see Figure 11). The size of the region of at-
traction of the risk dominated equilibrium is 0.2636, whereas the mixed equilibrium
has region of attraction of zero measure. Moving to networks of coordination games,
we show how to construct an oracle that predicts the limit behavior of an arbitrary
initial condition, in the case of coordination games played over a star network with
N agents. This is the most economic class of games that exhibits two characteris-
tics that intuitively seem to pose intractable obstacles to the quantitative analysis of
nonlinear systems: i) they have (arbitrarily many) free variables, ii) they exhibit a
continuum of equilibria.
6.2 Related work
A number of positive convergence results have been established for concurrent
dynamics [53, 17, 48, 16, 2, 70], however, they usually depend on strong assumptions
about network structure (e.g., load balancing games) and/or symmetry of available
strategies and/or are probabilistic in nature and/or establish convergence to approx-
imate equilibria. On the contrary our convergence results are deterministic, hold for
any network structure and in the case of the replicator dynamics are point-wise.
Apart from replicator dynamics, nonlinear dynamical systems have been studied
quite extensively in a number of different fields including computer science. Specif-
ically, quadratic dynamical systems [114] are known to arise in the study genetic
algorithms [62]. These are a class of heuristics for combinatorial optimization based
loosely on the mechanisms of natural selection [115, 13]. Both positive and negative
computational complexity and convergence results are known for them, including
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convergence to a stationary distribution (analogous of classic theorems for Markov
chains) [113, 115, 9] depending on the specifics of the model. In contrast, replicator
dynamic in linear congestion games defines a cubic dynamical system.
Price of anarchy-like bounds in potential games using equilibrium stability refine-
ments (e.g., stochastically stable states) have been explored before [30, 10, 2]. Our
approach and techniques are more expansive in scope, since they also allow for com-
puting the actual likelihoods of each equilibrium as well as the topology of the regions
of attractions of different equilibria. Finally, in independent parallel work Zhang and
Hofbauer have examined equilibrium selection issues in 2x2 coordination games for
replicator dynamics [143], however, their techniques do not scale to larger games and
they do not analyze the average case performance of these games but mostly focus
on which equilibrium is more likely to arise.
6.3 Definitions and basic tools
6.3.1 Average performance of a system
Let µ be the Lebesgue measure in Rn and assume that µ(S) > 0. Given a
dynamical system (continuous time) we assume that limt→∞ φt(x) exists for all x ∈
S (the limit is called a limit point); the system converges point-wise for all initial
conditions. If that is true, by continuity occurs that every trajectory converges to
some equilibrium of the dynamics6.
We would like to understand the average (long-term) behavior of the convergent
system, for example if the initial condition is chosen uniformly at random from S.
Intuitively, since the system converges to fixed points, we would like each fixed point
x0 to be assigned weight proportional to its region of attraction denoted by Rx0 . Let
ψ(x) = limt→∞ φt(x), i.e., ψ maps each starting point x to the limit of the φt(x). It
turns out that ψ is a measurable function.
6If limt→∞ h
t(x) = y and h continuous then h(y) = y. Set h ··= φ1.
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Lemma 6.1. ψ(x) is a measurable function.
Proof. For an arbitrary c ∈ R we have that




The set {x : φn(x)i < c − 1k} is measurable since φn(x)i is a (Lebesgue) measurable
function (by continuity). Therefore ψ(x)i is a measurable function.
Therefore, we can define the average (long-term) performance of the system under
some function u. Let u : S → R be continuous, then the average performance of a
system is defined as
apu ··=
∫
S u ◦ ψdµ
µ(S) = Ex∼U(S)[u(ψ(x))], (75)
with U(S) to be the uniform distribution on S. u quantifies the quality of the points
x ∈ S (e.g., social welfare in games). Observe that if m ··= minx∈FP u(x),M ··=
maxx∈FP u(x) where FP denotes the set of fixed points
7, then m ≤ apu ≤ M (a).
We believe that computing/approximating average performance is a very important
problem in order to understand the average behavior of a system.
To see the connection with game theory, think of S as the set of mixed (ran-
domized) strategies, a fixed point with region of attraction of positive measure as
a Nash equilibrium, u as the social cost/welfare. Then the integral (75) becomes a
weighted average among the social cost/welfare of the Nash equilibria. Therefore, by
observation (a) the average performance is sandwiched between the values (of social
cost/welfare) of best and worst Nash. We use (continuous time) replicator dynamics
on congestion and network coordination games as our benchmark. In that case, the
set of Nash equilibria is a subset of the set of fixed points, we can show the dynamics
converge point-wise and finally Nash equilibria are the only fixed points that get re-
gion of attraction of positive Lebesgue measure (they are linearly stable fixed points
7The set of fixed points in S is closed.
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of the dynamics). Later in this section we define the notion of average price of anar-
chy which is essentially a scaled version of average performance, defined particularly
for games.
Remark 12 (Generalizations of average performance). It is remarkable that the
definition of average performance can be used for point-wise convergent discrete time
dynamical systems (function ψ(x) will be equal to limk→∞ g
k(x) where g is the rule of
the discrete dynamics). Also, different measurement can be defined where the initial
condition follows other distribution than the uniform (it should be called something
different from average performance!).
6.3.2 Definition of average price of anarchy (APoA)
In this section we define the notion of average price of anarchy, following the
machinery from Section 6.3.1. It is natural to set S to be the product of simplexes
∆, but this is not the case since ∆ has measure zero in RM , where M ··=
∑
i |Si|. The
reason is that the probabilities sum up to one for each player. To circumvent this issue
(since from Section 6.3.1 we need µ(S) > 0), we consider a natural projection g of the
points p ∈ ∆ to RM−N by excluding a specific but arbitrarily chosen 8 variable for
each player. We denote g(∆) the “projected” product of simplexes and the projection
of any point p ∈ ∆ by g(p) (for example (p1,a, p1,b, p1,c, p2,a′ , p2,b′)→g (p1,a, p1,b, p2,a′)
where p1,a + p1,b + p1,c = 1 and p2,a′ + p2,b′ = 1)). Given a dynamical system which
describes the actions of rational agents for some particular game, is defined in g(∆)
(projected set of mixed strategies) and which converges point-wise to fixed points, we
can define apsc, apsw to be the average performance as in Section 6.3.1. For cost/utility










8Choose an arbitrary ordering of the strategies of each agent and then exclude the last strategy.
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Remark 13. The definition of APoA does not rely on the fact that the games are
congestion or network coordination and it does not rely on replicator dynamics. All it
needs is that given a game, we have a dynamic that converges point-wise for all initial
mixed strategies. Essentially APoA is a scaled version of the average performance. In
the next section we show that replicator dynamics converges point-wise for congestion
and network coordination games and also that the fixed points (of replicator on these
2 classes of games) with region of attraction of positive measure are Nash equilibria.
In particular APoA is well-defined.
6.4 Analysis of replicator dynamics in potential games
In this section we develop the mathematical machinery necessary for computing
the average case performance of replicator dynamics in different classes of potential
games. Specifically, we establish point-wise convergence of replicator dynamics for
linear congestion games and arbitrary networks of coordination games (Theorem 6.2).
This allows us to define properly the average case performance which is essentially
equal to the weighted sum of the social cost/welfare of all equilibria weighted by
the cumulative measure/volume of all initial conditions that converge to each (point-
wise). Next, we show that the union of regions of attraction of (locally) unstable
equilibria is of measure zero (Theorem 6.4). Combining this result with a game
theoretic characterization of (un)stable equilibria in [70], known as weakly stable
equilibria, establishes that only weakly stable equilibria affect the average case system
performance. The analysis here is a strengthening of the techniques of [70] to carefully
account for the possibility of continuums of unstable equilibria. Finally, we still need
to compute for each weakly stable equilibrium the size of its region of attraction.
The tool that is necessary for this is to establish invariants for replicator dynamics
in different classes of games. We present an information theoretic invariant function
(Theorem 6.7) for replicator dynamics for bipartite network coordination games.
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6.4.1 Point-wise convergence
We show that replicator dynamics converges point-wise for the class of linear con-
gestion and network coordination games. The proof of the theorem has two steps.
The first step is standard, utilizes the potential function of the game and establishes
convergence to equilibria sets. The critical, second step is to construct a local Lya-
punov function in some small neighborhood of a limit point.
Theorem 6.2 (Point-wise convergence). Given any initial condition replicator
dynamics converges to a fixed point (point-wise convergence) in all linear congestion
and network coordination games.
Proof. We prove here the result in the case of linear congestion games. The argument
for network coordination games follows similar lines and is in Appendix A.3.
We denote by ĉi the expected cost of agent i under mixed strategy profile p.
Moreover, ciγ is his expected cost when he deviates to strategy γ and all other agents










































= −∑i,γ,γ′ piγpiγ′(ciγ− ciγ′)2 ≤ 0, with equality at fixed
points. Hence (as in [70]) we have convergence to equilibria sets (compact connected
sets consisting of fixed points). We will furthermore argue that each trajectory has a
unique (equilibrium) limit point.
Let q be a limit point of the trajectory p(t) where p(t) is in the interior of ∆ for all
t ∈ R (since we started in the interior of ∆) then we have that Ψ(q) < Ψ(p(t)). We
define the relative entropy I(p) = −∑i∑γ:qiγ>0 qiγ ln(piγ/qiγ) ≥ 0 (Jensen’s ineq.)
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We break the term
∑
















< 0 for ‖p− q‖1 < ε and Ψ(q) < Ψ(p).
Proof of Claim. To prove this claim, first assume that p → q. We get ĉi − ciγ →
d̂i − diγ for all i, γ. Hence for small enough ε > 0 with ‖p− q‖1 < ε, we have that









































= piγ(ĉi−ciγ) (replicator equations), and the claim is proved.
Notice that Z(p) ≥ 0 (sum of positive terms, I(p) ≥ 0) and is zero iff p = q. (i)
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To finish the proof of the theorem, if q is a limit point of p(t), there exists an
increasing sequence of times ti, with tn → ∞ and p(tn) → q. We consider ε′ such
that the set C = {p : Z(p) < ε′} is inside B = ‖p− q‖1 < ε where ε is from
claim above. Since p(tn) → q, consider a time tN where p(tN) is inside C. From
the claim above we get that Z(p) is decreasing inside B (and hence inside C), thus
Z(p(t)) ≤ Z(p(tN)) < ε′ for all t ≥ tN , hence the orbit will remain in C. By the
fact that Z(p(t)) is decreasing in C (claim above) and also Z(p(tn)) → Z(q) = 0 it
follows that Z(p(t))→ 0 as t→∞. Hence p(t)→ q as t→∞ using (i).
Remark 14. If the fixed points of the dynamics are isolated then a (global) Lyapunov
function suffices to show that the system converges point-wise (first step of the proof
above). However, this is not the case even in linear congestion games (see Lemma
6.27, where there are uncountable many fixed points which are Nash equilibria).
6.4.2 Global stability analysis
Replicator dynamics - in linear congestion games and network coordination games
and essentially any dynamics that converges point-wise - induces a probability distri-
bution over the fixed points. The probability for each fixed point is proportional to
the volume of its region of attraction. The fixed points can be exponentially many
or even accountable many, but as it is stated below (Corollary 6.5), only the weakly
stable Nash equilibria (see Definition 10) have non-zero volumes of attraction.
In [70] Kleinberg et al. showed that in congestion games, every stable fixed point
is a weakly stable Nash equilibrium. The following theorem (that assumes point-wise
convergence) has a corollary that for all but measure zero initial conditions replicator
dynamics converges to a weakly stable Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 6.4 (Replicator converges to stable fixed points). The set of initial
conditions for which the replicator converges to unstable fixed points has measure zero
in ∆ for linear congestion games and network coordination games.
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Proof. To prove the theorem we will use Center Stable Manifold Theorem (see The-
orem 1.3). In order to do that we need a map whose domain is full-dimensional.
However, a simplex in Rn has dimension n− 1. Therefore, we need to take a projec-
tion of the domain space and accordingly redefine the map of the dynamical system.
We note that the projection we take will be fixed-point dependent; this is to keep
of the proof that every stable fixed point is a weakly stable Nash proved in [70] rel-
atively less involved later. Let q be a point of our state space ∆ and Σ = | ∪i Si|.
Let hq : [N ] → [Σ] be a function such that hq(i) = γ if qiγ > 0 for some γ ∈ Si
(same definition with discrete case). Let M =
∑ |Si| and g a fixed projection where
you exclude the first coordinate of every player’s distribution vector. We consider the
mapping zq : R
M → RM−N so that we exclude from each player i the variable pi,hq(i)
(zq plays the same role as g but we drop variables with specific property this time).





For t = 1 and an unstable fixed point p we consider the function ψ1,p(x) =
zp ◦φ1 ◦ z−1p (x) which is C1 diffeomorphism, where φ1 is the time one map of the flow
of the dynamical system in ∆ (we assume we do the renormalization trick described
in Section 1.1.1). Let Bzp(p) be the ball that is derived from 1.3 and we consider the
union of these balls (transformed in RM)
A = ∪pAzp(p),
where Azp(p) = g ◦ z−1p (Bzp(p)) (z−1p ”returns” the set Bzp(p) back to RM). Due
to the Lindelőf’s Lemma A.1, we can find a countable subcover for A = ∪pAzp(p),
i.e., A = ∪∞m=1Azpm (pm).
Let ψn,p(x) = zp ◦ φn ◦ z−1p (x). If a point x ∈ g(∆) (which corresponds to g−1(x)
in our original ∆) has as unstable fixed point as a limit, there must exist a n0 and
m so that ψn,pm ◦ zpm ◦ g−1(x) ∈ Bzpm (pm) for all n ≥ n0 and therefore again from
1.3 and the fact that ∆ is invariant we get that we get that ψn0,pm ◦ zpm ◦ g−1(x) ∈
(W scloc zpm (pm) ∩ zpm(∆)), hence x ∈ g ◦ z
−1
pm ◦ ψ−1n0,pm(W scloc zpm (pm) ∩ zpm(∆)).
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Hence, the set of points in g(∆) whose ω-limit has an unstable equilibrium, is a
subset of
C = ∪∞m=1 ∪∞n=1 g ◦ z−1pm ◦ ψ−1n,pm(W scloc zpm (pm) ∩ zpm(∆)) (76)
Observe that the dimension of W scloc zpm (pm) is at most M − N − 1 since we as-
sume that pm is unstable (Jpm has an eigenvalue with positive real part) 9 and thus
dimEu ≥ 1, hence the set (W scloc zpm (pm) ∩ zpm(∆)) has Lebesgue measure zero in
RM−N . Finally since g ◦ z−1pm ◦ ψ−1n,pm : RM−N → RM−N) is continuously differen-
tiable in an open neighborhood of g(∆), ψn,pm is C
1 and hence locally Lipschitz in
that neighborhood (see [110] p.71) and it preserves the null-sets (see Lemma A.2).
Namely, C is a countable union of measure zero sets, i.e., is measure zero as well.
Since the dynamical system after renormalization is topologically equivalent with the
system before renormalization, Theorem 6.4 follows.
This theorem extends to all congestion games for which the replicator dynamics
converges point-wise (e.g., systems with finite equilibria). Combining theorem 6.4
with the weakly stable characterization of [70] which holds for all congestion/potential
games, we get the following:
Corollary 6.5 (Replicator converges to pure NE). For all but measure zero
initial conditions, replicator dynamics converges to weakly stable Nash equilibria for
linear congestion games and network coordination games.
6.4.3 Invariant functions from information theory
We have established that all attracting (⊆ linearly stable) fixed points are weakly
stable Nash equilibria. We still need to characterize and compute the regions of
attraction of these equilibria. The key idea here is to characterize the boundaries of
the regions of attraction. This is due to the following theorem.
9Here we used the fact that the eigenvalues with absolute value less than one, one and greater
than one of eA correspond to eigenvalues with negative real part, zero real part and positive real
part respectively of A
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Theorem 6.6 ([69]). If q is an asymptotically stable equilibrium point for a system
ẋ = f(x) where f ∈ C1, then its region of attraction Rq is an invariant set whose
boundaries are formed by trajectories.
If we identify a (continuous) invariant function f , i.e., a function that remains
constant on any trajectory, and q is a (limit) point of the trajectory then the whole
trajectory lies on the set {x : f(x) = f(q)}. If we identify more invariant functions
f1, f2, . . . , fk then the whole trajectory lies on the set {x : f1(x) = f1(q) ∧ f2(x) =
f2(q)∧· · ·∧fk(x) = fk(q)}. By identifying enough invariant functions, we can derive
an exact algebraic description of the trajectory.
By our point-wise convergence result (Theorems 6.2, A.3) each trajectory con-
verges to an equilibrium. So each point of the state space that does not belong in the
region of attraction of a weakly stable equilibrium, must converge to an unstable equi-
librium. By computing the (union of) regions of attraction of all unstable equilibria
we can understand how they partition the state space into regions of attractions for
the asymptotically stable equilibria10. All points on this stable manifold of unstable
fixed point q lie on the set {x : f1(x) = f1(q) ∧ f2(x) = f2(q) ∧ · · · ∧ fk(x) = fk(q)}
where f1, . . . , fk the invariant functions of the dynamic. Such descriptions can allow
for exact computation of volumes of regions of attraction (Section 6.5.1), approxi-
mate volume computation (Section 6.5.2), designing efficient oracles for testing if an
initial condition belong in the region of attraction of an equilibrium (Section 6.6),
and computing average system performance, amongst other applications.
The following lemma that identifies invariants functions in bipartite coordination
games follows straightforwardly from prior work on identifying invariant functions for
network generalizations of (linear transformations of) zero-sum games [112, 111]). To
prove any such statement it suffices to compute the time derivatives of these functions
10The region of attraction of an unstable equilibrium is referred to as the stable manifold of the
(unstable) fixed point.
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along any trajectory and show them to be equal to zero. For completeness, we provide
the proof below.
Lemma 6.7 (Invariance of KL [112, 111]). Let p(t) = (p1(t), ...,pN(t)) (with
p(0) ∈ ∆) be a trajectory of replicator dynamics when applied to a bipartite network
of coordination games that has a fully mixed Nash equilibrium q = (q1, ...,qN) then∑
i∈Vleft H(qi,pi(t))−
∑
i∈Vright H(qi,pi(t)) is invariant, with H(x,y) = −
∑
i xi ln yi.
















































































































The cross entropy between the Nash q and the state of the system, however is
equal to the summation of the K-L divergence between these two distributions and
the entropy of q. Since the entropy of q is constant, we derive the following corollary
(rephrasing the previous lemma):
Corollary 6.8. Let p(t) with p(0) ∈ ∆ be a trajectory of the replicator dynamic
when applied to a bipartite network of coordination games that has a fully mixed Nash
equilibrium q then the K-L divergence between q and the p(t) is constant, i.e., does
not depend on t.
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Stag Hare
Stag 5, 5 0, 4
Hare 4, 0 2, 2
(a) Stag hunt game.
Stag Hare
Stag 1, 1 0, 0
Hare 0, 0 w, w
(b) w-coordination game
Figure 10: Stag hunt game
6.5 Applications of average case analysis
We use the tools we have developed in the previous section to compute the regions
of attractions and find the average case performance of replicator dynamics for classic
game theoretic settings. The game we examine are: the Stag Hunt game, (parametric)
coordination games, polymatrix coordination games played over a star as well as
symmetric linear load balancing games.
6.5.1 Exact quantitative analysis of risk dominance in stag hunt
The Stag Hunt game (Figure 10(a)) has two pure Nash equilibria, (Stag, Stag)
and (Hare,Hare) and a symmetric mixed Nash equilibrium with each agent choosing
strategy Hare with probability 2/3. Stag Hunt replicator trajectories are equivalent
those of a coordination game11. Coordination games are potential games where the
potential function in each state is equal to the utility of each agent. Since the mixed
Nash is not weakly stable replicator dynamics converges to pure Nash equilibria for all
but a zero measure of initial conditions (Theorem 6.4). When we study the replicator
dynamic here, it suffices to examine its projection in the subspace p1s × p2s ⊂ (0, 1)2
which captures the evolution of the probability that each agent assigns to strategy
Stag (see Figure 11). Using the invariant property of Lemma 6.7, we compute the
size of each region of attraction in this space and thus provide a quantitative analysis
of risk dominance in the classic Stag Hunt game.
11If each agent reduces their payoff in their first column by 4, the replicator trajectories remain
invariant. This results to a w-coordination game with w = 2.
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Figure 11: Vector field of replicator dynamics in Stag Hunt






1 + 2p1s − 3p21s) and has Lebesgue measure 127(9+2
√
3π) ≈




(1 − p1s +
√
1 + 2p1s − 3p21s) and has Lebesgue measure 127(18 − 2
√
3π) ≈






1 + 2p1s − 3p21s) and has zero Lebesgue measure.
















φiγ(t,p), corresponds to the probability that each agent i assigns to strategy γ at
time t given initial condition p. This is a special case of Corollary 6.8. We use this
invariant function to identify the stable and unstable manifold of the interior Nash q.




Similarly for the unstable manifold, we have that limt→−∞ φ(t,p) = q. The time-






ln(1 − p1s)−23 ln(p2s) − 13 ln(1 − p2s) = 23 ln(q1h) + 13 ln(1 −
q1h)−23 ln(q2h)− 13 ln(1−q2h) = 0, since the fully mixed Nash equilibrium is symmetric.
This condition is equivalent to p21s(1−p1s) = p22s(1−p2s), where 0 < p1s, p2s < 1. It is
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straightforward to verify that this algebraic equation is satisfied by the following two





1 + 2p1s − 3p21s).
Below, we show that these manifolds correspond indeed to the state and unstable
manifold of the mixed Nash, by showing that this Nash equilibrium satisfies these
equations and by establishing that the vector field is tangent everywhere along them.
The case of the diagonal is trivial and follows from the symmetric nature of the
game. We verify the claims about p2s =
1
2
(1 − p1s +
√
1 + 2p1s − 3p21s). Indeed, the
mixed equilibrium point in which p1s = p2s = 2/3 satisfies the above equation. We
















) , where the last equality is derived
by the definition of replicator dynamics.





















u1(s)− (p1su1(s) + (1− p1s)u1(h))
) .










u1(s)− (p1su1(s) + (1− p1s)u1(h))
) = p2s(1− p2s)(3p1s − 2)
p1s(1− p1s)(3p2s − 2)
. (77)
However, p2s(1− p2s) = 12p1s(p1s − 1 +
√




(p1s − 1 +
√
1 + 2p1s − 3p21s)(3p1s − 2)






1 + 3p1s −
√
1− p1s)(3p1s − 2)√
1− p1s · (3p2s − 2)
.
(78)
Similarly, we have that 3p2s − 2 = 12
√




1 + 3p1s). By
multiplying and dividing equation (78) with (
√
1 + 3p1s + 3
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√
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Finally, this manifold is indeed attracting to the equilibrium. Since the function





1 + 2p1s − 3p21s) is a strictly decreasing function of p1s in
[0,1] and satisfies y(2/3) = 2/3, this implies that its graph is contained in the subspace(




2/3 < p1s < 1 ∩ 0 < p2s < 2/3
)
. In each of these
subsets
(




2/3 < p1s < 1 ∩ 0 < p2s < 2/3
)
the replicator
vector field coordinates have fixed signs that “push” p1s, p2s towards their respective
equilibrium values.
The stable manifold partitions the set 0 < p1s, p2s < 1 into two subsets, each of
which is flow invariant since the unstable manifold itself is flow invariant. Our con-
vergence analysis for the generalized replicator flow implies that in each subset all but
a measure zero of initial conditions must converge to its respective pure equilibrium.

































3π) = 0.7364 and the theorem follows.
6.5.2 Average price of anarchy analysis in coordination/consensus games
via polytope approximations of regions of attraction
We focus on a parametric family of coordination games, as described in Fig-
ure 10(b). We denote an instance of such a game a w-coordination/consensus game.
We take the w parameter to be greater or equal to 113. This game captures strate-
gic situations where agents must learn to coordinate on a single action and where
one pure equilibrium (consensus outcome) is preferable for both agents. The initial
condition of the replicator dynamics captures each agent’s initial bias. Both agents
12This corresponds to the risk dominant equilibrium (Hare,Hare).
13It is easy to see that for any 0 < w < 1, w-coordination game is isomorphic to 1/w-coordination
game after relabeling of strategies. Also, the replicator trajectories in the 2-coordination game are
equivalent to the standard stag hunt game.
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update their beliefs/distributions by applying the replicator and eventually the sys-
tem converges to an equilibrium. Interestingly, since the mixed Nash is not weakly
stable, Theorem 6.4 implies that the agents will reach a consensus with probability
1 as long as the initial conditions are chosen according to an arbitrary distribution
F admitting a density with respect to the Lebesgue measure. A natural such prior
(distribution) is the uniform one, since it encodes a total ignorance of the agents’
initial biases. We wish to understand what is the expected system performance given
a uniformly random initial condition. Although the inefficient equilibrium will arise
with positive probability hopefully its probability is small enough that no matter the
w efficiency gap between the two pure equilibria the average system performance is
always within an absolute constant of the optimal, independent of w. We will show
that this is indeed the case.
Theorem 6.11. The average price of anarchy of the w-coordination game with w ≥ 1
is at most w
2+w
w2+1
and at least w(w+1)
2
w(w+1)2−2w+2 .
For any w, a w-coordination game is a potential game and therefore it is payoff
equivalent to a congestion game. The only two weakly stable equilibria are the pure
ones, hence in order to understand the average case system performance it suffices
to understand the size of regions of attraction for each of them. We focus on the
projection of the system to the subspace (p1s, p2s) ⊂ [0, 1]2. We denote by ζ, ψ, the
projected flow and vector field respectively.
Lemma 6.12. All but a zero measure of initial conditions in the polytope (PHare):





0 ≤ p1s, p2s ≤ 1
converges to the (Hare,Hare) equilibrium. All but a zero measure of initial conditions
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in the polytope (PStag):
p2s ≥ −p1s +
2w
w + 1
0 ≤ p1s, p2s ≤ 1
converges to the (Stag, Stag) equilibrium.
Proof. First, we will prove the claimed property for polytope (PStag). Since the game
is symmetric, the replicator dynamics are similarly symmetric with p2s = p1s axis
of symmetry. Therefore it suffices to prove the property for the polytope P ′Hare =
PHare∩{p2s ≤ p1s} = {p2s ≤ p1s}∩{p2s ≤ −wp1s+w}∩{0 ≤ p1s ≤ 1}∩{0 ≤ p2s ≤ 1}
We will argue that this polytope is forward flow invariant, i.e., if we start from an
initial condition x ∈ P ′Hare ψ(t,x) ∈ P ′Hare for all t > 0. On the p1s, p2s subspace






Figure 11). The line segments AB, AC are trivially flow invariant. Hence, in order
to argue that the ABC triangle is forward flow invariant, it suffices to show that
everywhere along the line segment BC the vector field does not point “outwards” of
the ABC triangle. Specifically, we need to show that for every point p on the line







p1s|p2s − (p1sp2s + w(1− p1s)(1− p2s))|
p2s|p1s − (p1sp2s + w(1− p1s)(1− p2s))|
=
p1s(1− p1s)(w − (w + 1)p2s)
p2s(1− p2s)(−w + (w + 1)p1s)
.




wp1s(1− p1s)(1− (w + 1)(1− p1s))
w(1− p1s)(1− w(1− p1s))(−w + (w + 1)p1s)
=
p1s(−w + (w + 1)p1s)
(1− w + wp1s)(−w + (w + 1)p1s)
=
p1s







We have established that the ABC triangle is forward flow invariant. Since the
w-coordination game is a potential game, all but a zero measurable set of initial
conditions converge to one of the two pure equilibria. Since ABC is forward invariant,
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all but a zero measure of initial conditions converge to (Hare,Hare). A symmetric
argument holds for the triangle AB′C with B′ = (0, 1). The union of ABC and AB′C
is equal to the polygon PHare, which implies the first part of the lemma.
Next, we will prove the claimed property for polytope (PStag). Again, due to
symmetry, it suffices to prove the property for the polytope P ′Stag = PStag ∩ {p2s ≤
p1s} = {p2s ≤ p1s} ∩ {p2s ≥ −p1s + 2ww+1} ∩ {0 ≤ p1s ≤ 1} ∩ {0 ≤ p2s ≤ 1} We
will argue that this polytope is forward flow invariant. On the p1s, p2s subspace P
′
Stag
defines a triangle with vertices D = (1, w−1
w+1





line segments CD, DE are trivially forward flow invariant. Hence, in order to argue
that the CDE triangle is forward flow invariant, it suffices to show that everywhere
along the line segment CD the vector field does not point “outwards” of the CDE
triangle (see Figure 11) . Specifically, we need to show that for every point p on the




p1s|p2s − (p1sp2s + w(1− p1s)(1− p2s))|
p2s|p1s − (p1sp2s + w(1− p1s)(1− p2s))|
=
p1s(1− p1s)(w − (w + 1)p2s)
p2s(1− p2s)(−w + (w + 1)p1s)
.




p1s(1− p1s)(−w + (w + 1)p1s)
(−p1s + 2ww+1)(−w−1w+1 + p1s)(−w + (w + 1)p1s)
=
p1s(1− p1s)







+ p1s) + p1s(1− p1s)
≤ 1.
We have established that the CDE triangle is forward flow invariant. Since the
w-coordination is a potential game, all but a zero measurable set of initial conditions
converge to one of the two pure equilibria. Since CDE is forward invariant, all but
a zero measure of initial conditions converge to (Stag, Stag). A symmetric argument
holds for the triangle CD′E with D′ = (w−1
w+1
, 1). The union of CDE and CD′E is
equal to the polygon PStag, which implies the second part of the lemma.
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Proof. The measure/size of µ(PHare) = 2|ABC| = ww+1 , and similarly the measure

















+ 2 · µ(PStag) = 2w(1 − 2(w+1)2 ) + 2 · 2(w+1)2 =
2w − 4 w−1
(w+1)2
. This implies that w(w+1)
2




By combining the exact analysis of the standard Stag Hunt game (Theorem 6.9),
Theorem 6.11 and optimizing over w we derive that:
Corollary 6.13. The average price of anarchy of the class of w-coordination games











≈ 1.21. In comparison, the
price of anarchy for this class of games is unbounded.
6.6 Coordination/consensus games on a N-star graph
In this section we show how to estimate the topology of regions of attraction for
star networks of w-coordination games. This corresponds to strategic settings where
some agents again need to reach consensus but where there is an agent who works as
a center communicating with all agents at once. The price of anarchy and stability of
these games remain unchanged as we increase the size of the star. Specifically the price
of stability is equal to 1 whereas the price of anarchy can become unbounded large
for large w. We will argue that the average performance is approximately optimal.
This game has two pure Nash equilibria where all agents either play the first
strategy i.e., Stag, or the second i.e., Hare. For simplicity in notation sometimes we
denote the first strategy, i.e., Stag, as strategy A and the other strategy, i.e., Hare,
as strategy B. This game has a continuum of mixed Nash equilibria. Our goal is
to produce an oracle which given as input an initial condition outputs the resulting
equilibrium that system converges to.
Example. In order to gain some intuition on the construction of these oracles let’s
focus on the minimal case with a continuum of equilibria (N = 3, center with two
205
(a) Examples of stable
manifolds for different
mixed Nash.
(b) Stable manifolds lie
on the intersection of
level sets of invariant
functions.
Figure 12: Star network coordination game with 3 agents
neighbors). Since each agent has two strategies it suffices to depict for each one the
probability with which they choose strategy A (the “bad” Stag strategy). Hence, the
phase space can be depicted in 3 dimensions. Figure 12 depicts this phase space. The
point (0, 0, 0) captures the good pure Nash (all B), whereas the point (1, 1, 1) the
bad pure Nash (all A). There is also a continuum of unstable mixed Nash equilibria.
Specifically, as long as the center player chooses A with probability w/(w + 1) and
the summation of the probabilities that the two other agents assign to A is exactly
2w/(w + 1). In Figure 12, we have chosen w = 2 this continuum of equilibria cor-
responds to the red straight line. These are unstable equilibria and by Theorem 6.4
almost all initial conditions are attracted to the two attracting pure Nash. For any
mixed Nash equilibrium there exists a curve (co-dimension 2) of points that converge
to it. Figure 12(a) depicts several such stable manifolds for sample mixed equilibria
along the equilibrium line. The union of these stable manifolds partitions the state
space into two regions, one attracting to equilibrium (A,A,A) and the other attract-
ing to the equilibrium (B,B,B)). Hence, in order to construct our oracle its suffices
to have a description of these attracting curves for the mixed equilibria. However,
as shown in Figure 12(b), we have identified two distinct invariant functions for the
replicator dynamic in this system. Given any mixed Nash equilibrium, the set of
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points of the state space which agree with the value of each of these invariant func-
tions define a set of co-dimension one (the double hollow cone and the curved plane).
Any points that converge to this equilibrium must lie on the intersection of these sets
(black curve). In fact, due to our point-wise convergence theorem, it immediately fol-
lows that this intersection is exactly the stable manifold of the unstable equilibrium.
The case for general N works analogously, but now we need to identify N − 1 (= n)
invariant functions in an algorithmic, efficient manner.
Here is the high level idea of the analysis: We start the analysis by showing
that the only fixed points with region of attraction with positive measure are when
all players choose strategy Stag or all players choose strategy Hare. After that we
show that the limit point will be either one of the two mentioned, or a fully mixed.
Therefore we need to compute the regions of attraction of the 2 fixed points where
all choose Stag or all choose Hare. To do that, we need to compute the boundary of
these two regions (namely the center/stable manifold of the fully mixed ones). This
happens as follows: Given an initial point (x1, ..., xn, y), we compute the possible fully





) (will be one possible because we have one variable
of freedom due to Lemma 6.14 below) that is on the boundary of the two regions. If
the initial condition is on the upper half space w.r.t to the possible fully mixed limit





) the dynamics converge to the everyone playing Stag, otherwise
to everyone playing Hare. To simplify notation in the remainder of this section, we
rename strategy Stag as strategy A and strategy Hare as strategy B.
6.6.1 Structure of fixed points
If a “leaf” agent i applies a randomized/mixed strategy at a fixed point, it must
be the case that the strategy of the center agent y = w
w+1
. Otherwise, the “leaf”
agent would strictly prefer either strategy A or strategy B. Hence the fixed points
of the star graph game have the following structure: If the center agent has a pure
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n. In that case, if all the “leaf” agents have pure strategies then y can
have any value in [0, 1], otherwise y = w
w+1
.
6.6.2 Invariants and oracle
Lemma 6.14. [ln(xi(t))− ln(1− xi(t))]− [ln(xj(t))− ln(1− xj(t))] is invariant for
all i, j (independent of t).
Proof. By taking the derivative, we get d
dt
[ln(xi(t))− ln(1− xi(t))] = [y−w · (1− y)]
and d
dt
[ln(xj(t))− ln(1− xj(t))] = [y − w · (1− y)] and claim follows.
Next, we will argue that if we start in the interior of ∆, the system can converge









Lemma 6.15. For all initial conditions in the interior of ∆, either the dynamic
converges to all A’s, i.e, (1,. . . ,1), or to all B’s, i.e., (0,. . . , 0), or to some fully
mixed fixed point, i.e, (x1, . . . , xn,
w
w+1






Proof. We consider the following two cases:
• If xi(t) → 1 for some i, then ln(xi(t)) − ln(1 − xi(t)) → +∞. So from Lemma
6.14 for every j we get that ln(xj(t)) − ln(1 − xj(t)) → +∞, hence xj(t) → 1.
Due the structure of the equilibrium set and point-wise convergence, y(t) must
converge to 0 or 1. Due the fact that the fixed point (1, . . . , 1, 0) is repelling we
get that the system converges to all A’s. The same argument is used if xi(t)→ 0
for some i.
• If the dynamic converges to an equilibrium were all “leaf” agents are mixed,







n because by the analysis of the structure of the
fixed points that is the only possibility.
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Let (x1(0), . . . , xn(0), y(0)) be the initial condition, where xi(0), y(0) are the prob-
abilities agent i, center agent chooses A (1− xi(0), 1− y(0) will be the probability to
choose B) respectively. By Lemma 6.15, we know that the corresponding trajectory
will converge either to the all A’s equilibrium or the all B’s equilibrium or a fully
mixed one. Next, by using Lemma 6.14 we will narrow down the possibilities for this









Due to Lemma 6.14 the quantity xi(t)/(1−xi(t))
x1(t)/(1−x1(t)) is time invariant. Hence, the limit
point (x1, . . . , xn,
w
w+1
) must satisfy this condition, i.e.,
xi =
cix1
1 + (ci − 1)x1
(79)















where we have defined c1 = 1.
Observe that the function f(x) = cx
1+(c−1)x is strictly increasing in [0, 1] (given any








strictly increasing in [0, 1] (as sum of strictly increasing functions in [0, 1]) and g(0) =
− w
w+1
n < 0 and g(1) = n− w
w+1
n > 0. Thus, it has always a unique solution in [0, 1]
and equivalently the system of equations (79,80) has a unique solution. Together with
y = w
w+1
, the equilibrium limit point lies in the interior of ∆. Given x1(0), . . . , xn(0)
we can compute (approximate with arbitrary small error ε) x1, . . . , xn via binary
search (using Bolzano’s theorem).
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Lemma 6.16. Since star graph is a bipartite graph from Lemma 6.7 we have that
since (x1, . . . , xn, y) is a fully mixed Nash then along any system trajectory









[xi ln(xi(t)) + (1− xi) ln(1− xi(t))]
is (time) invariant, i.e. independent of t.







n for some t, the trajectory converges







n for some t, the trajectory converges
to all B’s.
Proof. In the first case, y(t) is increasing and xi(t) (for all i) are non-decreasing







n holds for all t′ > t. In the second case







n holds for all for t′ > t. Combining this with Lemma 6.15, concludes
the proof.









n and y(t) < w
w+1
(x1(t), . . . , xn(t) are





n and y(t) > w
w+1
(x1(t), . . . , xn(t)
are increasing and y(t) decreasing). Combining all the facts together, we get that
the stable manifold of the fixed point (x1, . . . , xn,
w
w+1
) can be described as follows:
(x1(0), . . . , xn(0), y(0)) lies on the stable manifold if
∑
i xi(0) > n
w
w+1




i xi(0) < n
w
w+1
and y(0) > w
w+1
and by Lemma 6.16 we get that
y(0)
w





















By Lemma 6.18 we have that there exist at most two y(0) that satisfy (81), one which
is ≥ w
w+1







, y(0) should be the largest root of
the two so that dynamics converges to the fully mixed, otherwise the smallest root.
If now the initial condition y(0) does not satisfy (81), then the dynamics converges to
all A’s if y(0) is greater that it is supposed (so that dynamics converges to the fully
mixed) and to all B’s otherwise. Therefore we have the oracle below:
Table 3: Oracle algorithm
Oracle
1. Input: (x1, ..., xn, y)
2. Output: A or B or mixed
3. If
∑
xi > (≥) ww+1n and y ≥ (>) ww+1 return A.
4. If
∑
xi < (≤) ww+1n and y ≤ (<) ww+1 return B.
5. Set ci =
xi(1−x1)
















for i ≥ 2.






























n and f(y) < 0) return A.
10. return mixed.
Remark 15. Given any point from ∆ uniformly at random, under the assumption of
solving exactly the equations to compute x′1, ..., x
′
n and infinite precision the probability
that the oracle above returns mixed is zero.
Given this oracle it is straightforward to establish an upper bound of 3.6 for the
average price of anarchy, which is independent of w as well as the size of the star.
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Corollary 6.19. The average price of anarchy for the class of star w-coordination
games (with n+ 1 agents) is at most 3.6.
Proof. There are exactly two possible outcomes with positive probability; all the
agents choose strategy A and all choose strategy B. Assume we take one sample
at random (x1, . . . , xn, y) from ×n+1i=1 ∆2 where n + 1 are the number of agents. It
turns out from the oracle above on the star-graph (see also discussion later) game
that if
∑
i xi < n
w
w+1
and y < w
w+1
then the dynamics eventually converge to all
agents choose B. Hence the region of attraction of the outcome all agents choose
B will be at least the probability that a sample at random satisfies
∑
i xi < n
w
w+1
and y < w
w+1
. By Chernoff Bounds, this is at least p = w
w+1
(1 − e−n/3·(1/2− 1w+1 )).




pw+1−p . It is not hard to see that p is increasing w.r.t n and w.
The average price of anarchy bound w
pw+1−p as a result is a decreasing function of n,
however it is not monotonous as a function of w. We examine the function w
pw+1−p
and visual inspection seems to suggest that it is always less than 3.6.
6.7 APoA in linear, symmetric load balancing games
6.7.1 Linear symmetric load balancing games
In this section, we prove the following bounds on the average price of anarchy of
linear, symmetric load balancing games. In symmetric load balancing games, each
agent14 chooses a distribution over machines selfishly and we assume that the cost of
machine γ is a linear function of γ’s load.
Theorem 6.20 (APoA for linear load balancing). The average price of anar-
chy in terms of makespan of symmetric, linear load balancing games is at most 3/2.
Moreover, generically, the average price of anarchy of symmetric, linear load balanc-
ing games is 1. Specifically, given any number of agents and machines, the set of
14Agents have same cost functions.
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linear latency functions such that the average price of anarchy of the resulting game
is greater than 1 is a zero measure set within the set of all linear latency functions.
We will break down the proof of theorem 6.20 into several technical lemmas. The
next definition encodes Nash equilibria where randomizing agents do not “interact”
with each other.
Definition 24 (Almost pure NE). We call a mixed Nash equilibrium of a load
balancing game to be almost pure, if the intersection of the supports of the strategies of
any two randomizing agents contains only edges whose latency functions are constant
functions.
Lemma 6.21. The average price of anarchy of a symmetric, linear load balancing
games is at most equal to the ratio of the cost of the worst almost pure Nash equilibrium
divided by the cost of the optimal outcome.
Proof. By corollary 6.5 we have that for all but a zero measure of initial conditions
replicator dynamics converges to weakly stable equilibria. By definition, weakly stable
equilibria have the property that given any two agents with mixed strategies if one
agent deviates to one the strategies in his support and plays it with probability
one then the second agent should still stay indifferent between the strategies in his
support. If there exists two agents with mixed strategies such that the intersection of
their supports contains machines with strictly increasing latency functions then if one
agent deviates to playing that machine with probability one, he will strictly increase
the cost experienced by the second agent on that machine, whereas by this deviation
he can only decrease the cost of all other machines in the support of the second agent.
The second agent is no longer indifferent between the strategies in his support and
thus the initial equilibrium was not weakly stable. In the worst case average price
of anarchy places all of the probability mass of initial conditions to the worst almost
pure Nash equilibrium. In this case the average price of anarchy would be equal to
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the ratio of the cost of the worst almost pure Nash equilibrium divided by the cost
of the optimal outcome.
Lemma 6.22 (Pure NE are optimal). In symmetric linear load balancing games
all pure Nash equilibria have optimal makespan.
Proof. Suppose not, that is, suppose that there exists a pure Nash equilibrium whose
makespan, i.e., the load of the most congested machine, is not optimal amongst
all outcomes/configurations. That means that its most loaded machine must be a
machine with a strictly increasing cost function that has higher load than its load at
the optimal outcome15. Hence, there must be another machine whose load is strictly
less than its load at the optimal configuration. If we move one agent from the first
to the second machine we claim that its cost will strictly decrease. Indeed, its new
latency is at most the latency of the second machine in the optimal configuration,
which is less or equal to the optimal makespan, which by hypothesis is strictly less than
the makespan of the first configuration, which was its original cost. Hence, the original
configuration cannot be a Nash equilibrium and we have reached a contradiction.
Lemma 6.23. In any symmetric, linear load balancing games the ratio of the cost of
the worst almost pure Nash equilibrium divided by the cost of the optimal outcome is
at most 3/2. Furthermore, this bound is tight.
Proof. First, we create the lower bound. We have a load balancing game with two
agents and three machines. The latency function for the first machine is 3x whereas
for the other two machines is 2x. It is straightforward to check that the strategy
outcome where the first agent chooses the first machine and the second agent chooses
one of the remaining two machines uniformly at random is a Nash equilibrium and,
in fact, a weakly stable one. The makespan of this equilibrium is 3, whereas the
15If there exist more than one outcomes with minimal makespan, we just arbitrary focus on one
of the optimal configurations.
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optimal state has each of the two agents choosing deterministically one of the last
two machines and using it by themselves. The makespan of that outcome is 2, which
results in a lower bound of 3/2.16
Next, we will show that this bound is tight. First, we will establish that it suffices
to examine Nash equilibria where the intersection between the supports of the mixed
strategies of any two randomizing agents is empty. Indeed, suppose that we have two
randomizing agents where the intersection of their supports contains some machines
with constant latency functions. If we force one of the two agents to deviate and
choose deterministically the strategy of constant latency in his support then the
makespan of the state remains constant and furthermore the outcome is still a weakly
stable Nash. The reason that it remains a Nash is that if an agent wished to deviate
to some strategy used by the deviating agent originally, then when deviating to that
machine he would experience exactly the same cost as when using the machine with
the constant cost function. Thus, he could have profitably deviated in the initial
configuration. This is impossible since that configuration was a Nash equilibrium.
Trivially, this new Nash equilibrium is weakly stable since we have only decreased the
number of randomizing agents and the supports of the remaining randomizing agents
remained the same. We can keep performing these deviations up until there no longer
randomizing agents for which the intersection of the supports contains any machine
(of constant latency function). Hence, in terms of identifying the almost pure Nash
equilibrium with the worst makespan it suffices to focus on the set of almost mixed
NE where the intersection of the supports of any two randomizing agents is empty.
We have established that if suffices to focus on mixed Nash equilibria where each
machine has at most one randomizing agent. We will establish that the makespan of
each such equilibrium is within a 3/2 factor of the makespan of a pure Nash equilibrium,
which by Lemma 6.22 implies that it is within a 3/2 factor of the optimal makespan.
16This construction is due to Bobby Kleinberg,
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The argument is as follows: We will start from the mixed Nash and will proceed by
fixing the randomizing agents to playing strategies in their support with probability
one. We start from the randomizing agent i that experiences minimum cost amongst
all randomizing agents. We fix him to playing the strategy in his support that he
chose with minimal probability in the original mixed Nash. We also fix the rest of
the randomizing agents to arbitrary strategies in their support. Next, we repeatedly
go through all agents in decreasing cost order and we allow each agent to move and
migrate to the least expensive (available) path if it is strictly cheaper than his current
path. Due to symmetry once we find one agent who does not wish deviate all of the
rest of the agents do not wish to deviate either due to symmetry of the available
paths. This process will terminate at equilibrium since this is a potential game.
Furthermore, agent i (nor of any of the other agents in his machine) will ever move
during this process. If he did move then there would exist at some point a profitable
deviating move from him. However, immediately after fixing the randomizing agents
to choosing something in their current support, agent i did not have any improving
deviations since his experienced cost was minimal amongst all randomizing agents and
hence at least as small as the cost of any deviation. In fact, the cheapest available
deviations are exactly the strategies that belonged in his support. As we allow costly
agents to move greedily from their current strategy to the best available strategy the
cost of the best available deviation cannot decrease with time. Thus, agent i will
not deviate. Hence, the makespan at the resulting pure Nash equilibrium will be
at least equal the cost of agent i when his was fixed to the strategy that he played
with minimal probability. If we denote that edge as e and its load (excluding agent
i) as xe then this implies that the makespan at the resulting Nash and thus the
optimal makespan is at least ae(xe + 1) + be. However, the original mixed state was
an equilibrium and if agent i played strategy e with probability p then no agent in the
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original Nash equilibrium would experience cost more than ae(xe + p+ 1) + be.
17 But
since e was chosen to be the strategy played with minimal probability in his original
support p ≤ 1/2 and hence no agent can experience cost more than ae(xe + 3/2) + be.
So, the original makespan is at most ae(xe + 3/2) + be and the optimal makespan is at
least ae(xe+ 1) + be. The ratio between these two terms becomes maximal (and equal
to 3/2) for be = 0 and xe = 0, which is exactly satisfied by our tight lower bound.
Remark 16. If we slightly perturb the above tight example so that the latency function
for the first machine is 3x whereas for the other two machines is 2x + ε then the
continuum of equilibria with the bad makespan will have a non-negligible region of
attraction resulting in an average price of anarchy which is strictly greater than one.
Lemma 6.24. In generic symmetric linear load balancing games the set of almost
pure Nash equilibria coincides with the set of pure Nash equilibria. Specifically, the
set of linear latency functions such the set of almost pure Nash equilibria is a strict
superset of the set of pure Nash equilibria is of measure zero within the set of all linear
latency functions.
Proof. We will show that if a linear symmetric load balancing game has an almost
pure Nash equilibrium that is not pure, i.e., that has at least one agent using a
randomized strategy, then the coefficients of the linear latency functions belong to a
zero measure set. Indeed, let’s focus on one of the randomizing agents. Since this
agent is indifferent between (at least) two machines/edges e, e′ and he is the only
randomizing agent using these machines (or some of these machines have a constant
latency function) then there exist integer numbers k, k′, so that the cost of these two
machines are equal under loads k, k′. This implies that ae · k + be = ae′ · k′ + b′e.
However, for any fixed k, k′ the set of coefficients ae, ae′ , be, be′ that satisfy this linear
equation is a zero measure set. Hence, given any number of agents and machines
17If he did we would strictly prefer to deviate to edge e.
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the set of functions that have almost pure Nash equilibria that are not pure can be
expressed as a countable union of zero-measure sets, which is a zero-measure set.
By combining the lemmas of this section, Theorem 6.20 follows immediately.
6.7.2 Better APoA in N balls N bins
In the classic game of N identical balls, with N identical bins, each ball chooses
a distribution over the bins selfishly and we assume that the cost of bin γ is equal to
γ’s load. We know for this game that the PoA is Ω( logN
log logN
) [35]. We prove that the
Average PoA is 1.
Theorem 6.25 (APoA in N balls N bins). The average price of anarchy in terms
of makespan for the (identical) N-balls N-bins is 1.
This is derived via Corollary 6.5 and by showing that in this case the set of weakly
stable Nash equilibria coincides with the set of pure equilibria.
Claim 6.26 (Every weakly stable NE is pure). In the problem of N identical
balls and N identical bins every weakly stable Nash equilibrium is pure.
Proof. Assume we have a weakly Nash equilibrium p. From corollary 6.5, we have
the following facts:
• Fact 1: For every bin γ, if a player i chooses γ with probability 1 > piγ > 0, he
must be the only player that chooses that bin with nonzero probability. Let i, j
two players that choose bin γ with nonzero probabilities and also piγ, pjγ < 1.
Clearly if player i changes his strategy and chooses bin γ with probability one,
then player j doesn’t stay indifferent (his cost ciγ increases).
• Fact 2: If player i chooses bin γ with probability one, then he is the only player
that chooses bin γ with nonzero probability. This is true because every player
j 6= i can find a bin with load less than 1 to choose.
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From Facts 1,2 and since the number of balls is equal to the number of bins we get
that p must be pure.
Proof of Theorem 6.25. Hence from Lemma 6.26 and 6.5 we get that for all but
measure zero starting points of g(∆), the replicator converges to pure Nash Equilib-
ria. Every pure Nash equilibrium (each ball chooses a distinct bin) has social cost
(makespan) 1 which is also the optimal. Hence the Average PoA is 1.
Remark 17. The lemma below shows how crucial is Lindelőf ’s lemma A.1(essentially
separability of Rm for all m) in the proof of Theorem 6.4. Even simple instances
of games with constant number of agents and strategies may have uncountably many
equilibria. In such games, naive union bound arguments do not suffice since we cannot
argue about the measure of an uncountable union of measure zero sets.
Lemma 6.27. For N ≥ 4 the set of NE of the N balls N bins game is uncountable.
Proof. We will prove it for N = 4 and then the generalization is easy, i.e., if N > 4
then the first 4 players will play as shown below in the first 4 bins and each of the
remaining N − 4 players will choose a distinct remaining bin. Below we give matrix
A where Aiγ = piγ. Observe that for any x ∈ [14 , 34 ] we have a Nash equilibrium.
A =

x 1− x 0 0
1/2 0 1/2 0
0 1/2 0 1/2
0 0 x 1− x

.
6.8 Conclusion and remarks
The results of this chapter appear in [102]. We show that replicator dynamics
converges point-wise to fixed points for linear congestion and network coordination
games. Moreover, we define an average case analysis notion in dynamical systems
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focusing on games and replicator dynamics. We call this notion average price of
anarchy (APoA) and provide upper and lower bounds for APoA in different classes
of games. Several questions arise:
• Other settings/games/mechanisms. In recent followup work, [127] applies
our approach to peer prediction mechanisms where the size of the basin of at-
traction of the truthful equilibrium is used as a proxy for the robustness of
truthful play. The replicator model predicts/confirms the significant improve-
ment in robustness of recent mechanisms over earlier approaches. It would be
interesting to test the robustness of other (approximately) truthful, differen-
tially private mechanisms in a similar manner.
• Other dynamics. Perform average case analysis for other dynamics and com-
pare them against replicator dynamics.
• Generalization of APoA. Generalize the notion of APoA to dynamics that
do not necessarily converge. In particular, it would be intriguing to define an
APoA notion for chain recurrent sets (see [106]).
• Point-wise convergence. Generalize the point-wise convergence result to a
larger class of congestion games, (e.g., for polynomial cost functions).
• Volumes of regions of attraction as a function. Given a prior distribution
over initial conditions (e.g., uniform), every point-wise convergent dynamical
system with isolated fixed points induces a probability distribution over these
fixed points. By approximating this function (from priors over initial conditions
to posteriors over equilibria), we can predict the average case (long-term) be-
havior of the system (without having the equations of the dynamics). Nontrivial
distributions will result to a (unique) distribution/prediction that puts positive




GRADIENT DESCENT AND SADDLE POINTS
7.1 Introduction
The interplay between the structure of saddle points and the performance of gradi-
ent descent dynamics is a critical and not well understood aspect of non-convex opti-
mization. Despite our incomplete theoretical understanding, in practice, the intuitive
nature of the gradient descent method (and more generally gradient-like algorithms)
make it a basic tool for attacking non-convex optimization problems for which we
have very little understanding of the geometry of their saddle points. In fact, these
techniques become particularly useful as the equilibrium structure becomes increas-
ingly complicated, e.g., such as in the cases of nonnegative matrix factorization [73]
or congestion/potential games [122] (see Chapter 6), where symmetries in the nature
of non-convex optimization problems give rise to continuums of saddle points with
complex geometry. In these cases, particularly, the simplistic, greedy attitude of the
gradient descent method, which is by design agnostic towards the global geometry of
the cost function to be minimized, comes rather handy. As we move forward in time,
the cost keeps decreasing and convergence is guaranteed.
This simplicity, however, comes at least seemingly at a significant cost. For ex-
ample, it is well known that there exist instances where bad initialization of gradient
descent converges to saddle points [95]. Despite the existence of such worst case
instances in theory, practitioners have been rather successful at applying these tech-
niques across a wide variety of problems [117]. Lee et al. [74] have given a very clear
justification of the effectiveness of gradient descent methods in terms of circumvent-
ing the saddle equilibrium problem using tools from dynamical systems. At a glance,
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the paper argues the following intuitively clear message: The instability of (locally
unstable) saddle points translates to a global phenomenon and the probability of
converging to such a saddle point given a randomly chosen (random not over a local
neighborhood but over the whole state space) initial condition is zero. We have seen
the analogue of this in Theorems 2.9, 3.15, 3.13.
Formally, Lee et al. define a cost function f as satisfying the “strict saddle”
property if each critical point x of f is either a local minimizer, or a strict saddle,
i.e., ∇2f(x) has at least one strictly negative eigenvalue (for formal definitions see Def-
inition 25). They argue that if f : RN → R is a twice continuously differentiable func-
tion then gradient descent with constant step-size α (defined by xk+1 = xk−α∇f(xk))
with a random initialization and sufficiently small constant step-size converges to a
local minimizer or negative infinity almost surely.
Critically, for this result to apply, f is required to have isolated saddle points, ∇f
is assumed to be globally L-Lipschitz1 and the step-size α is taken to be less than
1/L. These regularity conditions soften somewhat the impact of the statement both
theoretically as well as in practice. First, although the assumption of isolated fixed
points is indeed generic for abstract classes of cost functions, in several special cases
of practical interest where the cost function has some degree of symmetry (e.g., due
to scaling invariance) this assumption is not satisfied. For this reason, the impor-
tant question of whether the assumption of isolated equilibria is indeed necessary was
explicitly raised in [74]. Moreover, the assumption of global Lipschitz continuity for
∇f is not satisfied even by low degree polynomials (e.g., cubic). Finally, a natural
question is how tight is the assumption on the step-size?
Our contribution. In this chapter we provide answers to all the above questions.
We show that the assumption of isolated saddle points is indeed not necessary to
argue generic convergence to local minima. To argue this, we need to combine tools
1That is, f satisfies ‖∇f(x)−∇f(y)‖2 ≤ L ‖x− y‖2.
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that we essentially used in previous chapters when we argued about measure zero
set of initial conditions, e.g., we make use of Center-Stable Manifold Theorem 1.3
(see Theorem 7.1). Moreover, we show that the globally Lipschitz assumption can be
circumvented as long as the domain is convex and forward invariant with respect to
gradient descent (see Theorem 7.2). This technique makes our results easily applicable
to many standard settings. Finally, using linear algebra and eigenvalue analysis we
provide an upper bound on the allowable step-size (see 7.3). Our work shows that
the high level message of [74] is practically always binding. Saddle points are indeed
of little concern for the gradient descent method in practice, but it takes some theory
to argue so.
7.2 Related work
First-order descent methods can indeed escape strict saddle points when assisted
by near isotropic noise. [108] establishes convergence of the Robbins-Monro stochastic
approximation to local minimizers for strict saddle functions, whereas [70] establishes
convergence to local minima for perturbed versions of multiplicative weights algo-
rithm in generic potential games. Recently, [58] quantified the convergence rate of
perturbed stochastic gradient descent to local minima. The addition of isotropic noise
can significantly slow down the convergence rate. Our setting is deterministic and
corresponds to the simplest possible discrete-time implementation of gradient descent.
Numerous curvature-based optimization techniques have been developed in order
to circumvent saddle points (e.g., trust-region methods [33, 130], modified Newton’s
method with curvilinear line search [90], cubic regularized Newton’s method [96],
and saddle-free Newton methods [38]). Unlike gradient descent, these methods have
superlinear per iteration implementation costs, making them impractical for high-
dimensional settings.
Gradient descent with carefully chosen initial conditions can bypass the problem
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of local minima altogether and converge to the global minimum for many practical
non-convex optimization settings (e.g., dictionary learning [6], latent-variable models
[144], matrix completion [68], and phase retrieval [21]). In contrast, we focus on the
performance of gradient descent under generic initial conditions. Finally, some recent
work has been focusing on the connections between stability and efficiency of fixed
points in non-convex optimization (e.g., Gaussian random fields [28]).
7.3 Preliminaries and formal statement of results
Assume a minimization problem of the form minx∈RN f(x) where f : RN → R is a
twice continuously differentiable function. Gradient descent is one of the most well-
known algorithms (discrete dynamical system) to attack this generic optimization
problem. It is defined by the equations below:
xk+1 = xk − α∇f(xk), k ≥ 0
or equivalently xk+1 = g(xk) with g(x) = x− α∇f(x), g : RN → RN and α > 0.
It is easy to see that the fixed points of the dynamical system xk+1 = g(xk) are
exactly the points x so that ∇f(x) = 0, called critical points or equilibria. The set of
local minima of f is a subset of the set of critical points of f . These two sets do not
coincide and this poses a serious obstacle for proving strong theoretical guarantees
for gradient descent, since the dynamics may converge to a critical point which is not
a local minimum, called a saddle point.
Lee et al. [74] argue, under technical conditions which include the assumption
of isolated critical points, that the set of initial conditions that converge to strict
saddle points is a zero measure set (for definition of strict saddle, see Definition 25
below). The paper leaves as an open question whether the condition of isolated
equilibria was necessary. We prove that the set of initial conditions that converge
to a strict saddle point is a zero measure set even in the case of non-isolated critical
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points2. Furthermore, one of the conditions for f is that ∇f is globally Lipschitz,
which implies that the second derivative of f is bounded, i.e., there exists a β > 0
such that for all x we have ‖∇2f(x)‖2 ≤ β. However, even third degree polynomial
functions are not globally Lipschitz. We provide a theorem which can circumvent this
assumption as long as the domain S is forward or positively invariant with respect
to g, i.e., g(S) ⊆ S. Finally, we provide an easy upper bound on the step-size α, via
eigenvalue analysis of the Jacobian of g, i.e., I − α∇2f(x).
Below we give some necessary definitions for the rest of this chapter.
Definition 25.
• A point x∗ is a critical point of f if ∇f(x∗) = 0. We denote by C = {x :
∇f(x) = 0} the set of critical points (can be uncountably many).
• A critical point x∗ is isolated if there is a neighborhood U around x∗ and x∗ is
the only critical point in U 3. Otherwise it is called non-isolated.
• A critical point x∗ of f is a saddle point if for all neighborhoods U around x∗
there are y, z ∈ U such that f(z) ≤ f(x∗) ≤ f(y).
• A critical point x∗ of f is strict saddle if λmin(∇2f(x∗)) < 0 (minimum eigen-
value of matrix ∇2f(x∗) is negative).
• A set S is called forward or positively invariant with respect to some function
h : E → RN with S ⊆ E ⊆ RN if h(S) ⊆ S.
7.3.1 Main theorems
In [74], the steps of the proof of their result are the following: Under the regularity
assumption that ∇f is globally Lipschitz, with some Lipschitz constant L, Lee et
al. are able to show that g(x) = x − α∇f(x) is a diffeomorphism for α < 1/L.
2Our arguments hence allow for cost functions f ’s with uncountably many critical points.
3If the critical points are isolated, then they are countably many or finite.
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Afterwards, using the Center-Stable Manifold Theorem 1.3, they show that the set
of initial conditions so that g converges to saddle points has measure zero, under the
assumption that the critical points are isolated. We generalize their result for non-
isolated critical points, answering one of their open questions (see also the example
in Section 7.5.1, where there is a line of critical points).
Theorem 7.1 (Non-isolated). Let f : RN → R be twice continuously differentiable
and supx∈RN ‖∇2f(x)‖2 ≤ L < ∞. The set of initial conditions x ∈ RN so that
gradient descent with step-size 0 < α < 1/L converges to a strict saddle point is of
measure zero, without the assumption that critical points are isolated.
We can prove a stronger version of the theorem above, circumventing the globally
Lipschitz condition for domains which are forward invariant (see also the example in
Section 7.5.2).
Theorem 7.2 (Non-isolated, forward invariant). Let f : S → R be twice contin-
uously differentiable in an open convex set S ⊆ RN and supx∈S ‖∇2f(x)‖2 ≤ L <∞.
If g(S) ⊆ S (where g(x) = x − α∇f(x)) then the set of initial conditions x ∈ S so
that gradient descent with step-size 0 < α < 1/L converges to a strict saddle point is
of measure zero, without the assumption that critical points are isolated.
Finally, via eigenvalue analysis of I − α∇2f(x), we can find upper bounds on the
step-size of gradient descent. A straightforward theorem is the following:
Theorem 7.3 (Upper bound on step-size). Let f be a twice continuously differ-
entiable function in an open set S ⊆ RN and C∗ be the set of local minima. Assume
also that γ < infx∈C∗ ‖∇2f(x)‖2 <∞. A necessary condition so that gradient descent
converges to local minima for all but (Lebesgue) measure zero initial conditions in S




7.4 Proving the theorems
Before we proceed with the proofs, let us argue that Theorem 7.2 is a generalization
of Theorem 7.1. This can be checked easily by setting S ··= RN and observing that
g(RN) ⊆ RN . We continue with the proofs of Theorems 7.2 and 7.3.
7.4.1 Proof of Theorem 7.2
In this section, we prove Theorem 7.2. We start by showing that the assumptions
of Theorem 7.2 imply that ∇f(x) is Lipschitz in S.
Lemma 7.4 (Bounded second derivative implies Lipschitz condition). Let f :
S → R where S ⊆ RN is an open convex set and f be twice continuously differentiable
in S. Also assume that supx∈S ‖∇2f(x)‖2 ≤ L <∞. Then ∇f satisfies the Lipschitz
condition in S with Lipschitz constant L.
Proof. Let x,y ∈ S (column vectors) and define the function H : [0, 1] → RN as
H(t) = ∇f(x + t(y − x)). By the chain rule we get that H ′(t) ··= dHdt = (∇2f(x +




















∥∥∇2f(x + t(y − x))∥∥
2




L ‖y − x‖2 dt = L ‖y − x‖2 .
Remark 18. From Schwarz’s theorem we get that ∇2f(x) is symmetric for x ∈ S,
hence ‖∇2f(x)‖2 = sp (∇2f(x)) (recall sp (A) denotes the spectral radius of matrix
A).
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The assumption that supx∈S ‖∇2f(x)‖2 ≤ L <∞ implies that ∇f(x) is Lipschitz
with constant L in the convex set S, as stated by Lemma 7.4. We show that the
converse holds as well, i.e., the Lipschitz condition for ∇f(x) with constant L in
the main theorem in Lee et al. implies ‖∇2f(x)‖2 ≤ L for all x ∈ S and hence the
assumption in Theorems 7.1, 7.2 that supx∈S ‖∇2f(x)‖2 ≤ L is satisfied.
Lemma 7.5 (Lipschitz condition implies bounded second derivative). Let f :
S → R where S is an open convex set and f is twice continuously differentiable in S.
Assume ∇f(x) is Lipschitz with constant L in S, then it holds supx∈S ‖∇2f(x)‖2 ≤ L.
Proof. Fix an ε > 0. By Taylor’s theorem, since f is twice differentiable with respect








− ε ‖y − x‖2 ,
for y sufficiently close to x (depends on ε). Therefore under the Lipschitz assumption
we get that there exists a closed neighborhood U(ε) of x, so that for all y ∈ U we get
∥∥(∇2f(x))(x− y)∥∥
2
≤ ‖∇f(x)−∇f(y)‖2 + ε ‖y − x‖2 ≤ (L+ ε) ‖x− y‖2 . (82)
We consider a closed ball B subset of U , with center x and radius r (in `2) and set




by definition of spectral
norm, scaled so that the length of the vectors are at most r. Using (82) we get that
‖∇2f(x)‖2 ≤ L + ε. Since ε is arbitrary, we get that ‖∇2f(x)‖2 ≤ L. We conclude
that supx∈S ‖∇2f(x)‖2 ≤ L.
Lemmas 7.4 and 7.5 show that the smoothness assumptions in Lee et al. paper
are equivalent to ours. We use the condition on the spectral norm of the matrix
∇2f(x) so that we can work with the eigenvalues in our theorems (e.g., in Remark 18
the spectral norm coincides with spectral radius for ∇2f(x)). Below we prove that
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the update rule of gradient descent, i.e., function g is a diffeomorphism under the
assumptions of Theorem 7.2 (similar approach appeared in [74]).
Lemma 7.6 (Diffeomorphism). Under the assumptions of Theorem 7.2, function
g is a diffeomorphism in S.
Proof. First we prove that g is injective. We follow the same argument as in [74].
Suppose g(y) = g(x), thus y−x = α(∇f(y)−∇f(x)). We assume that x 6= y and we
will reach a contradiction. From Lemma 7.4 we get ‖∇f(y)−∇f(x)‖2 ≤ L ‖y − x‖2
and hence ‖x− y‖2 ≤ αL ‖y − x‖2 < ‖y − x‖2, since αL < 1 (contradiction).
We continue by showing that g is a local diffeomorphism. Observe that the Jaco-
bian of g is I − α∇2f(x). It suffices to show that α∇2f(x) has no eigenvalue which
is 1, because this implies matrix I − α∇2f(x) is invertible. As long as I − α∇2f(x)
is invertible, from Inverse Function Theorem (see [129]), it follows that g is a local
diffeomorphism. Finally, since g is injective, the inverse g−1 is well-defined and since
g is a local diffeomorphism in S, it follows that g−1 is smooth in S. Therefore g is a
diffeomorphism.
Let λ be an eigenvalue of ∇2f(x). Then |λ| ≤ sp (∇2f(x)) = ‖∇2f(x)‖2 ≤ L
where the equality comes from Remark 18 and first and last inequalities are satisfied
by assumption. Therefore α∇2f(x) has as eigenvalue αλ and |αλ| ≤ αL < 1. Thus all
eigenvalues of α∇2f(x) are less than 1 in absolute value and the proof is complete.
To finish the proof of Theorem 7.2, we use the Center-Stable Manifold Theorem 1.3,
since g(x) = x − α∇f(x) is a diffeomorphism, where supx∈S ‖∇2f(x)‖2 ≤ L and
α < 1/L.
Our approach deviates a lot from that of [74] from this point until the end of the
proof. Let r be a critical point of function f(x) and Br be the (open) ball that is
derived from Theorem 1.3. We consider the union of these balls
A = ∪rBr.
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Due to Lindelőf’s Lemma A.1, we can find a countable subcover for A, i.e., there
exist fixed points r1, r2, . . . such that A = ∪∞m=1Brm . If the dynamics of gradient
descent converges to a strict saddle point, starting from a point v ∈ S, there must
exist a t0 and m so that g
t(v) ∈ Brm for all t ≥ t0. From Theorem 1.3 we get
that gt(v) ∈ W scloc(rm) ∩ S, where we used the fact that g(S) ⊆ S (from assumption
forward invariant), namely the trajectory remains in S for all times 4. By setting
D1(rm) = g
−1(W scloc(rm)∩S) and Di+1(rm) = g−1(Di(rm)∩S) we get that v ∈ Dt(rm)
for all t ≥ t0.
Hence the set of initial points in S so that gradient descent converges to a strict
saddle point is a subset of
P = ∪∞m=1 ∪∞t=0 Dt(rm). (83)
Since rm is a strict saddle point, the Jacobian I − α∇2f(x) has an eigenvalue
greater than 1, namely the dimension of the unstable eigenspace satisfies dim(Eu) ≥
1, and therefore dimension of W scloc(rm) is at most N−1. Thus, the set W scloc(rm)∩S has
Lebesgue measure zero in RN and so does D1(rm). Finally since g is a diffeomorphism
(from Lemma 7.6), g−1 is continuously differentiable and thus it is locally Lipschitz
(see [110] p.71). Therefore using Lemma A.2 below, g−1 preserves the null-sets and
hence by induction Di(rm) has measure zero. Thereby we get that P is a countable
union of measure zero sets, i.e., is measure zero and the claim of Theorem 7.2 follows.
A straightforward application of the Theorem 7.2 is the following:
Corollary 7.7 (Gradient descent only converges to minimizers). Assume that
the conditions of Theorem 7.2 are satisfied and all saddle points of f are strict. Addi-
tionally, let ν be a prior measure with support S which is absolutely continuous with
respect to Lebesgue measure, and assume limk→∞ g
k(x) exists5 for all x in S. Then
Pν [lim
k
gk(x) = x∗] = 1,
4W scloc(rm) denotes the center-stable manifold of fixed point rm
5gk denotes the composition of g with itself k times.
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where x∗ is a local minimum.
Proof. Since the set of initial conditions whose limit point is a (strict) saddle point is
a measure zero set and we have assumed limk→∞ g
k(x) exists for all initial conditions
in S then the probability of converging to a local minimizer is 1.
Remark 19. Arguing that limk g
k(x) exists follows from standard arguments in sev-
eral settings of interest (e.g., for analytic functions f that satisfy Lojasiewicz Gradient
Inequality), see papers [74], [1] and references therein.
The importance of Theorem 7.2 will become clear in the examples that appear in
Section 7.5. In the example of Section 7.5.2, the function is not globally Lipschitz (we
use the example that appears in [74]), nevertheless Theorem 7.2 applies and thus we
have convergence to local minimizers with probability 1. In the example of Section
7.5.1 we see that the function has non-isolated critical points.
7.4.2 Proof of Theorem 7.3
We proceed by contradiction. Consider any local minimum x∗, and by assumption
we get that sp (∇2f(x∗)) > γ. Let α ≥ 2
γ
. Therefore the Jacobian I−α∇2f(x∗) of g at
x∗ has spectral radius greater than 1 since sp (I − α∇2f(x∗)) ≥ sp (α∇2f(x∗))− 1 >
αγ − 1 ≥ 1. This implies that the fixed point x∗ of g is (Lyapunov) unstable. Since
this is true for every local minimum, it cannot be true that gradient descent converges
with probability 1 to local minima.
7.5 Examples
7.5.1 Example for non-isolated critical points
Consider the simple example of the cost function f : R3 → R with f(x, y, z) =
2xy+ 2xz−2x−y− z. Its gradient is ∇(f) = (2y+ 2z−2, 2x−1, 2x−1). Naturally,
its saddle points correspond exactly to the line (1/2, w, 1 − w) for w ∈ R, and by
computing their (common) eigenvalues we establish that they are all strict saddles
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(their minimum eigenvalue is −2
√
2). As we expect from our analysis effectively no
trajectories converge to them (instead the value of practically all trajectories goes to
−∞). We plot in red some sample trajectories for small enough step sizes, starting
in the local neighborhood of the equilibrium set.
Figure 13: Example that satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 7.1. The black line
represent critical points of f , all of which are strict. The red lines correspond to
diverging trajectories of gradient descent with small step size.
7.5.2 Example for forward invariant set









in previous sections, f is not globally Lipschitz so the main result in [74] cannot
be applied here. We will use our Theorem 7.2 which talks about forward invariant
domains.
The critical points of f are (0, 0), (0, 1), (0,−1). (0, 0) is a strict saddle point and
the other two are local minima. Observe that the Hessian ∇2f(x, y) is
J =
 1 0
0 3y2 − 1
 .
For S = (−1, 1) × (−2, 2), so we get that sup(x,y)∈S ‖∇2f(x, y)‖2 ≤ 11 (for y = 2




, and we have g(x, y) = ((1 −
232






). It is not difficult to see that g(S) ⊆ S (easy
calculations). The assumptions of Theorem 7.2 are satisfied, hence it is true that
the set of initial conditions in S so that gradient descent converges to (0, 0) has
measure zero. Moreover, by Corollary 7.7 it holds that if the initial condition is taken
(say) uniformly at random in S, then gradient descent converges to (0, 1), (0,−1)
with probability 1. The figure below makes the claim clear, i.e., the set of initial
conditions so that gradient descent converges to (0, 0) lie on the axis y = 0, which
is of measure zero in R2. For all other starting points, gradient descent converges to
local minima. Finally, from the figure one can see that S is forward invariant.








Figure 14: Example that satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 7.2. The three black
dots represent the critical points. Function f is not Lipschitz.
7.5.3 Example for step-size
We use the same function as in the previous example. Observe that for (0, 0),
(0, 1), (0,−1) we have that the spectral radius of ∇2f is 1, 2, 2 respectively (so the
minimum of all is 1). We choose α ≥ 2 and we get that g(x, y) = (−x, 3y − 2y3).
It is not hard to see that gradient descent does not converge (in the first coordinate
function g cycles between x and −x).
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7.6 Conclusion and remarks
The results of this chapter appear in [103]. Our work argues that saddle points
are indeed of little concern for the gradient descent method in practice under rather
weak assumptions for f which allow for non-isolated critical points. In some sense,
this is the strongest positive result possible without making explicit assumptions on
the structure of the cost function f nor using beneficial random noise/well-chosen
initial conditions. Naturally, all these directions are of key interest and are the object
of recent work (see Section 7.2). Keeping up with this simplest, deterministic imple-
mentation of gradient descent a natural hypothesis is that (in settings of practical
interest) it converges not only to local minimizers but moreover the size of the region
of attraction of each local minimizer is in a sense directly proportional to its quality.
Formalizing such statements and analyzing the average case performance of gradient
descent given random initial conditions is a fascinating question that could shed more
light into the surprising efficiency of the gradient descent method in many cases.
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APPENDIX A
MISSING TERMS, LEMMAS AND PROOFS
A.1 Terms Used in Biology
We provide brief non-technical definitions of a few biological terms that we use in
this thesis.
Gene. A unit that determines some characteristic of the organism, and passes traits
to offsprings. All organisms have genes corresponding to various biological traits,
some of which are instantly visible, such as eye color or number of limbs, and some
of which are not, such as blood type.
Allele. Allele is one of a number of alternative forms of the same gene, found at the
same place on a chromosome, Different alleles can result in different observable traits,
such as different pigmentation.
Genotype. The genetic constitution of an individual organism.
Phenotype. The set of observable characteristics of an individual resulting from the
interaction of its genotype with the environment.
Locus. A locus (plural loci) is the specific location of a gene, DNA sequence, or
position on a chromosome. Each chromosome carries many genes; humans’ estimated
‘haploid’ protein coding genes are 20,000-25,000, on the 23 different chromosomes.
Diploid. Diploid means having two copies of each chromosome. Almost all of the
cells in the human body are diploid.
Haploid. A cell or nucleus having a single set of unpaired chromosomes. Our sex
cells (sperm and eggs) are haploid cells that are produced by meiosis. When sex cells
unite during fertilization, the haploid cells become a diploid cell.
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A.1.1 Heterozygote Advantage (Overdominance)
Heterozygote Advantage describes the case when heterozygote genotype has a
higher relative fitness than homozygote genotype. Cases of heterozygote advantage
have been demonstrated in several organisms. The first confirmation of heterozygote
advantage was with a fruit fly, Drosophila melanogaster. Kalmus demonstrated in a
classic paper [64] how polymorphism can persist in a population through heterozygote
advantage. In humans, sickle-cell anemia is a genetic disorder caused by the pres-
ence of two recessive alleles. Where malaria is common, carrying a single sickle-cell
allele (trait) confers a selective advantage, i.e., being a heterozygote is advantageous.
Specifically, humans with one of the two alleles of sickle-cell disease exhibit less severe
symptoms when infected with malaria. Theorems 3.13 and 3.17 are related to that
phenomenon.
A.2 Statements and Proofs
A.2.1 Lindelőf ’s lemma
The following theorem holds for every separable metric space, i.e., every metric
space that contains a countable, dense subset. In particular, we use this theorem for
Rn extensively in this thesis (in Theorems 2.8, 3.6 and 6.4).
Theorem A.1 (Lindelőf ’s lemma [67]). For every open cover there is a countable
subcover.
A.2.2 Locally Lipschitz are null-set preserving
The following lemma is used in Chapters 2, 3, 6, 7 when we argue that the set
of initial conditions so that the dynamics converges to fixed points with an unsta-
ble direction, has measure zero. It roughly states that if a function f is locally
Lipschitz then it preserves the measure zero sets (measure zero sets are mapped to
measure zero sets).
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Lemma A.2 (Null-set preserving). Let h : S → Rm be a locally Lipschitz function
with S ⊆ Rm, then h is null-set preserving, i.e., for E ⊂ S if E has measure zero
then h(E) has also measure zero.
Proof. The lemma is well-known, but we give a proof for completeness. Let Bγ be
an open ball such that ‖h(y)− h(x)‖ ≤ Kγ ‖y − x‖ for all x,y ∈ Bγ. We consider
the union ∪γBγ which cover Rm by the assumption that h is locally Lipschitz. By
Lindelőf’s lemma A.1 we have a countable subcover, i.e., ∪∞i=1Bi. Let Ei = E ∩ Bi.
We will prove that h(Ei) has measure zero. Fix an ε > 0. Since Ei ⊂ E, we have that
Ei has measure zero, hence we can find a countable cover of open balls C1, C2, ... for






Ei ⊂ ∪∞j=1Cj we get that h(Ei) ⊂ ∪∞j=1h(Cj), namely h(C1), h(C2), ... cover h(Ei)
and also h(Cj) ⊂ h(Bi) for all j. Assuming that ball Cj ··= B(x, r) (center x and
radius r) then it is clear that h(Cj) ⊂ B(h(x), Kir) (h maps the center x to h(x)
and the radius r to Kir because of Lipschitz assumption). But µ(B(h(x), Kir)) =
Kmi µ(B(x, r)) = K
m








Since ε was arbitrary, it follows that µ(h(Ei)) = 0. To finish the proof, observe that
h(E) = ∪∞i=1h(Ei) therefore µ(h(E)) ≤
∑∞
i=1 µ(h(Ei)) = 0.
A.2.3 Point-wise convergence for network coordination games
Theorem A.3 (Point-wise convergence in network coordination). Given any
initial condition replicator dynamics converges to a fixed point (point-wise conver-
gence) in all network coordination games.
Proof. We denote by ûi the expected utility of agent i under mixed strategy profile
p and by uiγ his expected utility when he deviates to strategy γ and all other agents
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piγpiγ′(uiγ − uiγ′)2 ≥ 0,
with equality at fixed points. Hence (as in [70]) we have convergence to equilibria
sets (compact connected sets consisting of fixed points). We address the fact that
this doesn’t suffice for point-wise convergence. To be exact it suffices only in the case
the equilibria are isolated (which is not the case for network coordination games - see
Figure 12).
Let q be a limit point of the trajectory p(t) where p(t) is in the interior of ∆
for all t ∈ R (since we started from an initial condition inside ∆) then we have that






qiγ ln(piγ/qiγ) ≥ 0 (Jensen’s inequality)
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where diγ, d̂i correspond to the payoff of player i if he chooses strategy γ and his
expected payoff respectively at point q. The rest of the proof follows in a similar way
to Losert and Akin [82].
We break the term
∑
i,γ piγ(diγ − d̂i) to positive and negative terms (we ignore
zero terms), i.e.,
∑
i,γ piγ(diγ − d̂i) =
∑
i,γ:d̂i>diγ










< 0 for ‖p− q‖1 < ε and Ψ(q) > Ψ(p).
Proof of Claim. Assuming that p→ q, we get uiγ − ûi → diγ − d̂i for all i, γ. Hence
for small enough ε > 0 with ‖p− q‖1 < ε, we have that uiγ − ûi ≤ 34(diγ − d̂i) for the










































= piγ(uiγ − ûi) (replicator), and the claim is proved. Notice
that Z(p) ≥ 0 (sum of positive terms and I(p) ≥ 0) and is zero iff p = q. (i)
To finish the proof of the theorem, if q is a limit point of p(t), there exists an
increasing sequence of times ti, with tn →∞ and p(tn)→ q. We consider ε′ such that
the set C = {p : Z(p) < ε′} is inside B = ‖p− q‖1 < ε where ε is from claim above.
Since p(tn)→ q, consider a time tN where p(tN) is inside C. From claim above we get
that Z(p) is decreasing inside B (and hence inside C), thus Z(p(t)) ≤ Z(p(tN)) < ε′
for all t ≥ tN , hence the orbit will remain in C. By the fact that Z(p(t)) is decreasing
in C (claim above) and also Z(p(tn)) → Z(q) = 0 it follows that Z(p(t)) → 0 as
t→∞. Hence p(t)→ q as t→∞ using (i).
A.3 Mathematica code
A.3.1 Mathematica code for proving Lemma 5.35
Reduce[((1-k*x)/(m - k))/(b + (1 - b)*(x + (1 - k*x)/(m - k)))
<((1 - (k + 1)* x) /(m - k - 1))/(b + (1 - b)*(x + (1 -
(k + 1)*x)/(m - k - 1))) && 1 > b > 0 && 1 > x > 0 &&
1/(k + 1) > x > 1/m && m >= 3 && m >= k + 2 && k >= 1]
False
A.3.2 Mathematica code for proving Lemma 5.38
First inequality in Lemma 5.38:
Reduce[1 > b > 0 && m >= 3 && -(m - 2) (1 - b) s^2 - 2 s (1 + b
(m - 2)) + 1 + b (m - 2) == 0 && 0 < s < x < 1 && y ==
(1 - x)/(m - 1) && t == (x*y*(1 - b))/(b + (1 - b)*
(x + y)) && t <= 1/m && (1 - m*t)*(y + b + (1 - 2*b)*y)/
(b + (1 - b)*x^2 + (1 - b)*(m - 1)*y^2) >= 1]
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False
Second inequality in Lemma 5.38:
Reduce[1 > b > 0 && m >= 3 && -(m - 2) (1 - b) s^2 - 2 s (1 + b
(m - 2)) + 1 + b (m - 2) == 0 && 0 < s < x < 1 && y ==
(1 - x)/(m - 1) && 1/m >= t && t == (x*y*(1 - b))/(b +
(1 - b)*(x + y)) && ((1 - m*t)*((2*(x + y) + b*(2 - x +
(m - 3)*y))/(b + (1 - b)*x^2 + (1 - b)*(m - 1)*y^2) -
(2*x*(b + (1 - b)*x)^2 + 2*(m - 1)*y*(b + (1 - b)*y)^2)/
((b + (1 - b)*x^2 + (1 - b)*(m - 1)*y^2)^2)) >= 1)]
False
A.3.3 Mathematica code for proving τc > τu when m > 2
Reduce[1 > b > 0 && m >= 3 && -(m - 2) (1 - b) s^2 - 2 s (1 + b
(m - 2)) + 1 + b (m - 2) == 0 && 0 < s < 1 && (s*(1 - s)
*(1 - b))/((m - 1)*b + (1 - b)*(1 + (m - 2)*s)) <=




[1] Absil, P., Mahony, R. E., and Andrews, B., “Convergence of the iterates
of descent methods for analytic cost functions,” SIAM Journal on Optimization,
vol. 16, no. 2, 2005.
[2] Ackermann, H., Berenbrink, P., Fischer, S., and Hoefer, M., “Con-
current imitation dynamics in congestion games,” ACM symposium on Princi-
ples of distributed computing (PODC), 2009.
[3] Akin, E. and Losert, V., “Evolutionary dynamics of zero-sum games,” J. of
Math. Biology, vol. 20, 1984.
[4] Aldous, D. J., “Random walks on finite groups and rapidly mixing Markov
chains,” Lecture Notes in Mathematics 986, 1983.
[5] Anshelevich, E., Dasgupta, A., Kleinberg, J., Tardos, É.., Wexler,
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[35] Czumaj, A. and Vőcking, B., “Tight bounds for worst-case equilibria,” ACM
Trans. Algorithms, 2007.
[36] Daskalakis, C., Goldberg, P. W., and Papadimitriou, C. H., “The
complexity of computing a Nash equilibrium,” SIAM J. Computing, vol. 39(1),
2009.
[37] Daskalakis, C., Frongillo, R., Papadimitriou, C. H., Pierrakos, G.,
and Valiant, G., “On learning algorithms for Nash equilibria,” International
Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT), 2010.
[38] Dauphin, Y. N., Pascanu, R., Gulcehre, C., Cho, K., Ganguli, S.,
and Bengio, Y., “Identifying and attacking the saddle point problem in high-
dimensional non-convex optimization,” Advances in neural information process-
ing systems (NIPS), 2014.
[39] Dixit, N., Srivastava, P., and Vishnoi, N. K., “A finite population model
of molecular evolution: Theory and computation,” Journal of Computational
Biology, vol. 19, no. 10, 2012.
244
[40] Doebeli, M. and Ispolatov, I., “Chaos and unpredictability in evolution,”
Evolution, vol. 68, no. 5, 2014.
[41] Dubhashi, D. P. and Panconesi, A., Concentration of Measure for the Anal-
ysis of Randomized Algorithms. Cambridge University Press, 2009.
[42] Durrett, R., Probability models for DNA sequence evolution. Springer, 2008.
[43] Eigen, M., “Selforganization of matter and the evolution of biological macro-
molecules,” Die Naturwissenschaften, vol. 58, 1971.
[44] Eigen, M., “The origin of genetic information: Viruses as models,” Gene,
vol. 135, 1993.
[45] Eigen, M. and Schuster, P., “The hypercycle, a principle of natural self-
organization. Part A: Emergence of the hypercycle,” Die Naturwissenschaften,
vol. 64, 1977.
[46] Etessami, K. and Lochbihler, A., “The computational complexity of evo-
lutionarily stable strategies,” International Journal of Game Theory, vol. 37,
no. 1, 2008.
[47] Ethier, S. N. and Kurtz, T. G., Markov processes: characterization and
convergence, vol. 282. John Wiley & Sons, 2009.
[48] Even-Dar, E. and Mansour, Y., “Fast convergence of selfish rerouting,”
ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms (SODA), 2005.
[49] Ewens, W. J., Mathematical Population Genetics I. Theoretical Introduction.
Springer, 2004.
[50] Feller, W., An introduction to probability theory and its applications, vol. 2.
John Wiley & Sons, 2008.
[51] Fisher, R., The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection. A complete variorum
edition. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999.
[52] Fitch, W., The Evolution of Language. Approaches to the Evolution of Lan-
guage, Cambridge University Press, 2010.
[53] Fotakis, D., Kaporis, A. C., and Spirakis, P. G., “Atomic congestion
games: Fast, myopic and concurrent,” Algorithmic Game Theory, vol. 4997,
2008.
[54] Fudenberg, D. and Levine, D. K., The Theory of Learning in Games. MIT
Press Books, The MIT Press, 1998.
[55] Galanis, A., Stefankovic, D., and Vigoda, E., “Swendsen-wang algo-
rithm on the mean-field potts model,” APPROX/RANDOM, 2015.
245
[56] Garg, J., Mehta, R., Vazirani, V. V., and Yazdanbod, S., “Etr-
completeness for decision versions of multi-player (symmetric) Nash equilib-
ria,” International Colloquium on Automata, Languages, and Programming
(ICALP), 2015.
[57] Gaunersdorfer, A. and Hofbauer, J., “Fictitious play, shapley polygons
and the replicator equation,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 11, no. 2,
1995.
[58] Ge, R., Huang, F., Jin, C., and Yuan, Y., “Escaping from saddle points—
online stochastic gradient for tensor decomposition,” Conference on Learning
Theory (COLT), 2015.
[59] Gilboa, I. and Zemel, E., “Nash and correlated equilibria: Some complexity
considerations,” Games and Economic Behavavior, vol. 1, 1989.
[60] Harsanyi, J. C. and Selten, R., A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection
in Games. Cambridge: MIT Press., 1988.
[61] Hofbauer, J. and Sigmund, K., Evolutionary Games and Population Dy-
namics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.
[62] Holland, J. H., Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems. MIT Press,
1992.
[63] Istratescu, V., Fixed Point Theory: An Introduction. Mathematics and Its
Applications, Springer Netherlands, 2001.
[64] Kalmus, H., “Adaptive and selective responses of a population of drosophila
melanogaster containing e and e+ to differences in temperature, humidity, and
to selection for development speed,” Journal of Genetics, vol. 47, 1945.
[65] Kawamura, A., Ota, H., R osnick, C., and Ziegler, M., “Computa-
tional complexity of smooth differential equations,” Mathematical Foundations
of Computer Science, 2012.
[66] Kawamura, A., “Lipschitz continuous ordinary differential equations are
polynomial-space complete,” Computational Complexity, vol. 19, no. 2, 2010.
[67] Kelley, J. L., General Topology. Springer, 1955.
[68] Keshavan, R. H., Oh, S., and Montanari, A., “Matrix completion from
a few entries,” IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT),
2009.
[69] Khalil, H., Nonlinear Systems. Prentice Hall, 1996.
[70] Kleinberg, R., Piliouras, G., and Tardos, É., “Multiplicative updates
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